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ABSTRACT 
 
The dual diagnosis of learning disability and mental illness stigmatises and 
disenfranchises those subject to it. It silences the structural and material causes 
of distress, pathologises natural responses to difficult circumstances and 
legitimises the use of restrictive methods of governance. This study used a 
Foucauldian genealogical approach to explore the conditions of possibility for 
the emergence of dual diagnosis in Britain, its attending social practices, and 
the subjugated discourses that could provide alternative ways of constructing 
and responding to the distress that people with learning disabilities may 
experience. Analysis of clinical and social policy documents using Rose’s 
(1999) six perspectival dimensions suggested that dual diagnosis emerged 
within a historical context of governmental concerns regarding population 
control, particularly in relation to economy, productivity and social order. Distal 
conditions of possibility included the establishment of the state’s legal and 
political power over insanity; the medicalisation of idiocy and lunacy; and the 
emergence of disciplinary and biopolitical apparatuses of the state. The 
developmental (re)construction of idiocy opened up a possibility for its co-
occurrence with insanity and presented a conceptual framework that would be 
taken up following deinstitutionalisation, when dual diagnosis offered an 
explanation and potential solution for the social problems caused by those who 
did not settle into the community as desired. Dual diagnosis is neither fixed nor 
inevitable; it is a ‘truth’ produced by power that has been reified and endorsed 
through clinical and government policy and practice. Implications for clinical 
practice, research and policy are discussed. It is proposed that a more helpful 
approach to alleviating distress, poverty and disability is to address the material 
and social causes and the power-networks that sustain these. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
My objective . . . has been to sketch out a history of the 
different ways in our culture that humans develop 
knowledge about themselves: economics, biology, 
psychiatry, medicine, and penology. The main point is not to 
accept this knowledge at face value but to analyze these so-
called sciences as very specific "truth games" related to 
specific techniques that human beings use to understand 
themselves. 
  Foucault, 1988, p. 18 
 
 
1.1 Aims of the research 
This research examines and problematizes the ‘dual diagnosis’ of ‘learning 
disability’ and ‘mental illness’ in Britain using a Foucauldian genealogical 
approach1. This involves mapping out how dual diagnosis is understood and 
acted upon in the present day, followed by an exploration of the historical 
‘conditions of possibility’ for its emergence, its associated social practices, and 
alternative understandings that may have been subjugated. My overall aim is to 
raise critical discussion and debate and thereby create new possibilities for 
thought and action. 
It is important to note that in problematizing diagnostic categories and their 
interpellation, my intention is not to deny that people subject to them experience 
distress, but rather, to question their usefulness as an explanatory framework. 
  
                                                          
1 The genealogical approach employed is described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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1.2 Definitions and language 
‘Dual diagnosis’ is a medical term used to describe two diagnoses in an 
individual. Its contemporary use is most commonly associated with the co-
occurrence of mental health and substance misuse problems (Department of 
Health [DoH], 2002), however, in the context of learning disability, the term is 
used to refer to the co-existence of learning disability and mental health 
diagnoses (Bernal & Hollins, 1995). ‘Learning disability’ and ‘mental illness’ are 
also medical constructs.  
In Britain, within a health and social care context, ‘learning disability’ is most 
commonly defined as ‘a significantly reduced ability to understand new or 
complex information, to learn new skills (impaired intelligence), with a reduced 
ability to cope independently (impaired social functioning), which started before 
adulthood, with a lasting effect on development’ (DoH, 2001a, p. 14). In some 
diagnostic systems such as the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10; World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2016), the historical term ‘mental retardation’ continues to be used, and 
in academia, the term ‘intellectual disability’ is often employed instead. Whilst 
the exact wording may vary, the three core criteria of impaired intelligence, 
impaired social functioning, and onset before adulthood are consistent across 
most definitions (British Psychological Society [BPS], 2000). 
‘Mental illness’ is frequently referred to as a ‘mental health problem’, ‘psychiatric 
disorder’ or ‘mental disorder’, and definitions across the literature are variable. 
The WHO (2001) states that ‘mental disorders . . . are generally characterized . 
. . by some combination of disturbed thoughts, emotions, behaviour and 
relationships with others. Examples are depression, anxiety, conduct disorders 
in children, bipolar disorders and schizophrenia’ (p. 10). 
The ways in which particular groups of people are defined and described have 
significant implications for how they are perceived and responded to by others 
and themselves. For example, the notion that people diagnosed with a learning 
disability have reduced cognitive and coping abilities often translates as 
incompetence, whereas the concept of mental illness carries with it an 
assumption of irrationality (Foucault, 1961/1988). Both categories lead to the 
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perception that these are homogeneous groups of people rather than 
individuals with a range of needs and wishes (BPS, 2011).  
It is important to recognise that it is not the individuals subject to these labels 
who choose to define or understand themselves in this problem-focused way 
(Ryan & Thomas, 1987). Diagnostic categories are generally imposed on them 
by others who have been ascribed the authority to do so (usually psychiatrists 
and psychologists) and who are then granted the power to speak and do things 
on their behalf (Patel, 2003).  
I am mindful that by using these terms (and their historical counterparts) 
throughout my thesis I risk perpetuating and reinforcing their legitimacy. My 
hope, however, is that by offering an account that continually questions the 
origin, validity and reliability of these concepts, the reader will maintain an 
awareness of their inadequacy. 
1.3 Literature review 
the question I start off with is: what are we and what are we 
today? What is this instant that is ours? 
Foucault, 1988/2007, pp. 136-137 
 
1.3.1 Introduction to the literature review 
In this section I use a Foucauldian-informed approach to offer a critical overview 
of how dual diagnosis is currently understood within the learning disability 
literature. ‘Isolating the problem’ and situating it within a network of practices 
and power relations to ‘diagnose the present’ in this way is an important initial 
step in genealogical research (Tamboukou, 1999; see Chapter 3). As such, the 
literature review should be considered a part of the overall analytical work in this 
thesis.  
Most of the subheadings used to structure this review are identical to those 
commonly presented in the literature (epidemiology, policy context, 
assessment, and intervention). Whilst I am mindful that this risks reproducing 
the dominant biomedical discourse, my aim in using these constructs is to 
subsequently problematize them. The literature review ends with some service 
user and carer perspectives relating to dual diagnosis. This is followed by the 
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rationale for the current study and the specific research questions that my 
analysis aims to address.  
1.3.2 Search strategy 
The information presented in this introduction derives from literature focusing on 
the mental health of adults with a diagnosis of learning disability from the 
following sources: 
 Up-to-date editions of clinical psychology text books listed in the Learning 
Disability module reading list for the Professional Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology at the University of East London. 
 Legislation and guidelines produced by government authorities in the last 
ten years. 
 Policy and guidelines produced by: the British Psychological Society (BPS), 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP) and the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the last five years. 
 Clinical and academic research published in English from January 2011 to 
April 2016 in the form of literature reviews, systematic reviews, and meta-
analyses. These were identified through bibliographical database searches 
(see Appendix A for databases and search terms used) and further refined 
by reading titles and abstracts to exclude material that was not directly 
relevant to ‘dual diagnosis’. Only studies relating to Great Britain were 
included. Forensic studies and those that focused predominantly on 
children, challenging behaviour, autistic spectrum disorders (ASD), attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD) or dementia were excluded.  
The above data sources were chosen because it is predominantly within clinical 
literature and through policy that the mental health of people with a learning 
disability is constructed and governed, and because they represent what 
Foucault termed ‘prescriptive’ or ‘programmatic’ texts; documents that describe 
how people ought to behave and how societies ought to be constructed 
(O’Farrell, 2005).   
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1.3.3 The construction of the ‘problem’ of dual diagnosis 
1.3.3.1 Epidemiology 
Epidemiology is a scientific discipline that has been defined as ‘the study of how 
often diseases occur in different groups of people and why’ (Coggon, Rose & 
Barker, 2003, p.1). The ‘knowledge’ collected through epidemiological 
techniques is subsequently used by authorities to justify the planning of specific 
services and implementation of strategies that are designed to predict, prevent 
and manage illness in potentially affected populations (Buckles, Luckasson & 
Keefe, 2013). This led Detels (2015) to state that epidemiology constitutes ‘the 
basic science of public health’ (p. 403). It therefore has political value. 
The important role played by epidemiology in the differentiation, monitoring, 
regulation and subjection of particular social groups to governmental 
interventions is resonant of Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’2. As a technology3 of 
biopower, epidemiology can present a number of problems for those who are 
subject to it. For example, the ‘knowledge’ it gathers ignores the rich context of 
peoples’ lives, reducing them to a set of statistics and probabilities that has a 
totalising effect and creates an impression of homogeneity. Whilst epidemiology 
purports to focus on populations rather than individuals (Detels, 2015), its 
effects can be felt strongly at the individual level. It enables the denomination of 
particular ‘risk groups’ that are produced by the very process of their 
identification. This has the potential to create new social identities and realities 
(Führer & Eichner, 2015), which, for those subject to a dual diagnosis, are often 
negative. 
In the next section I examine recent4 epidemiological research relating to dual 
diagnosis. My aim here is twofold: firstly, to illustrate the lengths to which 
authorities such as researchers, academics and clinicians have gone to study 
and differentiate this group of people from the rest of the population; and 
secondly, to demonstrate the strategic and selective way in which 
epidemiological data have been used to construct a particular ‘truth’ about dual 
diagnosis that is then used to justify particular modes of governance. 
                                                          
2 ‘Biopower’ refers to the power that is deployed to manage the births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses of 
populations (O’Farrell, 2005). 
3 Foucault used ‘technology’ to refer to the collection of practical and intellectual techniques, devices, and tools 
used to shape people’s conduct into particular desired ways of being (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). 
4 In accordance with the search parameters described in Section 1.3.2. 
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1.3.3.2 Prevalence5 
‘People with intellectual disabilities (…) present with three to four times more 
common mental disorders than those without’ (Zaman & Bouras, 2016, p. 688) 
– this is the opening line of the chapter on ‘dual diagnosis’ in the latest edition of 
the Handbook of Intellectual Disability and Clinical Psychology Practice. It is a 
powerful statement that immediately emphasises and problematizes the mental 
health of people with learning disabilities.  
The statement is representative of the current dominant belief about the 
increased prevalence of mental illness in people with learning disabilities (DoH, 
2001a; DoH, 2009; BPS, 2011). When one looks closely at the evidence used 
to support this, however, a number of discrepancies emerge that undermine it. 
These are important to highlight because of the numerous authorities, 
institutions, policies and social practices that have been produced and 
legitimised on the basis of the ‘truth’ of this statement, and the impact of these 
on those subject to them. 
The overall prevalence rates of dual diagnosis reported in published research 
have varied enormously, from less than 10% to more than 80% (Borthwick-
Duffy, 1994; Cooper, Smiley, Morrison, Williamson & Allan, 2007), with the most 
recent review quoting a range of 13.9% to 75.2% (Buckles et al., 2013). 
Similarly wide-ranging prevalence rates have been found in research focusing 
on the diagnosis of specific mental disorders, for example, 6-31% for anxiety 
symptoms (Bailey & Andrews, 2003), and 1-91% for personality disorders 
(Alexander & Cooray, 2003). Findings from studies investigating the same 
mental disorder have been inconsistent, with some studies indicating a higher 
prevalence amongst people with learning disabilities and others finding no 
significant difference (Hatton & Taylor, 2010).  
The wide variation in reported rates has been attributed to a number of factors, 
including the use of different sample populations and sizes, the range of 
diagnoses considered, and the criteria used to define and assess them (Kerker, 
Owens, Zigler & Horwitz, 2004; Whitaker & Read, 2006; Smiley, 2005; Cooper 
et al., 2007). The effects of these methodological variations on reported 
                                                          
5‘Prevalence’ refers to the proportion of people in a given population who have been diagnosed with a particular 
disease or other condition at a specific point in time (Szklo & Nieto, 2007). 
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prevalence rates are illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed in more detail below. 
For comparative purposes, I have marked out the mental illness prevalence rate 
reported for the general population in previous adult psychiatric morbidity 
surveys undertaken in England (16-25%; Meltzer, Gill, Petticrew & Hinds, 1995; 
Singleton, Bumpstead, O’Brien, Lee & Meltzer, 2001; McManus, Meltzer, 
Brugha, Bebbington & Jenkins, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Variation of point-prevalence6 of mental disorder in adults with intellectual 
disabilities: Effect of diagnostic criteria, inclusion/exclusion of autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) and/or problem behaviour (PB) and sampling method (adapted from Buckles et 
al., 2013, p. 202). 
Studies undertaken with ‘administrative’ samples (such as people in psychiatric 
care settings or individuals known to local authorities) tend to report much 
higher prevalence rates than those using ‘population-based’ cohorts (such as a 
sample of all people with a diagnosis of learning disabilities living in a particular 
geographical area; Whitaker & Read, 2006). Problems also arise in the 
inconsistent definition of ‘mental illness’ in different diagnostic manuals and 
tools.  
The most significant discrepancy arises in the inclusion of ‘challenging 
behaviour’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘autistic spectrum disorders’ within dual 
diagnosis prevalence figures (Hemmings, Deb, Chaplin, Hardy & Mukherjee, 
                                                          
6 ‘Point prevalence’ refers to a snapshot of the rate present at that particular point in time (Buckles et al., 2013). 
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2013). In Cooper et al.’s (2007) study, the inclusion of these categories almost 
doubled the prevalence rate (from 22.4% to 40.9%); a pattern evident in other 
studies, including Corbett (1979), Lund (1985), and Cooper and Bailey (2001). 
The classification of ‘behaviour problems’ as a ‘mental disorder’ is encouraged 
by diagnostic manuals that have been produced specifically for the assessment 
of mental illness in people with a learning disability such as the DC-LD 
(Diagnostic Criteria for Psychiatric Disorders for Use with Adults with Learning 
Disabilities/Mental Retardation; RCP, 2001; see section 1.3.4.4.2).  
Another problem is the way in which comparisons with the ‘general’ population 
are frequently vague or lack validity. For example, Cooper et al. (2007) stated 
that the 40.9% prevalence rate in their study was ’higher than [that] observed in 
the UK general population’ (p. 32), citing ‘Singleton et al (2001) as their 
evidence, but without specifying the comparison rate. Whilst the rate in question 
(23%) is indeed much lower, as Singleton et al (2001) did not assess for ASD, 
ADHD or behavioural disorders, the two figures are not directly comparable. 
When these diagnoses are excluded from the Cooper et al. (2007) study, the 
overall prevalence rate is brought down to a more comparable 20.9%. 
There are a number of additional problems in how the data are selectively and 
rhetorically reported. In spite of the variability and sometimes even explicit 
acknowledgement of a lack of confidence in findings (e.g. NICE, 2016a), most 
studies go on to conclude that mental health problems are indeed more 
frequent in people with learning disabilities than in the general population – if 
not for all diagnoses, then at least for some. When a range of rates is reported 
that could represent both significant and non-significant findings, it is nearly 
always the higher figures that are emphasised and cited in subsequent studies 
and policy. It is also interesting that when findings are non-significant, rather 
than considering the possibility that they might indicate that people with learning 
disabilities are not that different from the general population (or indeed that they 
may be more resilient to mental health problems), authorities conclude that this 
lower rate must be an underestimation of the ‘real’ prevalence, maintaining that 
the mental health problems of people with learning disabilities are particularly 
complex and difficult to detect (Hassiotis & Turk, 2012). Some of the challenges 
outlined in the ‘identification’ of mental health problems in people with learning 
disabilities are discussed below. 
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It is commonly argued that people with learning disabilities have a reduced 
ability to self-report thoughts and emotions verbally or reliably, due to a 
combination of cognitive and communication difficulties, developmental delay, 
reduced confidence, a tendency to acquiesce, additional neurological, sensory 
or mental health needs, and/or medication side effects (NICE, 2016a). This 
constructs and positions them as complex, vulnerable individuals who struggle 
to express their emotions and whose views about their own lives are unreliable 
and/or untrustworthy.  
Without an insight into an individual’s internal world it is not possible to meet the 
diagnostic criteria for some categories of mental illness (Dagnan & Lindsay, 
2012). Consequently, it is argued that there is a need to rely on other people to 
notice and report changes in presentation (Moss, Prosser, Ibbotson & Goldberg, 
1996). 
It is also claimed that there is a general lack of awareness about the ways in 
which mental health problems can manifest differently in people with learning 
disabilities (particularly those with more severe disabilities) due to the 
hypothesised effect of developmental level on psychopathology (Sovner, 1986; 
Sovner & Hurley, 1986; Sturmey, 1995). For example, rather than expressing 
the ‘classic’ symptoms associated with depression such as hopelessness or 
guilt (intellectually complex concepts that researchers argue require a 
developmental age7 of around seven years; Cooper, Melville & Einfeld, 2003; 
RCP, 2001), someone with a ‘severe learning disability’ will never reach this 
‘mental age’ and might present with the ‘behavioural equivalents’ of aggression 
or social withdrawal instead (Sovner & Hurley, 1982, 1986; Cooper et al., 2003; 
Hurley, 2008)8.  
The concept of ‘diagnostic overshadowing’ (Reiss, Levitan & Szyszko, 1982), 
whereby the causes for symptoms that might be indicative of a physical or 
mental health problem are inadvertently attributed to the learning disability itself 
is also quoted often as a reason for under-reporting. For example, attributing 
social withdrawal to poor social skills rather than an underlying mental illness 
                                                          
7 Developmental age refers to a measure of an individuals’ functioning in social, emotional, intellectual or physical 
domains in comparison to the chronological age at which most individuals demonstrate that level of functioning 
(Corsini, 2002). 
8 Another example is the behavioural manifestation of mania as restlessness, insomnia, irritability or agitation 
(Sturmey, Laud, Cooper, Matson & Fodstad, 2010). 
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(Taylor, Lindsay & Willner, 2008). Recently, the ‘misdiagnosis’ of mental illness 
as ‘challenging behaviour’ has also been highlighted (see chapter 3). 
Other reasons include a lack of well-developed, reliable and valid standardised 
assessment measures of mental health designed specifically for people with 
learning disabilities (Deb, Matthews, Holt & Bouras, 2001), and a lack of 
specialist training for carers and professionals (Quigley, Murray, McKenzie & 
Elliot, 2001). 
There are a number of problems to note here. The ‘truths’ outlined above 
position people with learning disabilities as always-already9 vulnerable to 
mental illness, constructing them as complex individuals who struggle to 
express their emotions, whose views about their own lives are likely to be 
unreliable (and therefore untrustworthy) and who, because of their ‘atypical’ 
presentation, are inherently ‘different’ from everybody else. These are strong 
deficit-centric and highly pathologising statements that reinforce the 
subordination of people with learning disabilities and risk disenfranchising them 
further (Williams & Heslop, 2005). By positioning people with learning 
disabilities in this way, authorities construct a complementary identity for 
themselves as the ‘helper’ or the ‘protector’, legitimising their own role and 
power (Boyle, 2003). By drawing on a discourse of ‘complexity’, and criticising 
the knowledge and (in)actions of carers and other professionals, ‘specialist’ 
practitioners reinforce their own authority over the dually diagnosed. 
1.3.3.3 Aetiology: Causes, associated characteristics and risk factors 
There has been considerable interest in identifying possible reasons for the 
perceived higher prevalence of mental illness in people with learning disabilities. 
The dominant theory is that it is caused by a combination of three inter-related 
factors: an increased risk of biological vulnerabilities (NICE, 2016a; O’Brien & 
Yule, 1995; Zaman & Bouras, 2016); an increased likelihood of adverse life 
events and circumstances (Cooper et al., 2007; Martorell, Tsakanikos, Pereda, 
Gutiérrez-Recacha, Bouras & Ayuso-Mateos, 2009); and fewer psychological 
resources than the general population (van den Hout, Arntz & Merkelbach, 
2000). Whilst this biopsychosocial model recognises the influence of people’s 
                                                          
9 ‘Always-already’ refers to the idea that the subject positions we take up are already determined by proposed and 
imposed sociocultural discourses rather than something we can create for ourselves independently of power 
relations and practices (Foucault, 1984 in Fornet-Betancourt, Becker & Gomez-Müller, 1987). 
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social and environmental experiences on mental health, these are viewed as 
triggers rather than causes (which continue to be attributed to underlying 
biological vulnerabilities; Read, 2005). 
A summary table of the specific risk factors highlighted in the literature can be 
found in Appendix B. Although these have sometimes been presented as 
‘causes’, they generally represent associations rather than causal connections. 
In general, research findings for aetiological studies have been mixed, with 
some studies finding an association between dual diagnosis and a particular 
risk factor and others not. For example, some studies have found an increased 
prevalence of mental disorders amongst people with more severe learning 
disabilities (e.g. Cooper et al., 2007; Kerker et al., 2004; Bhaumik, Tyrer, 
McGrother & Ganghadaran, 2008), whilst others have not (e.g. Whitaker & 
Read, 2006; Bouras & Drummond, 1992). The lack of consistent findings is 
perhaps to be expected, particularly when one considers the wide range of 
factors being considered and the likelihood that causation is multifactorial and 
complex, and, importantly, unique to each individual. Despite this, as Zaman 
and Bouras (2016) note, the search for ‘a model that can be used in all clinical 
situations’ (p. 689) continues, in the hope that ‘with further research a better 
picture will emerge’ (pp. 689-690). Although such universal models may be 
helpful at a public health level, the problem is their assumption that human 
beings are homogeneous and that it is possible to capture an objective, 
universal ‘truth’ about them. They do not take cultural variations or individual 
circumstances into account.  
The next section looks at the contemporary responses to the ‘problem’ of dual 
diagnosis, in terms of policy, service design, case identification (assessment), 
and strategies to prevent and manage the mental health problems of people 
with learning disabilities. 
1.3.4 The management of dual diagnosis 
A number of ‘solutions’ have been offered in response to the ‘problem’ of dual 
diagnosis. These include techniques of surveillance and examination, such as 
screening for mental health problems at annual physical health checks and 
undertaking a comprehensive assessment when mental health problems are 
suspected. They also include the implementation of different types of 
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pharmacological and psychological interventions to manage the mental health 
(and behaviour) of people with learning disabilities. These ‘solutions’ or 
strategies can be viewed as practices of governmentality, which Foucault 
defined as a form of activity that aims to ‘shape, guide or affect the conduct of 
some person or persons’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 2)10.  
Current approaches to assessment and intervention in dual diagnosis are 
described in sections 1.3.4.4 and 1.3.4.5. First I will offer an overview of the 
policy context and service delivery models relevant to the mental health of 
people with learning disabilities. These can be viewed as forming part of the 
‘solution’ because of the important role they play in legitimising the governance 
of the dually diagnosed. 
1.3.4.1 Policy context 
Public policy is a technology of power, created to regulate and discipline 
people’s behaviour, and is used to justify and legitimise socio-political practices 
and institutional arrangements (Colebatch, 2002). It describes not just how the 
Government is addressing a particular social, economic or political problem, but 
how it intends to do so in the future (Anderson, 2015). Rather than a simple 
outcome of scientific, political or legal processes, or originating from a central 
force such as the ‘State’, policy is a product of a vast network of power 
relations. Demands for its creation may arise from a variety of actors: the 
general public, particular interest groups, service users, public or government 
officials, or anyone else holding an interest in a particular issue. This wide range 
of stakeholders has increasingly been directly involved in the process of policy 
development. Without their support (and that of their affiliated institutions), it is 
difficult to legitimise or deploy policy (Anderson, 2015), thus power can be seen 
as emerging and acting from below as well as above. Easy-read versions of 
policy documents relevant to people with learning disabilities are being 
increasingly produced, increasing the ability of this group of people to become 
more informed and involved in the political arena.  
Policy and guidelines are productive, creating or redefining roles, identities, 
authorities and institutions. Through them, and because of the ‘specialist 
                                                          
10 Foucault (1978/1991) also used the term to refer to ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form 
of power’ (p. 102). 
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knowledge’ they have acquired about human behaviour, a variety of ‘psy-
professionals’ such as psychologists, psychiatrists and other health and social 
care workers have been invested with ‘the authority to act as experts in the 
device of social rule’ (Rose, 1993, p. 285). ‘Psy-professionals’ and their 
accompanying knowledges therefore constitute important technologies of 
governmentality. They cannot be seen solely as agents of the State, however. 
The same ‘expert’ knowledge and truths that enabled their authority to be 
granted in the first place ensures the maintenance of their power status.  
The involvement of service users in service development is often a policy 
recommendation for both mental health and learning disability services (NHS 
Health Advisory Service, 1997; Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities 
[FPLD], 2004), in recognition that they are 'experts by experience' and thus in a 
key position to comment on and take on roles within service development 
(Hoole & Morgan, 2010). Service users with learning disabilities have 
themselves noted that there should be ‘nothing about us without us’ (DoH, 
2001b). 
Such initiatives have the potential to increase feelings of personal agency and 
enable people with learning disabilities to gain more control over their lives 
(Dearden-Phillips & Fountain, 2005). However, the focus of consultation and 
involvement is often set by those in power, who decide what questions to ask 
and what answers to publish, rather than research being designed by service 
users themselves. Moving beyond token consultation and delivering the 
requested outcomes have therefore been challenging tasks. 
1.3.4.1.1 Policy relating to dual diagnosis 
Underpinning all current learning disability policy in England is the fundamental 
principle that people with learning disabilities have the same human rights as 
everyone else (Human Rights Act 1998; United Nations Convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities, 2006). The most well-known documents are 
the Valuing People White Papers (DoH, 2001a, 2009). These set out strategies 
for learning disability services based on the four core principles of legal and civil 
rights, promoting independence, giving choice to individuals and encouraging 
social inclusion. Whilst these have provided a helpful focus and supported the 
implementation of important changes, because White Papers represent 
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government proposals for future legislation rather than a firm commitment, 
many saw them as being optional, and there has been a substantial gap 
between policy and practice (Joint Committee on Human Rights [JCHR], 2008; 
DoH, 2005). 
Although a handful of documents relating specifically to the mental health of 
people with learning disabilities had been created prior to 2005 (most notably 
the first Mansell report; DoH, 1993), the last ten years (and five years in 
particular) have seen a vast increase in the production of reports, guidelines 
and policy on dual diagnosis. The main driver for this recent proliferation was 
the 2011 Winterbourne View scandal, where the physical and psychological 
abuse of people with learning disabilities living at the hospital was exposed by a 
BBC Panorama investigation (see section 3.3.7). An ensuing review by the DoH 
(2012) set out a plan of action to review and transform services for people with 
learning disabilities or autism who also have mental health conditions or 
‘challenging behaviours’. Key pledges included the development of clinical 
guidelines on challenging behaviour by Summer 2015, and on dual diagnosis by 
Summer 2016.  
The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 is particularly relevant to people with a 
dual diagnosis. Although one of the Act’s principles is that capacity is presumed 
unless demonstrated otherwise, having a ‘learning disability’ and/or ‘mental 
illness’ is sufficient grounds for questioning someone’s capacity: 
a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he 
is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter 
because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the 
mind or brain11. . . . It does not matter whether the impairment or 
disturbance is permanent or temporary. (Mental Capacity Act, 2005, s2)  
The NICE (2016a) guidelines state that ‘all staff are accountable in ensuring 
that the person’s capacity to make specific decisions is assessed’ (p. 32), 
including consenting to any assessment and treatment offered. People should 
be supported to make their own decisions wherever possible, and, for those 
who lack capacity, the best interests process should be followed for any 
decisions that need to be made on their behalf.  
                                                          
11 Examples listed in the MCA code of practice include ‘conditions associated with some forms of mental illness’ and 
‘significant learning disabilities’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs [DCA], 2007, p. 44). 
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The Mental Health Act (MHA) 2007, whilst not specific to people with learning 
disabilities, is also important, as it allows for the detainment and treatment of 
individuals against their will should there be significant concerns about their 
mental health. Through the MHA, the medical psychiatric discourse can be used 
to control, exclude and impose treatment on those subject to it (Bracken & 
Thomas, 2001).   
1.3.4.2 Clinical and professional practice guidelines 
Recommendations regarding clinical interventions for the assessment, 
prevention and management of specific mental health problems in England are 
largely provided by NICE in the form of evidence-based ‘clinical guidelines’. 
These are developed by ‘independent’ committees comprising ‘experts’ and 
service user representatives, with draft guidelines open to commentary from 
interested stakeholder groups. The organisation itself is accountable to the 
DoH, a power arrangement that may reduce its ability to be truly independent 
and affect what is prioritised and accepted. 
Moncrieff and Timimi (2013) demonstrated how NICE guidelines are formed in 
the context of power and knowledge relationships, and the significant effect that 
these and other social and political influences have on the way in which 
‘evidence’ is interpreted and selected. Problems highlighted included the lack of 
consideration given to critical literature that challenges the validity of psychiatric 
diagnoses, and the consequent privileging of medicalised understandings and 
legitimising of biomedical approaches such as treating emotional and 
behavioural problems with psychotropic medication. They also noted the 
privileging of particular research designs such as randomised control trials 
above others (Goldenberg, 2006), which can be particularly problematic in the 
case of dual diagnosis due to small sample sizes, limited funding for these kinds 
of studies, and ethical concerns around informed consent that result in the 
routine exclusion of people with learning disabilities from most research. 
Another area of concern was the way in which the medicalisation of human 
distress can benefit particular organisations such as pharmaceutical companies, 
and the financial conflicts of interest that exist between authors and these 
companies (Conrad, 2007).  
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Other problems include the way in which NICE clinical guidelines restrict 
professional autonomy and choice, implicitly or explicitly discouraging the use of 
other approaches that have not (yet) met the stringent criteria for evidence. 
Service user choice is limited for similar reasons.  
1.3.4.2.1 Clinical guidelines relating to dual diagnosis 
NICE guidelines relating to dual diagnosis were published in September 2016. 
These state that they pre-existing NICE guidelines should continue to be used 
to guide the support offered to people with learning disabilities and that their aim 
is to highlight adjustments that might be needed to ensure equality of care and 
support for them (NICE, 2016a). The BPS (2016) has recently produced a 
publication outlining the range and effectiveness of psychological therapies 
available to people with learning disabilities, and the RCP (2016) has produced 
guidelines on the prescription of psychotropic drugs for mental health or 
challenging behaviour. 
1.3.4.3 Service delivery models 
‘Services’ are the sites within which technologies of power are deployed, 
wherein conduct becomes officially constituted as ‘problematic’ and as requiring 
intervention, and where ‘expert’ authorities act upon it to improve it (Rose & 
Miller, 1994). 
Government policy has set a clear expectation that wherever possible and 
appropriate, people with learning disabilities should access mainstream 
services for their physical and mental health needs. It has also emphasised the 
importance of having ‘specialist’ services for those with more complex needs 
(Association of Directors of Adult Social Services [ADASS], Local Government 
Association [LGA] & NHS England [NHSE], 2015). Mental health services 
provided by the NHS are delivered in a stepped-care model as follows: 
1.3.4.3.1 Primary care 
The general practitioner (GP) is usually the first point of contact when there are 
physical or mental health concerns (NICE, 2016a). These are usually raised by 
those who deem the person’s behaviour ‘problematic’, rather than the person 
with a learning disability themselves (Beail & Jahoda, 2012); it is those who 
deem their behaviour to be ‘problematic’ who typically raise concerns. Concerns 
17 
 
might also be identified at the annual health checks offered to people on the 
‘Learning Disability Register12’. When a mental health problem is suspected, the 
GP initiates treatment or refers to a secondary mental health or learning 
disability service if the presentation appears complex (NICE, 2016a). One of the 
problems with this regular monitoring and the site within which it takes place is 
that it inevitably leads to higher numbers of people being identified. It always-
already involves a medicalised construction of and response to distress, and 
may result in the unnecessary medicating of people who might have responded 
to other approaches. 
1.3.4.3.2 Secondary care  
Community mental health teams (CMHTs) 
CMHTs support people with a moderate degree of mental health need (Joint 
Commissioning Panel for Mental Health [JCPMH], 2013). They are usually 
Psychiatry-led and tend to privilege a medical understanding of mental health 
difficulties. The inclusion of people with learning disabilities in this mainstream 
service has been challenging, with users reporting access difficulties (BPS, 
2011; Michael, 2008), poorer support and, in many cases, negative experiences 
(Bouras & Holt, 2004). CMHT staff often express not feeling appropriately 
skilled to meet their needs (Naylor & Clifton, 1993); a feeling that may be 
reinforced by dual diagnosis specialists’ own emphasis on the ‘expert’ 
knowledge that may be required.  
Community learning disability teams (CLDTs) 
CLDTs comprise health and social care professionals with specific ‘learning 
disability’ expertise, including nurses, social workers, psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists and speech therapists 
(Cooper & Bonham, 1987; NICE, 2016a). There is some overlap between 
professions, which can enable a more flexible and holistic approach but can 
also lead to lack of role clarity, ‘territoriality’ and discipline elitism (Hanley, 
2000). As well as delivering direct interventions, CLDTs may provide support to 
enable people with learning disabilities to access mainstream services (ADASS, 
LGA & NHSE, 2015).  
                                                          
12 In the UK, GP practices are financially rewarded for keeping a register of patients with learning disabilities 
through the ‘Quality and Outcomes Framework’ scheme. 
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Mental health in learning disability (MHiLD) teams 
In some areas of the country, psychologists, psychiatrists and community 
psychiatric nurses have moved away from CLDTs to form specialist MHiLD 
‘hubs’. These support people with learning disabilities who have more severe 
and/or complex mental health needs, and link into CLDTs, CMHTs and other 
more specialist services (such as forensic). One of the dangers in the formation 
of these separate teams is the reinforcement of the notion that people with 
learning disabilities have needs that are different and more complex than those 
without this label. There is also a risk of interventions becoming increasingly 
medicalised in the absence of close working relationships with other disciplines. 
Another disadvantage is that MHiLD teams are unable to offer the wider range 
of expertise and approaches available in mainstream mental health services 
(such as trauma or substance misuse; RCP, 1996). Moreover, specialist 
services do not provide the same level of crisis and out-of-hours support as 
mainstream services. 
1.3.4.3.3 Tertiary / Inpatient care  
As a last resort, those with acute and severe mental health needs may be 
detained or admitted to hospitals specialising in forensic, psychiatric, learning 
disability, and/or neuropsychiatric conditions (RCP, 2013). Medication is the 
predominant treatment here, although there are usually opportunities for 
occupational, psychological or creative therapies. Locked wards, and chemical 
and physical restraint are common, and  within these environments people with 
learning disabilities have very little power. Research indicates that many 
hospital admissions could be prevented with better community support, and that 
many people are remaining in hospital for long periods of time despite being fit 
for discharge (ADASS, LGA & NHSE, 2015).  
Whilst having such a wide range of options to meet the mental health needs of 
people with learning disabilities may be helpful, it can also be extremely 
confusing for users, referrers and service providers alike. Each will have their 
own eligibility criteria, and inappropriate referral may result in a delayed service. 
People are frequently passed from service to service and may ‘fall through the 
gaps’ (FPLD, 2002).  
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Having described the policies guiding the governance of people with a dual 
diagnosis and sites within which this occurs, I now examine the assessment 
processes through which the behaviours and emotions of people with learning 
disabilities come to be constructed as problematic, followed by the ways in 
which these are governed through particular ‘interventions’. 
1.3.4.4 Assessment 
Mental health assessment is an important technology of power; a dividing 
practice that separates the ‘mad’ from the ‘sane’ and that secures a legitimate 
authority over the government of those who come under the medical, 
psychiatric or psychological gaze. The focus on diagnosis positions assessment 
firmly within a medical model, subjugating alternative understandings of 
distress. 
1.3.4.4.1 General principles for assessment 
NICE (2016a) guidelines recommend coordination of mental health 
assessments in people with learning disabilities by professionals with specific 
expertise in dual diagnosis (typically Psychiatrists), recognising and reinforcing 
their authority of in this field. The guidelines also encourage the involvement of 
family, carers and other professionals, thus extending the gaze and authority to 
other people in the individual’s life. They promote an in-depth and 
comprehensive assessment, not just of the primary complaint, but of all 
potential psychiatric and physical pathology, social circumstances, level of 
learning disability, and risk. In this way, authorities gain power and control over 
the entirety of a person’s life; not just of the mind but also the body. Whilst the 
word ‘strengths’ is included amongst the list of areas to explore, the emphasis 
of assessment is very much on deficit, which could further stigmatise individuals 
already disempowered by their learning disability diagnosis.  
1.3.4.4.2 Assessment tools: Technologies of diagnosis 
Diagnostic classification systems are the main tools of the psychiatric 
profession. These both construct and are constructed by psychiatric knowledge, 
and through them, the application of psychiatric power is authorised. Diagnostic 
systems continue to be regarded as accurate reflections of objective diseases 
or disorders (Reich, 2000), despite the lack of evidence for any specific 
biological or genetic causal markers for mental illness (Bentall, 2004). 
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Numerous criticisms about the validity of such classifications, and evidence that 
their construction has been politically and socially driven have not significantly 
undermined the scientific status accorded to diagnosis and the tools for their 
‘identification’.  
In Britain, the most frequently used tool for the classification and diagnosis of 
mental illness is the ICD-1013 (WHO, 2016). Whilst this can be used with people 
with a mild learning disability and good communication skills (Clarke et al., 
1994), for those with moderate to severe learning disabilities, the DC-LD14 
(RCP, 2001) is recommended. The DC-LD is based on the premise that mental 
illness in people with learning disabilities presents atypically (because of delays 
to their emotional and cognitive development), and uses behavioural 
manifestations of mental illness to aid its identification in people with more 
severe impairments who are unable to verbally report on their internal world 
(RCP, 2001).   
The DC-LD is considered a valid and reliable assessment tool because it 
matches the diagnostic prevalence rates generated by the ‘gold standard’ of 
clinical judgement (Cooper et al., 2003). However, as noted in section 1.3.3.2, 
this is likely to be a consequence of both these methods categorising ‘problem 
behaviours’ as ‘mental disorders’, unlike other diagnostic systems. Only a 
handful of researchers have highlighted the controversial nature of this practice, 
and the potentially damaging effects that this lowering of diagnostic thresholds 
might have (McBrien, 2003; Tsiouris, Mann, Patti & Sturmey, 2003). So much 
emphasis has been placed on the superiority of the DC-LD over conventional 
diagnostic systems that its validity has not been thoroughly questioned. It has 
become somewhat of a ‘bible’ for learning disability psychiatrists, dominating 
much of the current thinking about dual diagnosis in clinical practice and 
research and, like its ‘mainstream’ counterparts, playing a significant role in the 
reification of mental disorders (and of dual diagnosis itself). 
1.3.4.4.3 Implications of diagnosis 
The use of diagnostic systems may give a sense of legitimacy, confidence and 
predictability to individuals, carers and professionals (Gergen, Hoffman, & 
                                                          
13 In the US, the DSM-V (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; American Psychiatric Association 
[APA], 2013) is used instead. 
14 In the US, the DM-ID (Diagnostic Manual – Intellectual Disability; Fletcher, Loschen, Stavrakaki & First, 2007) is 
used instead. 
21 
 
Anderson, 1996). However, they locate the problem within the individual, and 
ignore the role played by socio-political, economic and historical contexts, such 
as the higher deprivation, health inequalities and physical and attitudinal 
barriers that people with learning disabilities often experience (Emerson & 
Hatton, 1994; Gillman, Heyman, & Swain, 2000; Williams, 1996). Whilst 
diagnoses may enable access to health and social support, in the case of dual 
diagnosis, this often leads to people being excluded from or falling between 
services. 
Diagnosing someone is far from a neutral endeavour and has a significant 
impact on people’s subjectivities. Diagnoses ‘bring forth pathology, create 
problem saturated identities, and construct careers as patients and cases’ 
(Gillman et al., 2000, p. 403), limiting and delimiting how a person understands 
themselves and are understood by others (Roberts, 2005). They characterise 
people as unable to govern themselves and encourage dependency on 
‘rational’ others to govern them (Roberts, 2005). The ‘dual diagnosis’ label is 
particularly problematic because it carries with it stigma associated with both 
learning disability and mental illness diagnoses. It could create a social status of 
a ‘double pariah’ (Szymanski & Grossman, 1984, p. 156), and result in the 
further disempowerment of people with learning disabilities (Williams, 1999).  
The predominantly biomedical way in which the problem of dual diagnosis is 
constructed sets up particular ways of responding to it that are necessarily 
consistent with its medical conceptualisation. It is to these forms of government, 
or ‘interventions’ that I now turn. 
1.3.4.5 Interventions 
1.3.4.5.1 Pharmacological interventions 
Pharmacological interventions refer to the prescription of psychotropic drugs, 
including antipsychotics, antidepressants, anxiolytics and mood stabilisers. It is 
the primary mode of treatment in the management of dual diagnosis, despite 
little evidence for its effectiveness. It has been argued that people with learning 
disabilities are the most overmedicated group in society (Matson & Mahan, 
2010), and that medication is used as a form of chemical restraint for 
challenging behaviour, rather than treatment of an underlying mental illness 
(PHE, 2015). Polypharmacy is common (McGillivray & McCabe, 2004), and 
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there is substantial evidence that medication is used for long periods of time 
without a clear justification or adequate review (Public Health England [PHE], 
2015). 
One of the main problems with psychotropic medication, and antipsychotics in 
particular, is their significant side effects, which can range from dry mouth, 
weight gain and sedation to more serious and sometimes permanent metabolic, 
neurological and physiological damage (Matson & Mahan, 2010; Jenkins, 
2000). Medication can also produce the very behavioural symptoms that are 
considered indicators of mental illness, and could thus lead to new or extended 
diagnoses (McBrien, 2003). Another problem with pharmacological approaches 
is that they tend to be used in isolation, and do not address the psychosocial 
factors that might be influencing a person’s distress. Whilst the RCP (2016) 
recommends that antipsychotics only be used in combination with psychological 
(or other) interventions, this is not particularly emphasised, and in the NICE 
(2016a) guidelines, this recommendation is entirely absent.  
1.3.4.5.2 Psychological interventions 
From a Foucauldian perspective, psychological therapies are a manifestation of 
‘confession’ (Foucault, 1998, p. 58), a power-knowledge relation where a client 
is encouraged to disclose their inner thoughts and feelings to a therapist who 
judges and acts upon them in accordance with what their body of knowledge or 
theoretical framework deems to be ‘normal’ (Roberts, 2005). Clients are invited 
to internalise this framework and inscribe within themselves this power-
knowledge relation to become self-governing individuals (Foucault, 1998; 
Roberts, 2005). 
Historically, emotional and behavioural difficulties expressed by people with 
learning disabilities were assumed to be environmentally contingent or 
organically mediated (BPS, 2016). It was not believed that they possessed the 
intellectual ability or emotional understanding to benefit from talking therapies 
and consequently, behavioural therapies were the psychological treatment of 
choice. Whilst these remain popular, particularly for ‘challenging behaviour’, 
over the past decade the range of psychological therapies available to people 
with learning disabilities has expanded considerably to include those that had 
been available to the general population for some time. These include cognitive 
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behavioural therapy, psychodynamic approaches, narrative therapy, systemic 
therapy and ‘third-wave’ approaches such as mindfulness and acceptance and 
commitment therapy.  
The evidence-base for psychological therapies for people with learning 
disabilities is limited compared to the general population (Gustafsson et al., 
2009; Prout & Browning, 2011), largely due to the methodological constraints 
noted in section 1.3.3.2. ‘Knowledge’ about what ‘works’ comes primarily from 
practice-based research originating in specialist services (BPS, 2016). 
However, because practice-based research is not perceived to be sufficiently 
‘scientific’, it has not been included in the NICE (2016a) guidelines.  
In order to make these approaches more accessible to individuals with learning 
disabilities (and presumably increase compliance), NICE (2016a)a variety of 
personalised adaptations are recommended, for example, shorter sessions, 
simplified manuals and protocols, and the use of visual materials (NICE, 
2016a). Carers are encouraged to be involved, not just to provide additional 
support within or between sessions but also to develop and agree intervention 
goals (NICE, 2016a), thus ensuring an extended gaze and surveillance of 
individual’s behaviours, thoughts and feelings outside the clinic. 
1.3.5 Service user and carer views 
The biomedical discourse is not only dominant amongst professionals, it is also 
entrenched in the culture and belief systems of society at large (Gillman et al., 
2000). Many carers seek diagnosis to explain their relative’s experiences and 
anticipate the outcomes to be generally beneficial (for example access to social 
and medical support). Whilst this may be the case for some people, the 
negative consequences of receiving a diagnosis (see section 1.3.4.4.3) have 
prompted alternative conceptualisations of disability and distress.  
The social model of disabilities is a civil rights approach that was developed by 
people with physical disabilities in the 1970s and 80s. The model argues that 
disability is created through the political, social, economic, cultural and 
psychological exclusion of people with ‘impairments’ rather than by the 
impairment itself (Oliver, 1990; Barnes, 1991). Whilst people with a learning 
disability were largely absent from its original conceptualisation, authors such 
as Chappell (1998) argue that it can and should be extended to this group. It is 
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argued that with the right support, people with learning disabilities should be 
able to achieve the same things as everybody else.  
Other authors have argued that the impairment-disability dichotomy does not 
adequately recognise the historical social-political construction of ‘learning 
disability’ (Goodley, 2001; Rapley, 2004) and that embodied notions of 
‘impairment’ are not appropriate for people with learning disabilities for whom 
this impairment is inferred (Goodley & Rapley, 2001). The social model has 
been criticised by others for its lack of recognition of the ‘realities’ of impairment 
(Crow, 1996; Shakespeare, 2006) and recent trends argue for a medical and 
social continuum of disability that recognises that everyone is impaired in some 
way, not just disabled people (Shakespeare, 2006).  
Duggan (2002) advocates a social model of mental distress, which draws on the 
social model of disability in terms of its emphasis on service user expertise, 
power, exclusion and oppression, but which engages with individuals’ inner 
worlds more fully and links their experiences with external factors more 
explicitly. The model views mental distress as a response to intolerable life 
experiences and focuses on people’s needs rather than their diagnosis 
(Williams & Heslop, 2005).  
Alongside these social models, people with learning disabilities are increasingly 
finding a voice through self-advocacy groups, particularly People First (Goodley, 
1998). These have provided a public forum for the views and actions of people 
with learning disabilities to become known. They recognise people’s 
competence and resilience and can offer a framework for resistance (Chappell, 
Goodley & Lawthom, 2001). The subjectivities portrayed by this strengths-
based movement contrast sharply with the vulnerable and unreliable individual 
that is constructed by the psy-professions and other authorities. 
1.4 Rationale for study and research questions 
In this introduction, I have presented some of the problems with dual diagnosis 
and the ways in which certain truth claims have been used to promote social 
practices and legitimise authorities that are not always helpful to those who are 
subject to them.  
If we are to critically analyse the ongoing influence, applications and 
implications of the dual diagnosis label for people’s subjectivities, it is necessary 
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to capture the underlying ‘conditions of possibility’ (the ‘preconditions’) for its 
emergence, and the ‘dimensions of materiality, history and institutional practice 
in which it is embedded’ (Hook, 2005, p.26).  
References to the historical emergence of the dual diagnosis concept (e.g. 
Bongiorno, 1996; Bouras & Holt, 2004) tend to adopt a grand, progressive 
narrative emphasising the long overdue empirical discovery and recognition of 
the ‘truth’ about the mental health of people with learning disabilities. Alternative 
discourses have been marginalised and silenced, and the influence of power on 
these truth claims has rarely been acknowledged.  
The aims of this study, as stated in section 1.1, are to create new possibilities 
for thought and action by mapping out and exploring the conditions of possibility 
for the emergence of the dual diagnosis concept in Britain, its associated social 
practices, and alternative understandings that may have been subjugated.  
In order to do this, I will focus on the following research questions: 
1. How was dual diagnosis ‘made’ possible?  
2. What has held it in place? 
3. What have been the dominant discourses and their implications? 
4. What have been the subjugated discourses and how might these allow 
alternative understandings of the distress experienced by people 
diagnosed with a learning disability?  
  
26 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Epistemology 
This thesis is undertaken from a critical realist ontological position within a 
postmodernist social constructionist epistemological framework.  
In contrast with Western traditional ‘realist’ approaches (which assume there is 
a single reality that is fixed, measurable and observable), social constructionist 
approaches argue that numerous constructions of the world are possible, and 
that what becomes regarded as ‘truth’ is dependent on specific social, cultural 
and historical factors (Burr, 2003). Adopting a social constructionist perspective 
enabled me to take a critical stance toward ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge about 
‘dual diagnosis’, and explore the different ways in which the mental health of 
people with ‘learning disabilities’ have and could be understood.  
In order to adequately address issues of embodiment15, materiality16 and 
power17, I adopted a weaker version of social constructionism that allows for the 
existence of a world external to discourse (Willig, 2013). This enabled me to 
acknowledge the influence of extra-discursive social and material realities that 
structure and constrain our subjectivities and actions, such as the broader 
economic, political, institutional, legal and professional contexts (Willig, 2013). 
Harper (2011) has described this version of social constructionism as ‘critical 
realist social constructionism’ (p. 8), which is epistemologically relativist but 
ontologically realist. This position ‘acknowledges that our knowledge of the 
world is necessarily mediated by, and therefore also constructed through, 
                                                          
15 By ‘embodiment’ I am referring to the ways in which peoples’ subjectivities and actions are constituted by and 
through their biological/physiological body, and the discourses, cultural practices and person-social histories 
inscribed therein (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999). 
16 ‘Materiality’ refers to the physical nature of the world, and the tangible aspects and qualities of the ‘things’ 
within it, including the distribution of resources, the arrangement of space, and the positioning of bodies (Cromby & 
Nightingale, 1999). 
17 Please see section 2.2.3 for a detailed description of how I am conceptualising ‘power’ in this thesis. 
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language . . . while maintaining that there are underlying structures and 
mechanisms that generate phenomena’ (Parker, 1992, p. 141).  
2.2 Genealogy 
‘Genealogy’ is a Nietzschean conception and term that was adopted by the 
French philosopher Michel Foucault to describe the historical mode of inquiry he 
used in his work from the 1970s onwards. Foucault did not attempt to theorise 
or describe a universal methodology of genealogy, revising and customising his 
approach to the particular ‘problem’ he was trying to address at the time 
(Garland, 2014). He famously stated: ‘I would like my books to be a kind of tool 
box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use 
however they wish in their own area’ (Foucault, 1974/1994, p. 523). 
Consequently, genealogy has been understood and interpreted in different 
ways by different people, and it can be challenging to grasp and apply it. My 
own understanding has been shaped by the reading of a range of theoretical 
texts, genealogical studies and Foucault’s own work, as well as discussions 
with supervisors, colleagues and peers. A number of themes and key features 
have emerged from this process, namely: the ways in which genealogy differs 
from traditional historiography; the analysis of ‘emergence’ and ‘descent’, and 
the centrality of power in Foucault’s work. These are explained below. 
2.2.1 Genealogy vs traditional historiography 
Genealogies do not search for ‘origins’ (Foucault, 1977); they are not concerned 
with finding out what ‘truly happened’, to unearth something that was already 
there to be discovered, or to ‘capture the exact essence of things’ (p. 142). 
Rather than attempting to capture a precise object of knowledge, genealogy 
focuses on the processes and practices within which the object came to be 
seen as ‘truth’, to demonstrate that ‘there is no truth but truths, no reason but 
rationalities, no knowledge but knowledges of the ways people have come to 
understand themselves and the world’ (Tamboukou, 1999, pp. 210-211). 
Conventional historical analyses tend to present teleological accounts, 
describing history as a progressive linear development from a single point of 
origin towards an inevitable and meaningful end point (Burr, 2003). In contrast, 
genealogy documents the discontinuous process by which the past became the 
present – one that is haphazard, contingent and accidental (Sembou, 2011; 
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Hook, 2005; McNay, 1994). Whilst simultaneously retaining sensitivity to the 
recurrence of events and indeed to those occasions when they are absent 
(Foucault, 1977), genealogy focuses on identifying instances of events that are 
an exception to what is assumed as self-evident. This attentiveness to ‘buried’ 
or delegitimised knowledges enables the development of a counter-memory 
that can destabilise taken-for-granted truths and thus free up space for 
alternative ways of thinking and acting. 
Traditional histories use present-day concepts and meanings to understand and 
interpret past events when these may have been constituted quite differently 
and thus not be commensurate with the way in which they are experienced 
today (Tamboukou, 1999; Sembou, 2011). One example of this would be to 
claim that what was termed ‘idiocy’ in the nineteenth century is the same as 
what is defined as ‘learning disability’ today.  
Finally, whereas traditional history tends to place self-reflective subjects at the 
centre of events, genealogies view social and political practices as strategies 
without strategists rather than resulting from individual or collective 
psychological motivations: ‘no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can 
glory in it, since it always occurs in the interstice’ (Foucault, 1971, p. 150). 
2.2.2 Analysis of ‘emergence’ and ‘descent’ 
Instead of a search for origins or truth, Foucault elaborates genealogy as an 
analysis of ‘emergence’ and ‘descent’ (Tamboukou, 1999). Together, these 
principles aim to ‘fragment that which is presented as unitary and ahistorical on 
the one hand, and to destabilize assumptions of origin and continuity on the 
other’ (Hook, 2005, p. 23).  
 Emergence: The analysis of emergence attempts to grasp the very ‘moment 
of arising’. This is not a case of locating the ‘birth’ of a metaphysical object 
that had been awaiting discovery, but of unearthing the field of action within 
which it was brought into being. Analysis of this ‘surface of emergence’ 
involves plotting the multiple and complex processes that constitute it 
(Foucault, 1981), delineating the force relations in the diverse systems of 
subjection within which things appeared as events (Tamboukou, 1999). 
 Descent: Analysis of descent refers to the process of exploring the ‘lineage’ 
of objects or social types (Hook, 2005). However, rather than attempting to 
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identify a single ‘ancestor’, or point of origin, it aims to trace the numberless 
beginnings and historical transformations of people’s practices (Tamboukou, 
1999). Descent also explores the regimes that have enabled concepts to 
become ‘formalized objects of knowledge and targets for intervention’ 
(Butchart, 1998, p. 9, cited in Hook, 2005). By exposing the heterogeneity of 
what had been conceived as consistent, the analysis of descent disturbs and 
fragments what was previously thought immobile and unified (Foucault, 
1977). 
2.2.3 Emphasis on Power 
Foucault outlines a number of methodological considerations in the analysis of 
power that distinguish it from more traditional liberal and Marxist theories18: 
 Power is a relation, not a ‘thing’ owned by the State or anybody else: Power 
is a complex network of relations between individuals and groups that 
involves the whole social body, operating at the most micro-levels of social 
relationships (O’Farrell, 2005). Power is the result of these relations rather 
than their cause (McHoul & Grace, 1993). It should be analysed as 
something that circulates, a system within which individuals are merely 
vehicles who simultaneously experience and transfer power rather than being 
the points of its application (Foucault, 1977/1980). Power can only exist when 
it is being exercised, so for example, a king can only be a king if he has 
subjects (O’Farrell, 2005). 
 Power is productive as well as constraining: It generates particular types of 
behaviours, knowledges, institutions and subjectivities. It serves not just to 
dominate or repress, but also to make individuals ‘more intelligent, wise, 
happy, virtuous, healthy, productive, docile, enterprising, fulfilled, self-
esteeming, [and] empowered’ (Rose, 1996a, p. 12). Foucault argued that it is 
always possible to react and behave in different ways, noting that ‘there is no 
power without potential refusal or revolt’ (Foucault, 1986/2000, p. 325). 
Foucault also argued that power and knowledge are inseparable, building on 
each other so that specific types of knowledge are produced through the 
exercise of power and used to reinforce it further (Foucault, 1975/1991).   
                                                          
18 Liberal and Marxist theories characterise power as something that can be acquired, and that is usually deployed 
by a higher authority (such as the State) to control or oppress others. 
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2.3 Rationale for Genealogy 
I opted for genealogy because I felt that it would be the most suitable 
methodology to address my aims and research questions. A traditional 
discourse analysis would not have allowed for the analysis of power or the 
historical dimension enabled by a genealogy. I considered interviewing those 
involved in the promotion and development of the dual diagnosis concept in 
1980s Britain, and perhaps this might have helped me identify some of its more 
beneficial and productive aspects. However, I was conscious that this might 
resemble the progressive medical histories that are already available and miss 
out the distal conditions of possibility for its emergence. Another alternative 
would have been to interview individuals subject to dual diagnosis. This would 
have given me a good understanding of its current impact on people’s 
subjectivities and lived experiences but neglected the historical dimensions 
pertaining to the dual diagnosis itself. 
Psychological knowledge is produced in and through history, yet Psychology as 
a discipline has tended to search for empirical, ‘ahistorical’, universalising, 
internal and depoliticising explanations (Hook, 2005; Pilgrim, 2008). The psy-
complex has actively contributed to the ongoing medicalisation of people 
described as having learning disabilities and mental health problems, whether 
through their role and power in defining and diagnosing them, formulating 
understandings of experiences of distress within particular conceptual 
frameworks, or determining what (if any) treatment or support is given (Goble, 
1998).  
Genealogy can be a helpful way of thinking more critically about our present 
practices, including the deconstruction of the authority that the ‘psy’ disciplines 
have been accorded to pronounce on the ‘truth’ of this group of people. If 
clinical psychologists are to achieve their profession’s aim of promoting ‘valued, 
inclusive lives for people with learning disabilities’ (BPS, 2011, p. 1), it is 
important for them to be aware of what has led to the emergence of 
contemporary understandings of mental health issues in learning disability, the 
role that they play within these, and the alternative ways in which they may wish 
to think and practice. 
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2.4 Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations 
In this section I describe the models and ideas relating to reflexivity and ethical 
considerations adopted in my research, giving a more personal, contextualised 
account in section 2.4.3. 
2.4.1 Reflexivity 
Qualitative research explicitly acknowledges the influence that researchers’ own 
perspectives and experiences may have had in the research process, and 
explores these through the practice of ‘reflexivity’ (Burr, 2003). This is in 
contrast to positivist research, which strives to present authors and researchers 
as ‘neutral observers’ who are detached, objective and impartial (Silverman, 
1997). 
Willig (2013) distinguishes between two types of reflexivity:  
 Personal reflexivity involves a consideration of how the research may have 
been shaped by the researcher as a person, by their own ‘values, 
experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and 
social identities’ (p. 10). It also involves reflecting on how undertaking the 
research may have affected and possibly changed the researcher, personally 
and professionally. 
 Epistemological reflexivity relates to theoretical stance, and considers how 
the research has been shaped by the researcher as a theorist or thinker 
adopting particular assumptions about knowledge and the world. It looks at 
the implications (and possible limitations) of these assumptions for the 
research and its findings. 
Researchers’ subjectivities are often viewed as ‘biases’ that may compromise 
the rigour of research, however, as Willig (2013) asserts, researchers’ 
motivations should not be constructed in this way; they are an important factor 
in making research possible, and their responses to it may even allow for 
particular insights and understandings that would not otherwise be conceivable.  
Foucault (1977) moves beyond researcher subjectivity, advocating an 
awareness of and accounting for one’s own ‘entry into knowledge’ – not as an 
individual, but as a participant of a particular discipline (as a ‘Psychologist’, for 
example) and an attention to the formation of the discipline itself (Hook, 2005). 
32 
 
Foucault also recognises the role played by the researcher in the production of 
knowledge (Rose, 1999), and in the next section I consider some of the ethical 
considerations regarding the production and application of the knowledge 
produced herein. 
2.4.2 Ethical Considerations 
Notwithstanding the perspectival nature of the genealogical study I produce 
here, it still contains moral and political dimensions that can have 'material 
effects' (Jóhannesson, 2010). For example, it could ‘disrupt longstanding 
notions of selfhood, gender, autonomy, identity and choice’ (Morgan, 2010, p. 4) 
of the subjects implicated in the analysis. Whilst not an aspect that is within my 
control, it is also important to consider how findings may be used by others 
(Lee, 2000), for example to justify or legitimise particular courses of action or 
non-action.  
Ethical approval was not required as there were no participants in my research. 
Documents used are available in the public domain.  
2.4.3 Personal account 
The idea for this thesis was borne out of my previous experience working in an 
adult learning disability psychology service that was in the process of moving 
away from the CLDT to form one of the specialist MHiLD teams described in 
section 1.3.4.3. This shift had a number of potentially negative implications for 
the subjectivities of service users, and it raised some questions for me about 
the political, economic and professional motivations for such a move. My prior 
training had privileged scientific knowledge and deficit-focused models of 
understanding difference, and although I did not yet have an awareness of the 
critical literature, on a personal and professional level I had also become 
frustrated with the limitations that biomedical frameworks had on the 
subjectivities of those I worked with and on my own ability to work creatively 
with them. My thinking was shaped further by my experience of being a trainee 
clinical psychologist on a course that promotes a critical approach (Harper, 
Patel, Davidson & Byrne, 2007), particularly through the attendance of lectures 
that highlighted the fragility of the concept of mental illness, and the historical 
contingency of psychological knowledges and practices. 
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These experiences and reflections led me to opt for a methodology that enables 
me to question the naïve realist assumptions that are dominant within 
contemporary practices generally and those relating to dual diagnosis more 
specifically. However, I am aware that this is a difficult position to maintain for a 
number of reasons, including my own long-term socialisation into the scientist-
practitioner model within Psychology, the fact that I myself belong to the social 
apparatus and act as an ‘authority’ within it (Deleuze, 1992), my lack of 
experience with dual diagnosis at a personal level, and my inexperience with 
post-structuralist qualitative methodologies. In line with my epistemological 
positioning, it is also important to acknowledge that my research findings will 
represent an alternative perspective or interpretation, rather than the ultimate 
‘truth’ about dual diagnosis. 
I have taken a number of measures to help me address some of these tensions 
and challenges, including exploring them at supervision, with other peers 
undertaking Foucauldian-informed analyses, and keeping a reflective research 
journal (see Appendix C). Further reflections about these aspects following the 
completion of my research are discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.5 Procedure 
This section describes how I operationalised the principles of genealogy 
outlined in section 2.2 to enable a genealogically-informed analysis of dual 
diagnosis. 
2.5.1 Doing a Genealogy 
As stated earlier, Foucault did not provide a detailed description or step-by-step 
approach of how to undertake a genealogy. In developing my own ‘steps’ for 
doing a genealogy I was guided in particular by: Tamboukou (1999), Sembou 
(2011), and Garland (2014) for the preliminary stages of ‘diagnosing’ and 
problematizing the present, as well as the development of a dispositif (see 
below); Hook (2005) and Sembou (2011) for the analysis of ‘emergence’ and 
‘descent’; Carabine (2001) for the application of Foucauldian analysis to 
historical social policy documents; Rose (1999) for the analytical lenses; and 
Hawksley (2013) and Prescott (2013) for examples of how to adapt the above to 
a clinical psychology doctoral thesis. Whilst I present what appears to be a 
linear procedure, it is important to note that in a genealogical investigation, the 
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processes of collecting, analysing and interpreting data are entwined and 
dynamic, informing each other and often taking the researcher in unexpected 
directions (Carabine, 2001; Foucault, 1984/1988).  
The ‘first’ step was to isolate the ‘problem’ of ‘dual diagnosis’ (Tamboukou, 
1999). This involved capturing how it is understood and experienced ‘in the 
terms current today’ (Foucault, 1984/1988, p. 262), and ‘diagnosing’ the present 
through the interrogation and disturbance of what has become accepted as the 
‘truth’ (Sembou, 2011; Tamboukou, 1999; Garland, 2014). This is what my 
‘Introduction’ chapter aimed to achieve. 
The next step involved formulating a dispositif19 (Tamboukou, 1999), outlining 
the network of power relations between the ‘procedures, practices, apparatus 
and institutions’ (Carabine, 2001, p. 276) that might relate to the problem of dual 
diagnosis: ‘what was and is being said and done, by whom to whom, and to 
what effects’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 200). I attempted to do this visually 
(see Appendix D), to help me establish more readily what may be holding ‘dual 
diagnosis’ in place and hence what the analytical points might be for the next 
stage of my enquiry; for example, how did Psychiatry and Psychology become 
the main authorities in the governance of people with a dual diagnosis?  
I then looked at the surface of emergence within which dual diagnosis was 
brought into being, mapping the various force relations, systems and events 
that made it possible to emerge when and how it did. Alongside, I traced its 
historical descent, identifying the regimes that enabled it to become an object of 
knowledge as it is understood today, and tracking the ways in which events and 
practices involved in its history have changed or stayed the same (see section 
2.2.2).  
The above ‘steps’ were informed by Rose’s (1999) ‘perspectival dimensions’ 
(described in detail in section 2.5.3). I also made a chronology of events relating 
to the emergence of dual diagnosis to help me navigate through its complex 
history (see Appendix E). 
  
                                                          
19 Dispositif is the term Foucault used to describe ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault, 1977/1980, p. 194). 
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2.5.2 Selecting a corpus of statements 
The process of selection of my corpus of statements20 for analysis was guided 
by my research aims. I was also mindful of Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine’s 
(2008) advice on this subject, such as including historically-variable samples 
that reflect the diversity of discursive practices, and that identify their 
transformation over time and across different institutional spaces. 
2.5.2.1 Sources of data  
Data sources for analysis comprised legislation, official reports, policy 
documents and guidance published by the government or professional 
organisations; and academic and clinical research published in psychological or 
psychiatric journals or books. As outlined in chapter 1, my decision to focus on 
these types of documents was influenced by Foucault’s own interest in 
‘prescriptive’ or ‘programmatic’ texts. It was also driven by the suggestion that 
the object of ‘dual diagnosis’ first emerged within the psychiatric literature (RCP, 
2003) and the authority that has been ascribed to the psy-professions within the 
fields of mental health and learning disability. 
Wider reading was undertaken to help me contextualise the analysis within a 
broader social, political, legal, economic and professional framework. This 
included Foucault’s own work21, critical disability literature (e.g. Tremain, 2005; 
Rapley, 2004), and existing historical studies relating to learning disability, 
mental illness and dual diagnosis (e.g. Wright & Digby, 1996; Borsay, 2005; 
Dale & Melling, 2006; McDonagh, 2008; Pilgrim & Rogers, 2014; Menolascino, 
1970; Turner, 1989; Berrios, 1994), as well as the professions of Psychiatry and 
Clinical Psychology (e.g. Bewley, 2008; Hall et al., 2015).  
2.5.2.2 Search Strategy 
Foucault (1977) stated that genealogy ‘requires patience and a knowledge of 
details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material’ (p. 140).  
However, within the time constraints and confines of this thesis it was 
necessary to impose some pragmatic restrictions in relation to the type and 
                                                          
20 A corpus of statements (Foucault, 1969/2002) refers to a collection of discursive facts or formations; a text or 
social institution that reflects the ‘gaze’ of those who produced it and thus articulates the power relations of those 
involved (Letherby, Scott & Williams, 2013). 
21 In particular: Madness and Civilization; The Birth of the Clinic; Psychiatric Power; Discipline and Punish; The 
History of Sexuality; and Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. 
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quantity of material analysed, as outlined below. Carabine (2001) notes that 
these kinds of restrictions do not necessarily limit the value of the analysis, as 
genealogy need not trace the full history of particular moments in order to yield 
useful information about the imbrication of power and knowledge, or indeed 
about the construction of the problem. The final corpus of statements that this 
study was based on is listed in Appendix F. 
 Legislation, official reports, policy documents and guidance: documents 
relating specifically to the mental health of people with learning disabilities in 
Britain were identified through online searches of the BPS (www.bps.org.uk), 
the RCP (www.rcpsych.ac.uk), NICE (www.nice.org.uk) and the National 
Archives (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk). In order to trace how 
the construction and government of people with a dual diagnosis may have 
changed over time, I also used my reading, reference lists and archives to 
identify reports, policy and guidance that are now considered ‘out-of-date’. 
Searches were not limited to a particular time-frame, as I was interested in 
tracing the first time categories historically associated with learning disability 
and mental illness had been differentiated and legislated for. Once I had 
identified this as being 1324, and because there Official documents formed 
the bulk of my corpus of statements. 
 Academic and clinical research: For the analysis of emergence I used 
Menolascino (1970) as my point of departure, as this publication is frequently 
cited as being the ‘origin’ of the ‘dual diagnosis’ term itself. By undertaking a 
search of the ‘dual diagnosis’ term in academic publications22 from 1800-
2015, I discovered that it had in fact emerged in the 1980s. From the search 
results and through my reading I identified that the first books published 
about, and referring specifically to ‘dual diagnosis’ were Menolascino and 
McCann (1983) in the US, and Bouras (1994) in the UK. I added these 
publications to my corpus of statements as they offered a comprehensive 
representation of how dual diagnosis was being constructed at the time and 
could help me highlight potential conditions of possibility for its emergence. 
When I became aware that classifications historically associated with mental 
illness and learning disability had previously come together as co-occurring 
diagnoses, I decided to use this earlier iteration of dual diagnosis as the 
                                                          
22 See Appendix A for databases and search terms used. 
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starting point of the ‘emergence’ part of my analysis. I undertook a further 
literature search23, this time using historical terms and limiting my search to 
the period up to and including 1919. I knew from my reading that by then 
there had been a number of publications referring to the possibility of dual 
diagnosis, and that after the Mental Deficiency Act 1913, the population 
being studied had changed significantly. I complemented this literature with 
publications cited in contemporary histories of dual diagnosis, selecting those 
that appeared to be particularly relevant to how dual diagnosis is understood 
and practiced today. 
The documents identified for the introduction (see section 1.3.2) were also used 
to help trace emergence and descent.  
2.5.3 Tools and process of analysis 
2.5.3.1 Perspectival dimensions 
My analysis was guided by the six ‘perspectival dimensions’ that Nikolas Rose 
(1999) outlined in the preface to the second edition of his book Governing the 
Soul, namely: Problematizations, Explanations, Technologies, Authorities, 
Subjectivities and Strategies. Rose (1999) suggested that considering these 
interlinked dimensions can help uncover the various elements and relations that 
have contributed to the emergence of how we think, judge and act today. 
Rose’s ‘perspectival dimensions’ are described below, followed by examples of 
questions pertinent to ‘dual diagnosis’ that I used in the analysis of my corpus of 
statements. 
 Problematizations: This is a concept fundamental to Foucauldian theory 
that looks at the processes by which particular things have come to be seen 
as ‘problems’ or ‘problematic’ and in need of intervention (Foucault, 1985; 
Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). According to Rose (1999), this dimension looks at 
the different concerns (e.g. moral, political, economic), institutional sites (e.g. 
courts, schools, asylums), authorities (e.g. medical, legal, religious), criteria 
(e.g. norms, requirements, regulations) and ‘dividing practices’ (e.g. normality 
from pathology, madness from rationality) that have contributed to the 
emergence, definition and management of ‘problems’. 
                                                          
23 See Appendix A for databases and search terms used. 
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 Explanations: These refer to the ways in which something has been 
described and constructed that have enabled it to acquire a status of ‘truth’, 
for example, through the use of particular language or concepts, the 
employment of particular domains of evidence, criteria of demonstration or 
proof, and the forms of visibility, remarkability and calculability bestowed 
(Rose, 1999). 
 Technologies: This dimension focuses on how what has been deemed as 
‘true’ happens at a technical or material level. ‘Technologies’ encompass the 
various knowledges, instruments, techniques, persons, systems of 
judgement, buildings and spaces that have been devised to shape human 
conduct in directions that are in accordance with wider political, economic 
and moral strategies (Rose, 1996b). These assemblages of procedures, 
practices and tactics enable government to work at a distance (Miller & Rose, 
2008). They establish not only how people come to be known and acted 
upon, but how they come to know and act upon themselves (see 
‘subjectivities’ below).  
 Authorities: Within this dimension, Rose (1999) draws our attention to those 
who have sought, claimed or been given the authority or ability to ‘speak 
truthfully about humans, their nature and their problems’ (p. 27). It looks at 
who those persons are, what types of authority they exert, and where. It 
investigates how their authority came to be sanctioned (through which 
apparatuses, using what techniques), the conflicts and alliances between 
different claims to authority, and how authorities themselves are governed. It 
also examines the relation between authorities and those who are subject to 
them (e.g. doctor and patients, manager and employee, priest and 
parishioner). 
 Subjectivities: When analysing subjectivities, Rose (1999) emphasises four 
main areas:  
i) ontology (how human beings have come to be known, for example, as 
spirit, as soul, or as beings who possess consciousness, will, feelings, 
beliefs, and desires; as individualised or collectivised);  
ii) epistemology (how it is possible to ‘know’ human beings, for example 
through practices of observation, examination, or confession); 
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iii) ethics (the type of ‘selves’ that people should aim to be, for example, 
honourable, wise, self-controlled, autonomous and content;  
iv) technical (the practices and procedures people must apply to themselves 
if they are to achieve their ethical goals of autonomy, freedom and self-
fulfilment.  
As noted earlier, subjectivities are constituted through the effects of various 
technologies of power and of the self that are in keeping with wider socio-
political, moral and economic strategies.  
 Strategies: These relate to the ways in which regulatory practices link in with 
the wider moral, social and political objectives for the governance of 
populations (for example, maximising its fitness through eugenics, or using 
mental hygiene to minimise the cost of social maladjustment; Rose, 1999). 
This dimension looks closely at the relations and divisions between ways of 
governing conduct that have been accorded the status of ‘political’, and those 
authorities and apparatuses that are deemed ‘non-political’ (such as the 
‘expert’ knowledge of psychiatrists, or the ‘natural’ knowledges of the family; 
Rose, 1996). It includes a consideration of the role played by the psy-
practitioners within the broader governmental framework. 
2.5.3.2 Questions to guide analysis 
Problematizations:   How, where, why and by whom are the emotions and 
behaviours of people with learning disabilities being rendered problematic? 
According to what systems of judgement and in relation to what concerns do 
they become characterised and treated as a mental illness? 
 
Explanations:   How is ‘dual diagnosis’ being described and constructed? 
What concepts and explanatory systems are used to evidence it as truth? 
What is prioritised and emphasised? What alternative meanings and 
explanations are silenced or ignored?  
 
Technologies:   What are the procedures and practices used to judge, 
classify and categorise people as ‘dually diagnosed’? What techniques are 
used to guide the conduct of people who are subject to this classification? 
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Within which institutions do practices associated with ‘dual diagnosis’ take 
place and how are these institutions organised? 
 
Authorities:   Who is accorded the authority to speak of and/or act upon dual 
diagnosis and how did this come to be? What supports or legitimises this 
authority? What governs it? What is the relation between authorities and 
those who are subject to it? Where is there resistance to the dominant 
authority/ies and what impact does this have? Is there any space for people 
with ‘dual diagnoses’ to be authorities or experts of their own lives? 
 
Subjectivities:   What types of subjectivities are presumed and produced 
through the discourses and practices associated with ‘dual diagnosis’? What 
are the effects of these? What subjectivities are being constrained and what 
alternative ways of thinking and being might these subjectivities allow? 
 
Strategies:  What are the wider moral, social and political aspirations for the 
governance of people with a ‘dual diagnosis’? How are the regulatory 
practices associated with ‘dual diagnosis’ linked with these aims? What roles 
do political and non-political authorities and apparatuses play in the 
government of people with a ‘dual diagnosis’, and what are the relations and 
divisions between them? 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
How have we become what we are and what are the 
possibilities of becoming ‘other’?  
Tamboukou, 1999, p. 215 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter maps out and explores a number of historical, cultural, political and 
socio-economic ‘conditions of possibility’ for the emergence of dual diagnosis in 
Britain and its associated social practices, as well as alternative understandings 
of distress that may have been subjugated. 
I have chosen to present my analysis in the form of a broad chronological 
account to facilitate the reader’s experience of the narrative. Consistent with 
Foucault’s principle of non-linearity, however, a ‘discontinuous history’ is 
emphasised throughout by exposing multiple contingencies and shifts in 
power/knowledge networks that have influenced the present state of affairs. 
This includes the examination of a number of events that challenge the 
dominant discourse or that have been subjugated in mainstream accounts.  
The analysis is divided into two main sections: 
 Section 3.2 focuses on the analysis of ‘descent’ as outlined in section 
2.2.2. It examines the historical ‘lineage’ of the dual diagnosis of learning 
disability and mental illness, exploring the different systems of thoughts 
that enabled particular ideas associated with these two diagnoses to 
emerge, and tracing the multiple beginnings and transformations in 
people’s practices throughout history. In other words, it looks at how the 
surface of emergence was made possible. 
 
42 
 
 Section 3.3 focuses more explicitly on dual diagnosis itself, offering a 
more detailed analysis of the ‘surface of emergence’ into which it was 
brought into being. As explained in section 2.2.2, this involves mapping 
out diverse events and force relations that made it possible for dual 
diagnosis to emerge when it did, and the multiple and complex 
processes that constitute and maintain both its constructed nature and 
the attendant practices it supports. 
The sections above comprise a number of subsections, each incorporating a 
constellation of events or ‘conditions of possibility’ within a particular time period 
that can be traced back from the ways in which dual diagnosis has come to be 
constructed and governed in the present day. The precise content of each 
subsection varies, however, in general, most contain: an exploration of how 
particular individuals and populations came to be considered ‘problematic’ and 
in need of intervention in relation to broader social, political, economic or moral 
contemporaneous concerns; an analysis of the strategies and practices linked 
with the governance of such individuals or groups; and the implications of this 
deployment of power for those subject to it. Within each subsection I consider 
how these events and power networks may have contributed to how we think 
about, judge and act upon dual diagnosis today. I also identify subjugated 
discourses, and consider how these might enable alternative ways of thinking 
and acting in relation to the distress that people diagnosed with a learning 
disability may experience.  
It is important to note that it would not be possible (nor is it my intention) to 
undertake a comprehensive analysis of all the events that are implicated in, or 
could have contributed to, the emergence of dual diagnosis. Rather, my 
analysis is driven by the research questions I am aiming to answer (see section 
1.4), the selection of ‘prescriptive texts’ as my data source (such as policy 
documents and clinical research), and the attention to discontinuities outlined 
above, all within the context of the constraints inherent in a doctoral thesis that I 
described in section 2.5.2.2. 
3.2 Analysis of descent 
In this section, I analyse the historical lineage and transformations of a number 
of events that constitute various conditions of possibility for the emergence of 
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dual diagnosis and its associated social practices. In the analysis of descent I 
will be focusing on the more distal conditions of possibility for the emergence of 
dual diagnosis (research question 1), as well as examining the dominant and 
subjugated discourses associated with them (research questions 3 and 4). The 
aims here are to demonstrate the constructed nature of the two diagnoses that 
constitute dual diagnosis, namely learning disability and mental illness; and to 
identify some of the historical antecedents that have been picked up and 
circulated in the understanding and practice of dual diagnosis in the present 
day.  
In section 3.2.1 below I examine how the power networks implicated in the legal 
creation and differentiation of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ in the beginning of the 
fourteenth century shaped how learning disability and mental illness – the two 
diagnoses that constitute dual diagnosis today – came to be constructed, 
differentiated and governed in later years. 
3.2.1 The creation, differentiation and governance of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ 
in early English Law: De Praerogativa Regis 1324 
Although references to both idiocy and lunacy can be traced back to Greek and 
Roman societies in the fourth and fifth century B.C.E. (Ryan & Thomas, 1987), 
the first time these terms were codified and differentiated in English Law is 
thought to have been in the 1324 statute of King Edward II known as De 
Praerogativa Regis24 (McGlynn, 2005). This statute gave the monarch 
jurisdiction over the persons and property of those (usually men) who were 
deemed incapable of looking after their own affairs, including those who had not 
yet come of age and those of ‘unsound mind’ (Wright & Digby, 1996)25. 
In late medieval England, the feudal system of land tenure and ownership 
represented an important source of royal revenue. Therefore, those who might 
struggle or feel disinclined to maintain their lands or pay rent posed an 
economic problem for the King (McDonagh, 2008). To protect this income and 
                                                          
24 This translates as ‘On the King’s Prerogative’. 
25 Berkson (2006) notes that many of the items in the Praerogativa Regis can be traced back to the 
Digest of Justinian – an extensive codification of Roman laws from the 6th century C.E. that specified the 
legal requirements and rights of those deemed as lacking understanding due to a variety of sensory or 
mental disorders (including those who were deaf [surdus], blind [caecus], mute [mutism], cognitively 
impaired [demens or fatuus], insane or lunatic [furiosus or insanus], and exceptionally disreputable 
[turpitudine notabilis]), such as owning and managing property, making a will, or getting married. 
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preserve the patrimony of land ownership, a system was needed that facilitated 
the governance of these ‘problem’ individuals. One of the ways in which this 
was enabled was through the development of ‘statutes’– written enactments of 
a legislative authority (in this case, the King) – that problematized particular 
behaviours or kinds of people, and stipulated how they should be governed (in 
much the same way as laws and policy do today). In Foucauldian terms, 
statutes constituted a technology of power that enabled the enactment of 
‘sovereign power26’ (Foucault, 1975/1991). 
The De Praerogativa Regis created a number of legal entities that those who 
were not looking after their own affairs could be subjected to, and that explicitly 
or implicitly questioned their competency or capacity to do so. Of particular 
relevance to dual diagnosis were the categories of ‘Idiot’ and ‘Lunatick’: 
Section 11, relating to ‘The Custody of Lands of Idiots’, dictated that:  
The King shall have the Custody of the Lands of natural Fools, taking the 
Profits of them without Waste or Destruction, and shall find them their 
Necessaries, of whose Fee soever the Lands be holden ; and after the 
Death of such Idiots he shall render [it (the same)] to the right Heirs, so 
that such Idiots shall not aliene, nor their Heirs shall be disinherited. 
(Record Commission, 1810/1963, p. 226) 
This meant that when people were identified as ‘idiots’ or ‘natural fools’ (fools 
from birth), the King took custody of their lands and kept all profits generated 
therein, using a small portion of these to meet the idiot’s basic needs 
(Neugebauer, 1996). Upon the idiot’s death, his heirs would be able to assume 
control of the estate by purchasing their claim to the lands from the King 
(McDonagh, 2008). 
‘Of Lands of Lunaticks’ (section 12), stated that: 
Also the King shall provide, when any, that beforetime hath had his Wit 
and Memory happen to fail of his Wit, as there are many [per lucida 
intervalla (with lucid Intervals)] that their Lands and Tenements shall be 
safely kept without Waste and Destruction, and that they and their 
                                                          
26 ‘Sovereign power’ is a system of government that operated in feudal societies based on the power of 
the king as the representative of God on earth, to whom allegiance was owed and whose laws required 
compliance with (O’Farrell, 2005).  
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Houshold shall live and be maintained competently with the Profits of the 
same, and the Residue besides their Sustentation shall be kept to their 
Use, to be delivered unto them when they come to right Mind; so that 
such Lands and Tenements shall in no wise (within the aforesaid time) 
be aliened; and the King shall take nothing (of the profits) to his own Use. 
And if the Party die in such Estate, then the Residue shall be distributed 
for his Soul by the Advice of the Ordinary. (Record Commission, 
1810/1963, p. 226)  
This meant that the King would assume custody of the lands of those who were 
judged as having lost their ‘wit’ or reason later in life (referred to as ‘non compos 
mentis’ and later ‘lunatic’), that the revenue generated from those lands would 
be used for the upkeep of both the individual and their household, and that the 
lands and any profits made would be returned to the individual when (and if) he 
regained his wits or, if he did not recover, to his heirs upon his death 
(McDonagh, 2008). 
In order to deploy this statute, a system was needed that enabled the 
identification and differentiation between those who were (likely to be) able to 
meet their land-owning duties and those who could not – a ‘dividing practice’ 
(Foucault, 1982) that separated the ‘competent’ from the ‘incompetent’. This 
was achieved through the establishment of ‘inquisitions’ – examinations 
undertaken before a jury by local government officials (known as ‘escheators’) 
that judged whether or not someone was an ‘idiot’ or a ‘lunatick’ (McGlynn, 
2005). If the Crown became aware of a potential ‘idiot’ or ‘lunatick’ with personal 
wealth or assets (usually through a relative or government official), writs were 
issued that commanded a king’s representative to  
…diligently inquire, if the same I. be a Fool or Idiot, as aforesaid is, or 
not; and if he be, then whether from his birth or from another time; and if 
from another time, then from what time, and in what manner, and how 
(Fitzherbert, 1534/1718, p. 519) 
The evidence gathered was presented before the jury, and the person in 
question was examined against a set of criteria broadly relating to the 
government of financial affairs and other qualities desirable in the maintenance 
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of patrimony and patrilineage (McDonagh, 2008). To assess and establish 
idiocy, a fairly rudimentary form of assessment was used: 
And he who shall be said to be a Sot and Idiot from his Birth, is such a 
Person who cannot acompt or number Twenty-pence, nor can tell who 
was his Father, or Mother, nor how old he is, etc. so as it may appear 
that he hath no understanding of Reason what shall be for his Profit, or 
what for his Loss: But if he have such Understanding that he know, and 
understand his Letters, and do read by Teaching or Information of 
another Man, then it seemeth he is not a Sot, nor a natural Idiot. 
(Fitzherbert, 1534/1718, p. 519)  
Bearing a resemblance with the process of assessment for learning disability in 
the present day, if the person was able to demonstrate good orientation, 
intellect and memory through the pragmatic tests above, idiocy was ruled out. 
The examination then proceeded to an evaluation of reasoning and judgement 
in everyday life to help determine whether the person had lost their ‘Wit’. 
Possibly disturbed thoughts or behaviour were noted and used to support 
conclusions of lunacy (Neugebauer, 1996), much like the psychiatric 
assessment of mental illness today. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, 
individuals’ physical appearance, health, daily life and habits were also 
incorporated into examinations (Neugebauer, 1996); areas (amongst many 
others added since) that continue to be assessed by authorities in dual 
diagnosis today (see section 1.3.4.4) and that reflect the ever-increasing 
penetration of power and surveillance into everyday life for the purposes of 
identifying those who might struggle to meet particular socio-political and 
economic aspirations. 
The specific causes for the ‘unsound mind’ were not a concern, although they 
were recorded during inquisitions. Whilst contemporary authors writing about 
dual diagnosis (such as Szymanski & Crocker, 1989; and Scheerenberger, 
1987) have emphasised a dominance of supernatural or theological 
explanations for idiocy and lunacy until the eighteenth century, in his analysis of 
parish records relating to the application of the De Praerogativa Regis statute, 
Neugebauer (1979) demonstrated that most royal officials and private 
individuals actually proposed physical and psychological aetiologies. Rushton’s 
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(1988) examination of poor law records from 1600 to 1800 found a similar 
dominance of causal references to physical injury and grief. 
Whatever the probable cause, individuals subject to the De Praerogativa Regis 
statute were constructed as having little or no control over the onset or outcome 
of their ‘problem’. There is no sense of them being expected to or even able to 
manage any aspect of their financial affairs, or indeed of looking after 
themselves in any way, as suggested by the King’s commitment in De 
Praerogativa Regis to find Idiots their ‘Necessaries’, and for ‘Lunaticks’ to be 
‘maintained competently’.  
If the jury determined that someone was an ‘idiot’ or a ‘lunatick’, the provisions 
of De Praerogativa Regis would come into force and the individual would lose 
all authority. For all intents and purposes, his legal rights would be relegated to 
those held by children (McDonagh, 2008) and he would become a ward of the 
sovereign, governed in accordance with the King’s parens patriae27 legal power 
to act as his guardian and thus manage his property and earnings on his behalf. 
It is this same legal doctrine that continues to authorise the present-day 
government to intervene in someone’s ‘best interests’ when they are judged as 
unable to look after their affairs due to a ‘mental disorder’ (Gooding, 2014; BPS, 
2008). 
Guardianship for those subject to the De Praerogativa Regis statute was 
generally contracted out to private individuals (usually kin), rather than executed 
by the King himself or his administration – an example of how power can be 
deployed through a network of subsidiary authorities to govern people’s 
behaviours in accordance with the state’s aims and concerns. Idiots were either 
cared for by their family or confined in public houses, whilst lunaticks were 
typically cared for by friends or relatives, who might have hired servants for this 
purpose (Melton, Petrila, Poythress & Slobogin, 2007; Neugebauer, 1996).  
No treatment or cure was offered or suggested, although people with the means 
to do so may well have resorted to the different religious, astrological and 
physical approaches that were available at the time (Jarrett, 2012), and the 
notion that ‘lunaticks’ could recover (see below) would become increasingly 
relevant (particularly to the medical profession) in later years. Whilst an appeals 
                                                          
27 This translates at ‘the state as parent’. 
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process was available to those who believed they had been judged incorrectly, 
they needed to prove that they were sane, rational and competent before they 
could be ‘trusted’ to govern their own affairs in a desirable manner (McDonagh, 
2008), much like those who are subject to the Mental Health Act must do today. 
Implicit in the excerpts outlined above is a suggestion that whilst ‘Lunaticks’ 
may have lost their ‘Wit’ (ability to reason), this could be temporary, and they 
generally retained their ‘Memory’ (Melton et al., 2007). An idiot, on the other 
hand, lacked both ‘Wit’ and ‘Memory’, and theirs was a more permanent 
affliction – they were ‘natural fools’ (fools from birth) and they did not improve. 
These three dimensions: the lack or loss of ability to understand and/or reason; 
the degree of chronicity; and the age of onset – set up, defined and 
differentiated lunacy from idiocy within a broader concept of an ‘unsound mind’ 
(Berkson, 2006), which in turn was inextricably linked to a notion of mental 
(in)competency. This construction is remarkably similar to modern-day 
definitions and differentiations of mental illness and learning disability (see 
section 1.2) – both categorised within a broader concept of a ‘mental disorder’ 
(Mental Health Act 2007; APA, 2013; WHO, 2016), and explicitly associated 
with the notion of mental (in)capacity. 
With respect to dominant and subjugated discourses (research questions 3 and 
4), the construction of incompetence owing to an ‘unsound mind’ for people who 
are struggling to manage their affairs is a formulation that silences the strong 
economic discourse underpinning the creation of the ‘idiot’ and the ‘lunatick’ 
suggested in the excerpts and analysis above. Whilst some authors have 
proposed that the main purpose of the De Praerogativa Regis statute was a 
protective one, to ensure that people subject to it were not exploited (e.g. 
Ramsay, Gerada, Mars & Szmukler, 2011), it was clearly linked with profit and 
productivity, with little regard for the safeguarding or provision of those who 
were not landowners. The latter group of people, for now, were not of concern 
to the King; they were a problem for the family, the lord of the manor, the church 
or some other social institution to address if required. Further evidence for the 
financial and political motivations concerning this statute can be found in the 
ways in which the categories of ‘idiot’ and ‘lunatick’ were redefined or 
reinterpreted at different times for the benefit of particular authorities 
(Neugebauer, 1996). They offer an additional indication of the power that 
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authorities can have in determining the classification, administration and 
governance of people who might present a challenge to the status quo. 
3.2.2 The political power of the state over insanity 
In this subsection I examine the historical, socioeconomic and political factors 
that contributed to the extension of the Sovereign’s gaze from the problems 
represented by ‘incompetent’ land-owners to the problems posed by the non-
working poor, and that provided the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of a public system of welfare for those who came to be labelled the ‘impotent 
poor’. I identify that it was within this ‘impotent poor’ category that pauper 
‘Ideots’ and ‘Lunatickes’ would emerge as a separate group of people, and for 
whom legislation and state provision would become increasingly targeted and 
refined in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the problems they 
posed to the economy and social order. I then examine how the conflation of 
risk with lunacy enabled the emergence of the state’s ‘police power’; a power 
that in combination with the state’s power over the destitute and its medieval 
parens patriae power justified (and continues to justify) the state’s political 
authority over the ‘insane’ (including ‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’, and now people with a 
dual diagnosis; Mellett, 1981; Foucault, 1961/1988). 
3.2.2.1 The rising problem of the non-working poor: Labour Laws and 
Vagabonds Acts 
Following the demise of 30-40% of the population during the ‘Black Death’ 
plague pandemic in 1348, a number of labour laws (such as the Ordinance of 
Labourers 1349) were introduced to enforce those under the age of 60 to work 
and prevent them fleeing employers or demanding high wages at a time of 
labour shortage. This emphasis on productivity and its importance for the state’s 
economy was all the more urgent given the need to continue funding ongoing 
royal military activities such as the 100 years war (1337-1453) and the ensuing 
War of the Roses (1455-1487). It can also be construed as a sovereign attempt 
to limit the power that labourers and servants were gaining.   
The poor who did not work were increasingly constructed as ‘idle by choice’, 
with Vagabonds Acts introduced to criminalise and, characteristic of sovereign 
approaches, confine and punish anyone found, or even suspected of, begging: 
‘vagabonds, idle and suspected persons shall be set in the stocks for three days 
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and three nights and have none other sustenance but bread and water’ 
(Vagabonds and Beggars Act 1494). They would then be rendered invisible by 
being ‘put out of Town’ (Vagabonds and Beggars Act 1494). This legislation did 
not acknowledge or address the problem or causes of poverty and 
unemployment. Neither did it distinguish those who were physically unable to 
work or those who were struggling to find employment despite trying. When 
faced with the choice of starving or breaking the law, many opted for survival, 
which meant that legislation was largely ineffective in reducing the numbers of 
beggars.  
3.2.2.2 The emergence of a public system of welfare for the ‘impotent 
poor’: Old Poor Laws  
The Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds Statute of 1531 created the 
‘impotent poor’ subject, a category that comprised the disabled, the sick and the 
elderly (Beier, 1985). This enabled the discrimination of those who were 
‘unable’ to work (and consequently deserving of charity), from those perceived 
as ‘unwilling’ to work (and consequently deserving of punishment). It authorised 
the ‘impotent poor’ to apply for a licence to beg in an allocated area – the first 
time that outdoor relief was officially permitted for this group of people. In so 
doing, it also became possible to ‘enclose’ and ‘contain’ them, techniques of 
power that enabled more effective surveillance and thus governance (and that 
would become increasingly important in later times – see section 3.2.3). The 
statute also ordered the public flogging of able-bodied ‘beggars’ and ‘vagrants’ 
before returning them to their parish under the imperative that they put 
themselves to labour (Slack, 1990); a public display of sovereign power 
designed to deter the ‘idleness’ of others.  
The proceeding years (1536-1541) saw the destitution of a large number of sick 
and poor people as a direct result of the dissolution of the monasteries and the 
accompanying destruction of the religious institutions that had hitherto been 
their primary source of health and social support (Slack, 1990). This caused 
public concern, not just for the welfare of those affected, but for the physical 
dangers that these ‘bands of sturdy beggars’ might represent to the rest of 
society (Alaszewski & Brown, 2012). There were several appeals from local 
magistrates for the Crown to address this problem, and the ensuing 1536 Act 
for Punishment of Sturdy Vagabonds and Beggars, in addition to reinforcing the 
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punitive and labour imperatives of the earlier 1531 Statute, advocated voluntary 
weekly collections by the parish specifically for the care of the ‘impotent poor’, in 
the hope that this would eliminate their need to beg and thus help restore public 
order (Slack, 1990). It was a move that represented the first official state 
provision for this broad group of people, signifying a shift from religious to civic 
support, and strengthening the power of the state over destitute persons that 
had already begun to emerge (Mellett, 1981). 
The state’s power over the destitute was further reinforced through the Act for 
the Relief of the Poor 1601, which consolidated the provisions of previous Acts 
and made the levying of tax from rate payers compulsory (Alaszewski & Brown, 
2012). Assistance under this Act had two forms: ‘outdoor’ relief (such as food, 
fuel, clothing or money); and the less common (and more expensive) ‘indoor’ 
relief, largely provided by the institutions that began to emerge in the space 
opened up by the destruction of the religious establishments. Outdoor relief 
varied according to how an individual was classified: the ‘impotent’ poor could 
be cared for in ‘houses of dwelling’ (poorhouses or charitable almshouses); the 
sick could be admitted to hospital; the ‘able-bodied’ poor could be set to work in 
a House of Industry; and the ‘idle poor’ could be sent to a House of Correction 
or prison (Slack, 1990). In practice, such classifications and dividing practices 
were not so precise, however they did set up a way of thinking about what is 
now termed ‘service provision’ for particular ‘categories’ of people that would be 
taken up more methodically from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Scull, 
1989), and that is embodied in today’s ‘specialist’ learning disability, mental 
illness and dual diagnosis services (see Chapter 1). Indeed, some of the 
institutions listed above were the forerunners to the workhouses and asylums 
that would become central to the disciplinary apparatus of the state in later 
years – and that continue to exist in modified form for those with a dual 
diagnosis today.  
Whilst traces of Britain’s modern welfare state can be recognised in the poor 
law system described above, it is important to note that at this stage, and up 
until the nineteenth century, social and economic assistance from the state was 
highly localised and reserved for those who were truly destitute. As before, 
‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ continued to be viewed predominantly as a domestic or 
family problem, becoming subject to poor law applications only when care 
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arrangements broke down (usually due to illness or for financial reasons; Digby, 
1996; Rushton, 1988). Rushton (1996) argues that this was not because such 
individuals were well-integrated within society but because the family was 
placed ‘at the centre of a state-enforced system of care’ (Digby, 1996, p. 4). 
Indeed, the 1601 Poor Law stipulated that:  
the Father and Grandfather, and the Mother and Grandmother, and the 
Children of every poor, old, blind, lame, and impotent Person or other 
poor Person not able to work, being of a sufficient Ability, shall, at their 
own Charges, relieve and maintain every such poor Person in that 
Manner. (Cited in Higginbotham, 2017a) 
Hence, when the state intervened, and in line with current practice, it was to 
support the family rather than replace it (Rushton, 1988).  
The ‘old’ 1601 Poor Law was largely perceived as an equitable system that, 
with some amendments, formed the basis of poor relief for the next two 
centuries. However, it had been designed for a pre-industrial society, when 90% 
of the population lived in rural areas, and where overseers of the poor knew 
their parishioners and could distinguish the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’ 
poor. In section 3.2.3 I will examine how the state’s reliance on private 
domiciliary support for the ‘impotent poor’ became unsustainable in the context 
of a capitalist society and rapid population growth, and how the management of 
‘lunacy’ (and later ‘idiocy’) was shifted to publically-funded institutions from the 
more traditional family or community spheres. First, it is important to highlight 
another concern that emerged in relation to subcategories of the ‘impotent poor’ 
that is relevant to the governance and subjectivities of people with a dual 
diagnosis today: that of pauper ‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots’ and the dangers that they 
might (re)present to society.  
3.2.2.3 The conflation of risk with ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’: Vagrancy Acts and 
Lunacy Laws 
Having previously been amalgamated with those who had physical and sensory 
disabilities, it was in the 1601 Poor Act that those ‘naturally disabled. . . . in wit, . 
. . as the Ideot, Lunaticke, . . . etc., not being able to work’ (Dalton, 1618, p. 76) 
were explicitly highlighted as a separate subtype of the ‘impotent poor’. At this 
stage, however, the extensive administrative and legal efforts that had been 
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made in De Praerogativa Regis to distinguish land-owning ‘lunaticks’ from 
‘idiots’ (see section 3.2.1) were not translated to their pauper counterparts, 
presumably because there was no financial gain in doing so, inquisitions were 
an expensive process (Neugebauer, 1996), both groups were considered 
‘deserving’ of charity, and neither was viewed as particularly problematic to the 
state (beyond their lack of productivity).  
The perception of the pauper lunatic as ‘impotent’ and deserving of charity 
would change significantly over the course of the next two centuries. This shift 
is apparent in the Vagrancy Act 1714, which authorised the detention of 
‘persons of little or no estates, who, by lunacy, or otherwise, are furiously mad, 
and dangerous [emphasis added]’, for the duration of their ‘madness’. The 
discourse of risk, already used to legitimise the governance of the ‘sturdy 
beggars’ in the sixteenth century, is evident here, explicitly linking lunacy with 
the potential for violence and crime, and thus enabling the state to detain a 
group of people that had previously been protected under the ‘impotent poor’ 
label. In so doing, the status of the ‘dangerous’ pauper lunatic becomes similar 
to that of a ‘vagrant’, inviting the same custodial and punishing methods of 
governance associated with the latter. 
The Vagrancy Act marked the emergence of the state’s ‘police power’, a type of 
power that authorises it to act as protector of the public through the detention of 
people judged as posing a risk of physical harm to others (Gooding, 2014). It is 
a power that has been, and continues to be, used to justify legislation intended 
to safeguard the physical, social and moral well-being of the population, and 
that, in combination with the state’s parens patriae powers (see section3.2.1) 
constitutes much of modern mental health law (Melton et al., 2007). Its 
application in contemporary British law has been widened from the use of 
detention to the application of non-consensual treatment for people with a 
diagnosis of mental illness (and by extension, those with a dual diagnosis), as 
well as those diagnosed with a learning disability who display ‘abnormally 
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’ (Mental Health Act 2007). It has 
equally been broadened out to include not just those who may be at risk of 
harming others but also those who may harm themselves (Gooding, 2014). 
In authorising the detention of the ‘furiously mad and dangerous’, the Vagrancy 
Act 1714 supported the expansion of the small institutions specialising in the 
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care of lunatics that had already begun to emerge in the context of the De 
Praerogativa Regis, such as the private madhouses. The ‘trade in lunacy’ was a 
lucrative one, and represented an economic way to restrain those who 
threatened public order (Scull, 1977). From 1760 onwards, specialist institutions 
became the preferred (albeit last resort) choice for the confinement of 
dangerous lunatics (Rushton, 1988). By 1801, charitable asylums for pauper 
lunatics had opened up in nine different English towns. Whilst only housing a 
relative minority, these ‘specialist’ institutions served to promote the notion that 
they might be the best place to confine those who were troublesome or different 
(Jarrett, 2012).  
The concern over the ‘dangerousness’ that ‘lunatics’ may present increased 
substantially following a failed attempt on King George III’s life in 1800 by 
James Hadfield, who was found to be insane and thus acquitted from criminal 
charges28. The Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 was hastily introduced to prevent his 
release, instructing the indefinite detention of anyone who committed a crime 
during an episode of insanity. Argent (1978) argues that this reform was also a 
counter-revolutionary measure, motivated by the general fear amongst the 
English aristocracy that there would be a rebellion uprising to kill the King and 
overthrow the government like the one that had taken place in France. 
During the next four decades, ‘pauper lunatics’ and ‘criminal lunatics’ became 
increasingly conflated. They began to be legislated for together, initially in the 
Act for the better Care and Maintenance of Lunatics, being Paupers or 
Criminals in England 1808, which dictated that all those detained under 
vagrancy laws be sent to a county asylum in the first instance or, in its absence, 
to a licensed madhouse. A few years later, the criterion of ‘dangerousness’ for 
the detention of lunatics was diluted and, in some cases, became entirely 
absent. For example, whereas the Madhouses Act 1828 had defined ‘insanity’ 
to include any dangerous ‘lunatic’ or ‘idiot’, the Madhouses Law Amendment Act 
1829 changed this to mean all ‘lunatics’, ‘idiots’ and those of ‘unsound mind’ 
(Roberts, 1981). This omission legitimised the confinement of all ‘lunatic’ 
paupers – whether they were dangerous or not. It was an initiative that was 
                                                          
28 Insanity was (and continues to be) a defence to criminal charges, but at the time of Hadfield’s 
assassination attempt, if a jury agreed that he understood the crime ‘no more than a wild beast or a 
brut, or an infant’ (Rex v Arnold, 1724), he would have been released into the care of his family, leaving 
him free to make another attempt on the Monarch. 
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closely linked with the state’s efforts to rid workhouses of these individuals, who 
could be troublesome and unproductive, and who thus posed a threat to the 
order and discipline that the workhouse was designed to instil.  
The (potential) risks posed by ‘lunatics’ to society were reinforced further when, 
like other paupers, their morality was highlighted as a major concern. In 
combination with the medical construction of ‘lunacy’ as an illness and the 
associated discourses of chronicity and cure, the discourses of morality (and 
moral treatment) were used to justify the mandate for the compulsory 
construction of public lunatic asylums in the County Asylums Act 1845. 
Importantly, it was at this time that ‘idiots’ (who had not generally been 
considered a social threat and thus had avoided much of the confinement that 
‘lunatics’ were being subjected to)29, were also highlighted as potentially 
‘dangerous, not only in the ordinary but in a moral acceptation of the term’ 
(Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy [MCL], 1844, p. 97). The implication 
then, was that ‘idiots’ too needed to be closely monitored and confined, 
something that would indeed begin to happen as a matter of course towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, when concerns about morality, criminality and 
degeneration intensified. 
The construction of ‘idiots’ and ‘lunatics’ as potentially ‘risky’ continues to 
penetrate and, arguably, dominate the construction and subjectivities of those 
who are ‘dually diagnosed’ today. For example, ‘challenging behaviour’ is often 
interpreted as a symptom of mental illness, and frequently cited as the main 
reason individuals who end up being given a dual diagnosis come to the 
attention of services. The NICE (2016a) guidelines encourage a ‘risk 
assessment’ of those who are dually diagnosed, explicitly identifying ‘risk to self’ 
(p. 18) and ‘risk to others (including sexual offending)’ (p. 19) as areas to be 
assessed. Given the relatively low prevalence of ‘sexually inappropriate 
behaviour’ amongst even clinical populations of people with learning disabilities 
(1.6%; NICE, 2016b, p. 64), the fact that this is the only area to be explicitly 
highlighted under ‘risk to others’ suggests that moral danger continues to be a 
major concern. Similarly, social practices such as marriage and parenting 
continue to be areas of contention and state regulation today. 
                                                          
29 This decision was also a financial one, as domiciliary care was cheaper for the state to support than 
institutional options (Rushton, 1988). 
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Having explained how the state achieved its political authority over ‘insanity’, I 
now return to the narrative of the 1601 Poor Law, the historical events that led 
to its reform, and the concurrent establishment of a vast disciplinary apparatus 
of the state within which ‘specialist’ institutions for ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’ would 
emerge, and where ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ about ‘dual diagnosis’ could, and 
would, be created. 
3.2.3 The emergence of a disciplinary apparatus of the state 
3.2.3.1 From private to public burdens: Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 
After the English civil war (1642-1651), Parliament replaced the Monarchy as 
the ruling power, and over the next century, the breakdown of feudalism gave 
rise to a capitalist social and economic system that stimulated new methods of 
production and the emergence of agricultural and industrial ‘revolutions’. These 
significantly boosted the economy, and population numbers in England alone 
rose from approximately 8.3 million in 1801 to 16.7 million in 1851 (Census of 
Great Britain, 1801, 1851). As manufacturing processes became increasingly 
mechanised and unaffordable to previously self-sustained farmers, people were 
forced to migrate to towns and cities in search of employment within capitalist-
owned factories. By 1850, more than half the British population lived in urban 
areas, working in factories and mines.  
The new capitalist society privileged able-bodied workers who could keep up 
with the speed of factory work (Ryan & Thomas, 1987). This meant that 
‘unproductive’ family members were increasingly viewed as being a burden – 
not just for the state, but for families, who could no longer afford to stay at home 
to protect and support them (Scull, 1989). Family responsibility for lunatics and 
idiots thus became increasingly difficult for magistrates and parishes to enforce 
(Rushton, 1988). 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the number of people seeking poor relief 
had increased dramatically. Circumstances became even more challenging 
following the subsequent industrial and agricultural depressions, high 
unemployment rates, and soaring national debt caused by the Napoleonic wars. 
The rising cost of poor relief caused significant concern to the state (Scull, 
1977), as did the increase in civil unrest amongst the poor, and the seemingly 
limited effect that existing legal frameworks were having in imposing social 
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order. An alternative approach to addressing this myriad of problems was 
therefore needed.  
To this end, in 1832, the government appointed an ‘expert’ Royal Commission 
to undertake a thorough review of the poor relief system and make 
recommendations for alternative, more effective and economic ways of 
addressing the problem of poverty. This method of reviewing policy was 
markedly different from the government’s former ad hoc, incremental and 
pragmatic responses to challenges relating to poverty and labour (Alaszewski & 
Brown, 2012). In this ‘new’ approach, government action was to be shaped by 
recommendations made by expert reviews; a process that closely resembles 
the development of ‘evidence-based’ legislation, policy and guidance today 
(including that which is made for people with dual diagnosis). Whilst this shift 
may have reflected both the increasing power ascribed to such experts, and the 
privileging of a more methodical, ‘scientific approach’, there is also evidence to 
suggest that the Royal Commission was established to substantiate the 
changes that the government had planned already (Bloy, 2002). 
The Commission drew on a combination of social, moral, political and economic 
theories and concerns to justify and support their review: Thomas Malthus’s 
forecasts that population growth would outstrip food supplies; David Ricardo’s 
concern that an ‘iron law of wages’ was detrimental to independent labourers; 
and Jeremy Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism, which argued for the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people. The rationalisation for reform was no 
longer one that focused on the authority and glory of the sovereign, but one the 
emphasised the creation of a society that promoted the well-being and 
happiness of its citizens (Alaszewski & Brown, 2012). Some argued that the 
move was also a political one: an attempt by the Whig government to win the 
votes of the people who had been enfranchised by Great Reformation Act 1832 
by reducing the amount of tax they needed to pay. 
In their 1834 report, the Royal Commission concluded that poverty was caused 
by the idleness of morally weak individuals rather than socioeconomic factors, 
and that the existing system supported this ‘indolence and vice’ (p. 228). The 
rapidly ensuing Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 took forward most of the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations. It significantly modified the system of poor 
relief for the able-bodied so that it could only be obtained through well-
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regulated, centralised public workhouses (where individuals could be closely 
monitored and contribute to their own upkeep by working), rather than 
administrated arbitrarily at the parish level. Unlike its predecessor30, the ‘new’ 
workhouse was not about relieving destitution; it was about deterring idleness 
(Higginbotham, 2017b). The directive was for conditions to be so dire that only 
the truly desperate would seek relief; a mandate that was described as a 
message that ‘whosoever will not work ought not to live’ (Carlyle, 1839, cited in 
Bloy, 2016`).  
3.2.3.2 Disciplinary power and its deployment in new workhouse 
The ‘new’ workhouse was to be a place of strict discipline and order. To this 
end, the newly established Poor Law Commission was empowered to ‘make 
and Issue all such Rules, Orders, and Regulations for the Management of the 
Poor, [and] for the Government of Workhouses’ (Poor Law Amendment Act 
1834, section 15). They developed a standardised template of rules that all 
workhouses could adopt, stipulating in great detail everything from the 
admission procedure, to how space should be organised, to how paupers 
should spend their day. For example, on admission, individuals would be 
‘carefully examined, washed and cleaned’, issued with a workhouse uniform, 
and their own clothes and possessions stored until their discharge. The 
workhouses space was highly compartmentalised to enable strict segregation 
by sex and age, with no contact between them except at mealtimes (which had 
to be taken in silence). A regimented routine that involved set hours for activities 
such as mealtimes, work and rest structured each day, with a bell in operation 
to ensure good time-keeping. There were rules for when windows could be 
opened, how many hot meals per week should be served, when people should 
bathe, and when prayers should be read. ‘Disorderly’ or the more serious 
‘refractory’ conduct was punished, and a list of rules and penalties was in 
prominent display to remind inmates of the potential cost of such behaviours. 
‘Inmates’ were technically free to leave, but permission from the Governor or 
Matron was needed, and there were strict rules around this. 
                                                          
30 Parochial workhouses were well-established in England and Wales, with nearly two thousand in 
operation by the end of the eighteenth century that together housed approximately one hundred 
thousand paupers (Slack, 1990). Their original aim had been to provide work for unemployed able-
bodied paupers and they had not been designed to be particularly punitive or unpleasant. However, the 
majority of those who took up residence were the ‘impotent poor,’ resulting in workhouses taking on 
much more of a social institution function. 
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This highly structured system had been inspired by the rhythms of monastic and 
military life and was already being deployed in other institutions such as 
factories and prisons (Foucault, 1975/1991). It represented the operation of a 
new form of power that Foucault (1975/1991) termed ‘disciplinary power’; a 
power that enabled the mass control of bodies and movement by both 
‘increas[ing] the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and 
diminish[ing] these same forces (in political terms of obedience)’ (Foucault, 
1975/1991, p. 138).  
As illustrated in the above account, the operation of this ‘disciplinary power’ was 
facilitated by a number of techniques (such as the regulation and organisation 
of space, time and behaviour according to precise ‘norms’), and further aided 
and enforced by complex systems of surveillance (such as examination, 
hierarchical observation and normalising judgements; Foucault, 1975/1991; 
O’Farrell, 2005). Any deviant behaviour was immediately ‘corrected’, enabling 
individuals to learn how to behave in the ways that were expected of them and, 
ultimately, to internalise the regulations so that they could discipline themselves. 
Together, these strategies enabled the creation of compliant, or ‘docile bodies’, 
improved and reformed rather than simply punished (Foucault, 1975/1991). 
They therefore represented a shift from (though not complete displacement of) 
a ‘sovereign’ power ‘that drives out, excludes, banishes, marginalizes, and 
represses, to a fundamentally positive power that fashions, observes, knows, 
and multiplies itself on the basis of its own effects’ (Foucault, 1975/2003, p. 48).  
Disciplinary techniques and technologies would later be adopted in asylums and 
mental health hospitals (Foucault, 1975/1991), and continue to be exercised in 
existing services for people with a dual diagnosis. In fact, the mechanisms of 
discipline have since permeated the entire social body, and form a key 
component of the governance of society today (Foucault, 1975/1991). 
3.2.3.3 The separate governance of the insane 
As discussed earlier, the idea that ‘dangerous’ and land-owning lunatics could 
be managed in dedicated institutions (such as madhouses and charitable 
asylums) had already become fairly well-established in the eighteenth century.  
In 1808, the County Asylums Act demonstrated the government’s commitment 
to extend this segregation to all lunatics. It highlighted that ‘the practice of 
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confining such lunatics and other insane persons . . . in Gaols, Houses of 
Correction, Poor Houses and Houses of Industry, is highly dangerous and 
inconvenient’ (County Asylums Act 1808), presumably because ‘even by threats 
and punishment, [they] could neither be persuaded nor induced to conform to 
the regulations’ (Scull, 1977, p. 343) and were thus more difficult and expensive 
to manage. In the hope that these institutions could return to their original 
functions, the 1808 Act had authorised and encouraged magistrates and 
Justices of the Peace to build publically funded lunatic asylums in every county 
(Jarrett, 2012). Due to the financial implications of this, however, only a few 
were built and most people who might have come under the rubric of ‘insanity’ 
continued to receive alternative means of support.  
3.2.3.3.1 The emergence of dedicated ‘insane wards’ in the workhouse 
The separate governance of the insane was reiterated in the Royal 
Commissioners’ 1834 poor law report:  
The principle of separate and appropriate management has been carried 
into imperfect execution, in the cases of lunatics, by the means of lunatic 
asylums; and . . . it might be carried into more complete execution under 
extended incorporations acting with the aid of the Central Board. (Poor 
Law Commissioners [PLC], 1834, p. 307) 
The succeeding Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 did not make provisions for ‘a 
more complete execution’, however, and one theory is that commissioners were 
unable to develop a consistent and comprehensive policy for this complex and 
elusive group of people (Green, 1983). In actual fact, the new Poor Law made 
no reference to the management of lunacy or idiocy at all, except to prohibit the 
‘detention in any workhouse of any dangerous lunatic, insane person, or idiot for 
any longer period than fourteen days’ (section XLV). Of significance was the 
way in which this was almost immediately interpreted as meaning that ‘non-
dangerous’ lunatics, ‘insane’ persons or ‘idiots’ could stay in workhouses 
indefinitely, even though this had not been the Royal Commission’s intention 
(Myers, 1998). This alternative reading was likely to have been inspired by the 
reduced expense of keeping ‘insane’ paupers in poor law institutions (Ayers, 
1971) and, as expected, it resulted in a considerable rise in the number of these 
individuals within workhouses.  
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In many cases, workhouses began to establish their own dedicated ‘insane 
wards’, and by 1865 almost one in seven workhouses in England and Wales 
had one. A system of judgement to facilitate the classification and isolation of 
pauper ‘idiots’ and ‘lunatics’ was introduced early on: 
As soon as a pauper is admitted, he or she shall be placed in the 
probationary ward . . . until examined by the medical officer of the 
workhouse. If . . . labouring under any disease of body or mind, the 
pauper shall be placed either in the sick ward, or the ward for lunatics 
and idiots, not dangerous, as the medical officer shall direct.  (Poor Law 
Commission Office [PLCO], 1836, p. 89) 
In Foucault’s words, this examination was 
a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to 
classify, and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through 
which one differentiates them and judges them . . . The superimposition 
of the power relations and knowledge relations (Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 
184). 
Medical examination was thus a technique that had the power to produce a 
pauper ‘lunatic’ or ‘idiot’, just like medical and psychiatric examination can 
produce someone who is ‘dually diagnosed’ today. Insanity and idiocy become 
‘truths’ about a person; additional subjectivities that may not have existed until 
the deployment of the systems of judgement in question, and that had 
implications for how they were managed.  
The Poor Law excerpt above highlights an important discursive shift that began 
to take place towards the end of the eighteenth century: that of the construction 
of lunacy and idiocy as a ‘disease of the body or mind’, the associated potential 
for treatment and cure, and the ascendancy of the medical profession as the 
dominant authority in these matters. The medicalisation of lunacy and idiocy 
and its relevance to dual diagnosis will be examined in more detail in section 
3.2.4. For the purposes of this section relating to the emergence of a 
disciplinary apparatus of the state, I will focus on how discourses of chronicity 
and cure enabled the proliferation of the public asylums that had been 
espoused by the government for so long, and the application of disciplinary 
technologies of power therein (research questions 1 and 3). 
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3.2.3.3.2 Discourses of chronicity and cure: County Asylums Act 1845 
and Lunacy Act 1845 
The notion that lunacy could be temporary (and that recovery was therefore 
possible for many) had already been clear in law as early as the fourteenth 
century. Whilst possible causes and treatments had been debated since ancient 
times, these had not been a particular focus of legislation. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that legislation relating to insanity had initially developed from a 
need to administer property and, later, from a need to impose social, political 
and economic order amongst the poor. The main purpose of early institutions 
was therefore to contain populations of people who were unproductive or 
undesirable in society. They had little or no therapeutic input, and punishment 
was common, particularly in asylums and madhouses where mechanical 
restraint and physical coercion was the rule (Scull, 1981).  
The construction of lunacy and idiocy as biological illnesses in the nineteenth 
century enabled the emergence of novel treatments, and with them, the 
possibility of a cure. At a time when the insane were increasingly perceived as 
inconvenient, and custodial approaches were having a limited (or even 
negative) impact, such auspicious new approaches were gratefully embraced. 
In 1842, Metropolitan Commissioners in Lunacy were tasked with undertaking 
an in-depth national inquiry and census of the ‘insane’, which included the 
classification, treatment regime and conditions of paupers on admission to 
county asylums and licenced madhouses. Their 1844 report focused mainly on 
‘lunatics’, although there were a few references to ‘idiots’ that were significant to 
their later construction and government that I will refer to further when 
discussing the emergence of idiot asylums in section 3.2.3.3.4. In relation to 
‘lunatics’, the Commissioners advised that:  
the first object ought to be their cure, by means of proper medical 
treatment. This can only be obtained in a well-regulated Asylum; and 
therefore the detention of any curable lunatic in a Workhouse is highly 
objectionable, on the score both of humanity and economy. (MCL, 1844, 
pp. 95-96) 
These assertions had several implications. Firstly, that lunacy was curable in a 
large proportion of cases – but only if treated early – so lunatics should be sent 
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to the asylum as soon as possible. Secondly, that treatment needed to be 
‘proper’ and ‘medical’. This involved a combination of physical and moral 
management, reflecting not only the perceived causes of insanity and tried and 
tested methods, but also the growing authority of the medical profession (see 
section 3.2.4). Thirdly, that treatment needed to take place in a properly 
constructed and resourced asylum, highlighting the view that the building was 
an integral part of the treatment, and in itself therapeutic. Fourthly, that it was 
not only inhumane but expensive to keep lunatics in workhouses. It was argued 
that existing asylums were filling up with incurable lunatics because they had 
been initially sent to workhouses, where their condition had deteriorated and 
medical relief would no longer be effective. It had also been claimed that, once 
an asylum was built, the cost of curing a pauper lunatic could be as little as £5 
(versus the £200 to £400 cost of holding him indefinitely), and that up to 70% of 
cases could be cured (Ashley, 1843, in Roberts, 1981). Curing the lunatic could, 
of course, have the additional economic advantage of rendering him productive 
again. 
The promise of treatment and cure provided the final thrust and justification for 
the propagation of public lunatic asylums (Scull, 1977). In 1845, Parliament 
simultaneously approved two complementary Acts. The County Asylums Act 
1845 commanded the compulsory construction of public lunatic asylums and, 
whereas in 1832 there had only been thirteen such county asylums, by 1858 
that number had trebled (Bartlett, 1999), and by the end of the century there 
were 120 new public asylums housing more than one hundred thousand people 
in total (Jarrett, 2012). Alongside, the Lunacy Act 1845 mandated that asylums 
be headed by a live-in medical superintendent, officially recognising and 
contributing to the dominant position of the medical profession in the 
governance of lunacy. It also created a ‘Lunacy Commission’ tasked with 
licensing public and private asylums, as well as monitoring all admissions, 
treatments and discharges therein. In conjunction with the powers that had 
already been ascribed to Poor Law Commissioners, this enabled the 
establishment of a vast network of surveillance and examination of the insane 
across a number of institutional sites.  
Lunatic asylums were thus no longer constructed as sites for the confinement of 
troublesome individuals (Foucault, 1961/1988), or as ‘a permanent refuge for 
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the insane, . . . [but as] hospitals for their relief and cure’ (MCL, 1844, p. 7), 
much like acute mental health wards and ‘dual diagnosis’ inpatient units 
continue to be constructed today. Correspondingly, lunatics were no longer 
constructed as prisoners but as ‘patients’ who could be rendered docile by 
being treated, disciplined and even cured by the medical profession; a medical 
construction that continues today for those who are diagnosed with a mental 
illness (and by extension those with a dual diagnosis).  
3.2.3.3.3 The deployment of disciplinary power in lunatic asylums 
As mentioned above, the asylum building itself was considered an essential 
component for the treatment of insanity. It was not uncommon for medical 
superintendents to collaborate with architects to design buildings that could 
achieve its dual safeguarding and rehabilitative functions. In 1847, physician 
John Conolly, who was also superintendent at Hanwell Lunatic Asylum, 
published The Construction and Government of Lunatic Asylums and Hospitals 
for the Insane, a book that would become the standard for asylums in England 
and Wales. Its wide-ranging influence illustrates the intimate relationship 
between power and knowledge; how they build on each other so that specific 
types of knowledge are produced through the exercise of power and used to 
reinforce it further (Foucault, 1975/1991). 
Using Derby Lunatic Asylum as his prototype (see Figure 2), Conolly (1847) 
advised on every detail, including: architecture, construction materials, layout of 
sleeping rooms and galleries, furniture and internal decoration; classification 
and arrangement of patients; clothing and diet; recreation, employment and 
education; and staff numbers, qualifications and duties. He recommended that 
for optimum governance, asylums should house no more than four hundred 
individuals, that men and women should be segregated, and that there should 
be ‘separate wards and bed-rooms for the tranquil, for the sick, for the helpless, 
for the noisy, the unruly, or violent, and the dirty’ (p. 8).  
Lunatic asylums were typically built in semi-rural locations within large grounds, 
surrounded by high walls to prevent people escaping. Many had looming water 
towers, around which were arranged the kitchens, laundries, workshops, 
recreation hall, medical surgery and administration block (Jarrett, 2012). They 
were self-contained, ‘total’ institutions, requiring minimal contact (or 
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interference) from the outside world. Their layout was reminiscent of the power 
relation embodied in Foucault’s concept of the Panopticon, where a central 
observation tower enables the continuous surveillance of ‘inmates’ who assume 
they are being monitored at all times, and thus regulate their own conduct to 
avoid punishment (Foucault, 1975/1991). The architecture of institutions thus 
becomes an apparatus for creating and sustaining power relations independent 
of those who manage it (Foucault, 1975/1991). Indeed, the ability to govern 
from a distance and constant visual monitoring were key aspects of the new 
non-restrictive regime of treatment and cure:  
by this plan every advantage is secured, including that constant 
superintendence which is indispensable to preserving order and comfort, 
and without which the prevention of mischief – which is an important 
element of the non-restraint treatment – is quite impracticable. (Conolly, 
1847, p. 17). 
 
Figure 2: Plan of Derby lunatic asylum (Conolly, 1847, p. 184). 
In modern day, the ‘all seeing eye’ subsists at the centre of inpatient wards in 
the form of a ‘nursing station’, sometimes surrounded by large viewing windows.  
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In addition to the extensive regulation of space, disciplinary power was 
deployed in the day-to-day running of the asylum through techniques that 
resembled those exercised in the workhouse (see section 3.2.3.2), and that are 
recognisable in how those with a dual diagnosis are governed today in both 
inpatient and community contexts. These included the regulation of time (strict 
schedules and routines), people’s conduct (marching drills for exercise; manual 
work), physical examinations, and normalising judgements (correcting 
undesired behaviour) (Jarrett, 2012; Foucault, 1975/1991). Disciplinary power 
was also implemented through a variety of medical and psychosocial treatments 
that aimed to produce not just docile bodies, but docile minds (Carlson, 2005). 
For example, work was used as a ‘means of occupying the restless, diverting 
the thoughts of the melancholy, relieving the vacuity of the imbecile . . . in short, 
of contributing to the cure of all descriptions of patients’ (Conolly, 1847, p. 106). 
Importantly, and similar to those sectioned under the Mental Health Act today, 
individuals were not free to leave when they wished; their release was 
dependent on medical examination and approval. 
3.2.3.3.4 The emergence of idiot asylums 
Although the County Asylums Act 1845 had authorised the admission of all 
forms of ‘insanity’31 into lunatic asylums, because ‘idiots’ were largely ‘regarded 
as being beyond the means of cure’ (MCL, 1844, p. 97), in practice, many 
specifically excluded them due for fear that they would ‘silt up’ the system 
(Rushton, 1996). Consequently, idiots formed a minority of the asylum 
population (MCL, 1844)32. With the renewed efforts to relocate the insane from 
workhouses to asylums, and the emergence of a risk discourse associated with 
idiocy, there was increased pressure to provide some sort of care for these 
individuals – whether in lunatic asylums or (preferably) elsewhere. 
The success of Séguin’s work with idiot children at the Bicêtre Hospital in Paris 
in the 1840s highlighted a new approach that could be used with them: that of 
education and training. This incorporated elements of the ‘moral treatment’ used 
                                                          
31 The principal forms of insanity were described as: mania, dementia, melancholia, monomania, moral 
insanity, congenital idiocy, congenital imbecility, general paralysis of the insane, epilepsy and delirium 
tremens (MCL, 1844). 
32  In 1844 only 518 (approximately 5%) of the 11,272 ‘insane’ persons confined in asylums in England 
and Wales were classified as ‘idiots’ (MCL, 1844, p. 184). This was in contrast with the workhouse 
population, estimated by the Poor Law Commission as comprising an almost equal proportion of 6451 
lunatics to 6261 idiots in 1842 (although a broader definition of the term ‘idiot’; MCL, 1844, p. 96). 
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in lunatic asylums and involved a systematic (and disciplinary) programme of 
muscular, sensorial, moral and intellectual stimulation and training. It was 
designed to improve idiocy and, importantly, to create more useful, self-
sufficient, and productive individuals that could potentially return to society 
(Coulter, 2009). It was perceived as so effective that, just three years after 
stating that not much could be done for them, the Lunacy Commissioners 
declared that idiots ‘are in general capable of being greatly improved, both 
intellectually and morally, by a judicious system of training and instruction’ 
(Commissioners in Lunacy, 1847, p. 275). 
Despite ostensible support for such approaches, the government did little to 
support their introduction because lunatics presented a more urgent 
management problem, and the number of idiots of concern to the state and 
other authorities were comparatively few (Wright, 2001). The establishment of 
dedicated ‘idiot asylums’ was ultimately instigated by Mrs Ann Serena Plumbe, 
a parent who was dissatisfied with the lack of suitable education and training 
options available to idiot children like her son (Wright, 2001). As an arrow-root 
merchant she had a number of medical acquaintances whom she contacted for 
advice and interest in founding an institution for idiots that could provide 
education and training. These included Dr Samuel Gaskell (medical 
superintendent of the Lancaster lunatic asylum, and Dr John Conolly (Ayers, 
1971), who had both personally observed and written about Séguin’s work 
(Conolly, 1847). With their support and that of philanthropist and family friend 
Rev Andrew Reed33, Mrs Plumbe founded the Charity for Asylum of Idiots and, 
in 1848, the first ‘Hospital for Idiots’ was built in Highgate, London.  
Despite being a charitable organisation it was clear that charity did not extend to 
everyone. People were rejected ‘on the grounds of age, hopelessness, 
unfitness, too unfavourable, epileptic, badness, [or being] on parish relief’ 
(Langdon Down Museum of Learning Disability [LDMLD], 2014), with admission 
restricted to private patients and individuals who had been ‘voted in’ and whose 
fees were partially or fully paid for by charity subscribers (Wright, 2001). 
Demand was high: after opening with eight patients, this had risen to 33 just two 
months later, and doubled to 66 by the following year, significantly exceeding 
                                                          
33 Reed had been involved in the establishment of a number of charitable foundations, including the 
London Orphan Asylum and the Royal Hospital for Incurables. 
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the hospital’s capacity (LDMLD, 2014). In 1850 a public petition was made to 
raise funds for the construction of a purpose-built ‘Asylum for Idiots’ with a 
capacity for 400 residents. By 1855, ‘Earlswood Asylum’ had opened its doors, 
and over the next fifteen years the charity promoted and supported the 
establishment of a further four large-scale voluntary ‘idiot asylums’ (Bewley, 
2008).  
These purpose-built ‘idiot asylums’ adopted the characteristic architecture of 
lunatic asylums, enabling the same disciplinary deployment of space and 
techniques of examination, normalising judgement and strict regulation of time 
and conduct. They too were registered as ‘hospitals’ (even though they were 
more like ‘schools’), overseen by medical superintendents and bound by the 
Lunacy Commission’s regulations and inspectorate, which brought them under 
government authority despite the lack of state funding (LDMLD, 2014). In 1886, 
the Idiots Act made specific provision for ‘idiots’ and ‘imbeciles’, explicitly 
defining them as a separate group of people from those with ’lunacy’. It 
authorised local authorities to build ‘facilities for the care, education, and 
training of Idiots and Imbeciles’ and empowered poor law officials to detain such 
individuals in existing charitable institutions (Bewley, 2008). For individuals to 
be admitted, their parent or guardian had to agree for them to be certified as 
‘idiots’ or ‘imbeciles’. 
However, it clearly dictated that they could not be institutionalised ‘unless, in the 
opinion of a medical practitioner, he is capable of receiving benefit from the 
institution’ (Lushington, 1895, p. 812). McDonagh (2008) argues that the 
introduction of this Act was mainly driven by the professional and economic 
motivations of medical superintendents of existing ‘idiot asylums’ to have 
‘idiocy’, their area of expertise and authority, legally recognised as an entity 
distinct from ‘lunacy’. It was also influenced by the growing concerns about 
degeneration of the population that had been highlighted by the lack of moral 
and intellectual improvement of pauper children in statutory education facilities, 
and the need to identify those who were most likely to benefit from education 
and training (McDonagh, 2008).  
In summary, this section examined the emergence of a vast disciplinary 
apparatus of the state as a condition of possibility for the emergence of dual 
diagnosis. The initial adoption of a standardised institutional approach for the 
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growing number of paupers who struggled to meet the capitalist and industrialist 
aspirations of productivity was necessarily limited, and required clearer 
demarcations of ‘deviance’ to distinguish and isolate those who could not, or 
would not, conform to the new disciplinary regime. This differentiation was 
made possible through processes of examination that produced pauper 
‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots’. The construction of their ‘affliction’ as a biological illness 
provided a strong justification for specialist institutions for these populations that 
could serve the safeguarding and rehabilitative functions that continue to drive 
dual diagnostic services in the present day. Indeed, many of the techniques and 
technologies of disciplinary power that were deployed and refined by medical 
superintendents and other staff to produce ‘docile bodies’ and ‘docile minds’ in 
these institutions can be recognised in the approaches used to govern dual 
diagnosis today. Importantly, ‘lunatic’ and ‘idiot’ asylums provided sites where 
knowledge and 'truth’ about particular groups of people could be gathered and 
used to assist in the identification and governance of ‘deviants’ both within and 
without the confines of the institution. It was within these institutions that 
knowledge and ‘truth’ about ‘dual diagnosis’ would be created.  
The next section examines the shifts in discursive regimes, the knowledge-
power links and the social practices that enabled the medical profession to 
become the main authority and producer of knowledge about ‘idiocy’ and 
‘lunacy’ as additional conditions of possibility for the emergence of ‘dual 
diagnosis’. 
3.2.4 The medicalisation of ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’ 
In this section I explore some of the events that, in combination with the 
institutional context outlined above, facilitated the gradual medicalisation of 
‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’, the associated ascendancy of medical authority in these 
areas, and the emergence of the Psychiatric profession; a profession that was 
inextricably linked with the emergence of ‘dual diagnosis’ and that continues to 
be its main proponent, authority and producer of knowledge in the present day. I 
also highlight some of the psychiatric technologies and techniques that were 
taken up in the later governance of dual diagnosis. 
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3.2.4.1 The rise of science as ‘truth’ 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, beliefs that ‘insanity’ was caused by 
excess, possession of the soul or divine retribution were challenged by 
philosophical explanations that emphasised the lack or loss of ‘reason’. 
Resembling the concept of ‘Wit’ in De Praerogativa Regis, the ability to ‘reason’ 
was now situated in a person’s immaterial mind or soul, which in turn was 
perceived as being separate from the material body (Descartes, 1649/1989). 
Informed by this Cartesian mind-body dualism (that continues to shape our 
thinking today), the English philosopher John Locke (1690/1825) argued that 
the mind was a tabula rasa, a blank slate, and that reason could therefore be 
stimulated and restored through corrective experiences. In relation to insanity, 
he argued that 
there are degrees of madness, as of folly : the disorderly jumbling of 
ideas together, is in some more, some less. In short, herein seems to lie 
the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong 
ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason 
right from them : but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason 
scarce at all. (Locke, 1690/1825, p. 94) 
This emphasis on ‘rationality’ and new interest in the subject and object of ‘Man’ 
represented a sharp departure from the prior focus on ‘God’ and the divine. 
Rather than an approximation to the ‘truth’ about ‘idiocy’ or ‘lunacy’, however, 
this shift was produced by what it was possible to think within contemporaneous 
discursive regimes, power relations and legitimations of authority (Alcoff, 2005). 
In this case, it reflected (at least in part) the decline in the power of the Church 
and concurrent secularisation of the state, and the shift towards the scientific 
discourse of the ‘Enlightenment’ or ‘Age of Reason’. Within this intellectual and 
philosophical movement, science became a privileged way of uncovering truth 
and, for knowledge to acquire value as ‘truth’ it had to organise itself in 
accordance with scientific criteria (O’Farrell, 2005). In this way, science 
became a field of power/knowledge relations: ‘There is no power relation 
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ 
(Foucault, 1975/1991, p. 27). Medicine, and later psychiatry, psychology, 
criminology, and sociology constituted the ‘human sciences’; bodies of 
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knowledge that describe and govern human bodies and behaviour in 
accordance with ‘norms’ that they themselves produce. 
3.2.4.2 The production of medical knowledge about lunacy and idiocy 
Although some physicians had been involved in the ‘trade in lunacy’, most of 
the care in madhouses had been provided by people with no medical 
background, whose interests and motivations were largely economic (Scull, 
1977). Medical interest in ‘lunacy’ was scarce until the end of the eighteenth 
century, when legislation supported (and mandated) greater involvement of 
physicians in its administration (Scull, 1989). It was only in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, when specialist ‘idiot asylums’ collected large numbers 
of people together, that systematic medical attention to the problem of ‘idiocy’ 
emerged (Ryan & Thomas, 1987). Indeed, the assemblage of such 
‘populations’ in facilities where physicians were placed in charge, was one of 
the ways in which the exponential production of medical knowledge about 
‘insanity’ became possible. 
Drawing on the empirical language and methodologies of observation and 
experimentation of the new scientific discourse, physicians began to collect, 
create and disseminate ‘knowledge’ about ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’ in the numerous 
medical and scientific journals and publications that emerged in the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. Initially drawing on single case studies, physicians 
debated the causes of ‘insanity’ and whether these originated in the mind or in 
the body, with important implications for how they were treated or managed. 
Cases such as Victor, the ‘wild boy of Aveyron’, provided opportunities for 
physicians such as Jean Itard (1802) to test Locke’s tabula rasa theory of mind, 
and experiment with the application of educational and sensory-training and 
stimulation methods that had been used successfully with deaf students (and 
that would later be taken up by Séguin with ‘idiot’ children; Donaldson & 
Menolascino, 1977). French alienists Pinel and his pupil Esquirol argued that 
insanity was primarily an emotional (psychological) disease rather than spiritual 
or physical, and that it could therefore be cured through the stabilisation of the 
person’s emotional life (an important component of the emergent ‘moral 
treatment’ and current psychotherapies for people with a ‘dual diagnosis’. 
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Physical theories of insanity that challenged such Lockean views developed 
contiguously. For example, in his 1758 Treatise on Madness, English physician 
William Battie argued that mental disorders were caused by a dysfunction of the 
body rather than the mind and that they were therefore amenable to physical 
treatments. Neuroscientific theories of mind provided further somatic accounts 
of ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’ (Desjardins, 2016). For example, Gall’s (1810/1835) 
theory of organology (later re-named ‘phrenology’) viewed ‘idiocy’ as primarily 
physical in origin, hypothesising an aetiology of brain lesions, absent brain 
‘organs’ or small brain size. These medico-philosophical conceptualisations of 
insanity and neuroscientific theories about brain physiology and pathology 
significantly shaped the subsequent study of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ (Desjardins, 
2016), and their influence is noticeable in current psychological and biomedical 
theories relating to the ‘functional’ and ‘organic’ aetiologies of ‘dual diagnosis’. 
By constructing insanity as a disease, physicians were (and continue to be) able 
to profess an expertise in its management, and thus make a claim to knowledge 
and power (Scull, 1977). Physicians reinforced and embraced this proficiency, 
frequently commenting on the unique positioning of ‘medical men who have 
lived in asylums, and among the insane, and who alone know what the insane 
require’ (Conolly, 1847, p. 6); a sentiment echoed by Psychiatrists in relation to 
‘dual diagnosis’ in later years. In so doing, any expertise that others might have 
was relegated, including the self-knowledge and expertise of the subject in 
question. 
Medical knowledge and interest in the co-occurrence of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ did 
not begin to emerge until the end of the nineteenth century (Parsons, May & 
Menolascino, 1984). From an administrative point of view, the imperative was 
(and had been since at least the fourteenth century) on their distinction, so that 
each social group could be governed in the most efficient and effective way. 
This emphasis had inevitably shaped the dominant nineteenth-century 
conceptualisations of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ that viewed them as illnesses on a 
continuum of ‘insanity’, and thus mutually exclusive (see below).  
3.2.4.2.1 The emergence of technologies of classification 
Partly inspired by the hierarchical Linnaen classification system (Linnaeus, 
1735), physicians began to develop their own taxonomy and nomenclature in 
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the eighteenth century, often drawing on existing or past medical, legal and lay 
terminology to describe various forms and degrees of ‘insanity’. For example, 
Pinel (1798/1806) categorised ‘insanity’ into four basic types: ‘melancholia’, 
‘mania’ with or without ‘delirium’, ‘dementia’, and, at its lowest level, ‘idiocy’. By 
the 1840s these had increased to ten principle forms of ‘insanity’, acquiring a 
medico-legal status through their iteration in Lunacy Commissioner reports and 
subsequent legislation. A new category called ‘moral insanity’ was introduced 
to describe those whose emotions, affections and habits were ‘disordered’, 
‘violent’ or ‘morally perverse’ but who did not have hallucinations or problems 
with their intellectual or reasoning abilities (MCL, 1844). In other words, those 
who presented a threat to the social order but whose governance had perhaps 
not been so well-defined under previous ‘insanity’ legislation. This emphasis 
reflected a growing concern about morality that would eventually give rise to 
the extension and modification of insanity laws to enable the incorporation of 
this new group under the broader category of ‘mental defectives’. 
In his Compendium of Psychiatry, Kraepelin (1883/1919) argued that as a 
medical science, Psychiatry should research the biological causes of mental 
illness using methodologies employed by the natural sciences. In order to do 
this, he devised a classification system that grouped diseases according to 
patterns of clinical symptoms over time rather than the previously-used 
taxonomy based on similarity of major symptoms. Present-day diagnostic 
systems such as the DSM-5 and the ICD-10 can be traced back to Kraepelin’s 
nosological system. Their constant modification and expansion to reflect 
contemporaneous societal concerns are another illustration of how science and 
politics have interacted so that problems of knowledge become aligned with 
solutions to problems of social order (Pickersgill, 2012). Indeed, classification 
systems are powerfully constitutive of pathology and normality, and are one of 
the primary means through which psychiatric power operates (Pickersgill, 
2012; see Chapter 1). As a technology of power, they represent an important 
condition of possibility for the creation and maintenance of dual diagnosis. 
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3.2.4.2.2 Techniques of treatment and cure: Moral Treatment and 
Education 
As noted earlier, the ‘new’ conceptualisations of ‘lunacy’ and ‘idiocy’ made it 
possible for novel treatments and cures to emerge at a time when existing 
frameworks and approaches were having a limited impact. One of the main 
approaches popular in the nineteenth century was moral treatment, a 
psychosocial approach to madness that emerged towards the end of the 
eighteenth century that was promoted by Pinel at the Bicêtre Asylum in France 
and by Tuke at the York Retreat in Britain. A large component of moral 
treatment was dedicating to addressing the environmental causes of distress by 
providing optimal moral and environmental conditions, and a regimentation of 
daily life. Scull notes that as an alternative response to insanity, moral treatment 
represented ‘an epistemological break in the history of Western responses to 
madness’ (Scull, 1981, p. 9). 
Moral treatment was not offered to those with idiocy as they were constructed 
as lacking in emotions and thus not able to benefit from it. However, as 
discussed in section 3.2.3.3.4, in the 1840s Séguin, a French physician who 
had worked with both Itard and Esquirol, developed an educational training 
programme that challenged the perceived futility of treatments for idiots 
(Bewley, 2008). This built on approaches that had been used successfully with 
the deaf: 
In this application the master has to educate the muscular system and 
the sensorial apparatus, as well as the intellectual faculties . . . through 
them . . . doing, in fact, for them by art, by Instruction, by rousing 
imitation, what Nature does for healthier infant organizations. 
Séguin’s ideas were employed in British asylums, for example by Shuttleworth 
at the Royal Albert, who went on to publish his own book about the treatment 
and training of mentally-deficient children (Shuttleworth, 1895).  
Despite some success, the therapeutic optimism elicited by moral treatment and 
educational approaches was relatively short-lived. By the end of the nineteenth 
century it had become unworkable due to a variety of factors including cost, 
overpopulation of asylums and, importantly, changes in discourses about 
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insanity and its management (Benjamin & Baker, 2004; Pilgrim & Rogers, 
2014).  
3.2.4.3 The birth of Psychiatry 
Derived from the Greek psyche (‘soul’ or ‘mind’) and iatros (‘physician’), 
Psychiatry as a profession dates back to 1841, when the Association of Medical 
Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane (now Royal College of 
Psychiatrists) was formed (Shorter, 1997). As a medical ‘specialty’, however, its 
origins can be traced back to the eighteenth century. The medical profession 
had been involved in the administration of lunacy for some time, with medical 
practitioners (physicians, surgeons and apothecaries) increasingly being called 
upon by royal and parish officials to help with the assessment of thought to be 
insane (Stebbings, 2012). A number of doctor-led hospitals for the insane had 
also opened in the second half of the eighteenth century (Bartlett & Sandland, 
2004) that had helped establish their involvement and develop their expertise. 
Their powers to certify, detain and inspect were legally vested in the 
Madhouses Act 1774, and strengthened further by future legislation. The 
Madhouses Act 1828 required institutions with over 100 inmates to have a 
resident medical officer, a mandate that was extended to all asylums in the 
Lunacy Act 1845. The latter also authorised non-consensual treatment of those 
who had been certified (Gooding, 2014). In the words of Scull (2015), ‘madness 
was increasingly seen as something that could be authoritatively diagnosed, 
certified and treated only by a group of legally recognized experts. . . . “medical 
men” – increasingly an organized and self-conscious specialism within the 
profession of medicine’ (p. 6). 
In conclusion, the authority that physicians gained within the field of ‘idiocy’ and 
‘lunacy’ was made possible by a combination of inter-related factors, including: 
the growing influence and importance of medicine in maintaining the physical 
health of the nation; the presence of physicians within asylums; their adoption 
of the scientific discourse and the ‘expert’ scientific knowledge they were able 
to produce from the individualised disciplinary procedures adopted within these 
sites; the perceived success of moral treatment and other approaches in 
rehabilitating and reintegrating the ‘insane’ as productive members of society; 
and an increased legitimisation of their powers through legislation. It was this 
complex network of power-knowledge that enabled the emergence and 
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establishment of the medical speciality of ‘Psychiatry’; a profession that would 
become the main authority and producer of knowledge in ‘dual diagnosis’. 
In the final section of the analysis of descent, I examine the moral, political and 
socioeconomic concerns and explanations that led to the demise of ‘therapeutic 
optimism’ and a return to a model of care for the ‘insane’ that focused on 
confinement and protection rather than rehabilitation or cure. I highlight how 
such governmental concerns were concomitantly informed by and incorporated 
into changing discourses that emphasised a biomedical aetiology of ‘insanity’; a 
construction that continues to dominate our understanding of ‘dual diagnosis’ 
today. I note how discourses of heredity and degeneracy enabled the attribution 
of social problems such as poverty, illness and crime to individuals’ biology, and 
how this supported the development of new ‘preventative’ biological 
technologies of power designed to act at the level of the ‘population’. I also look 
at how the associated creation of the ‘mental defective’ as a new class of social 
deviance in the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 legitimised the detention and 
supervision of a much greater number of individuals whose behaviours were 
perceived to pose an irremediable threat to the social order.  
I then analyse the confluence of knowledge and power in the creation and 
administration of the intelligence test, highlighting the ways in which the 
inscription of psychological concepts such as ‘mental age’ and ‘developmental 
delay’ onto the bodies and minds of ‘idiots’ and ‘imbeciles’ would pave the way 
for the emergence of ‘dual diagnosis’, and create a role for the emerging 
discipline of Psychology that would later support its ongoing involvement with 
the dually diagnosed. 
3.2.5 The emergence of a biopolitical apparatus of the state 
As the rates of admissions accelerated, hospitals become overcrowded, with a 
growing number of ‘chronic’ and ‘dangerous’ cases (Digby, 1996). In the context 
of these larger asylum populations and the associated growth in the 
administrative responsibilities of medical superintendents, it became 
increasingly difficult to appropriately promote and implement the cost- and 
resource-intensive approaches that moral treatment and systematic training 
programmes represented (Bradoch & Parish, 2001). Cure rates for lunacy, 
which had never been as high as predicted, dwindled, and although ‘idiots’ 
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could learn skills and many had become ‘productive workers’, they did not 
achieve ‘normality’ (Myers, 1998; Harbour & Maulik, 2010). Coulter (2009) 
highlights also a deterioration in global economic conditions in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century (the ‘Long Depression’), when such individuals were 
unable to compete with more ‘able’ others for the scarce employment available, 
and were thus maintained in the devalued subjectivities of non-productive, 
social and moral deviants (Manion & Bersani, 1987). The result was that 
institutions once again became custodial warehouses, whose success was 
redefined as meeting basic needs rather than ‘cure' (Scull, 1981). 
Notions of curability and associated practices were also challenged by the 
emerging discourses about heredity and degeneration as the main causes of 
not only insanity, but of a myriad of other physical, moral and social ‘evils’ that 
were particularly rife amongst the poor (Pilgrim & Rogers, 2014). As an 
inherited genetic disorder of the brain, located firmly within the body of the 
patient, insanity was not likely to be amenable to environmental or educational 
reform. More alarmingly, there was a danger that this condition would be 
passed on to the children of affected individuals, and, because they were 
breeding faster than the ‘elite’ bourgeoisie, it would ultimately result in the 
degeneration of the entire population. On the basis of these assumptions, such 
individuals posed a risk to both current and future social order, and a solution 
that addressed both these axes was needed. This was enabled through the 
science and practice of ‘eugenics’. 
3.2.5.1 Eugenics, biopower and the emergence of the ‘mental defective’: 
Mental Deficiency Act 1913 
‘Eugenics’ was the name given by Francis Galton (1883) to describe the 
science of improving the population’s genetic stock.  In combination with other 
racist theories, such as Bénédict Morel’s (1857) degeneration theory and 
Cesare Lombroso’s (1876/2006) theory of anthropological criminology, Galton’s 
research gave strength to the eugenics socio-political movement of the late 
nineteenth century that ‘sought to improve the body politic and to relieve it of the 
economic and social burdens of disease and degeneracy in the future by acting 
upon the reproductive decisions and capacities of individuals in the present’ 
(Rose, 2001a, p. 3).  
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Eugenics embodied a regime of power that Foucault (1976/1998) named 
‘biopower’: a type of power over life that aimed to achieve the ‘subjugation of 
bodies and the control of populations’ (p. 140) via the interrelated 
‘anatamopolitics’ of the individual body (through techniques of discipline), and 
the ‘biopolitics’ of the population (through a range of regulatory controls over 
biological processes that included ‘propagation, births and mortality, the level of 
health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause 
these to vary’; p. 139). 
In the twentieth century, these aims were made possible through the 
formulation and enactment of a number of state policies and programmes that 
included both ‘positive’ eugenic measures (such as encouraging the 
reproduction of ‘fit’ individuals who had ‘desirable’ traits), and ‘negative’ 
measures (such as segregation or institutionalisation, sterilisation, prevention of 
marriage, forced abortion or genocide of those individuals and families identified 
and classified as ‘degenerate’ or ‘unfit’; Rose, 2001b). Such reprobates included 
people who were poor, disabled, or of ‘unsound mind’, as well as criminals, 
‘moral deviants’ (such as unmarried mothers and homosexuals), and particular 
racial and cultural groups (such as Roma gypsies and Jews in Nazi Germany).  
In Britain, concerns about the problems that these kinds of individuals posed to 
the moral, physical and economic welfare of society were long-standing. They 
were reinforced further by the lack of moral and intellectual improvement of 
pauper children in statutory education facilities, where, following the 
implementation of the Education Act 1870, they had become visible for the first 
time (McDonagh, 2008). In the context of the ‘crisis’ of the asylums, a downturn 
in the economy, and the availability of new discourses about ‘insanity’ and its 
management, a Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-
Minded in 1904 was established to review ‘the existing methods of dealing with 
idiots and epileptics, and with imbecile, feeble-minded, or defective persons not 
certified under the Lunacy Law’ and advise on ‘the amendments in the law or 
other measures which should be adopted in the matter, due regard being had to 
the expense involved in any such proposals’ (Commission for the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-Minded [CCCFM], 1908, p. xvi). Their findings, published 
as the Radnor Report four years later, concluded that: 
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there are numbers of mentally defective persons whose training is 
neglected, over whom no sufficient control is exercised, and whose 
wayward and irresponsible lives are productive of crime and misery, of 
much injury and mischief to themselves and to others, and of much 
continuous expenditure wasteful to the community and individual 
families. 
We find a local and “permissive” system of public education which . . . 
even if it be useful during the years of training, is supplemented by no 
subsequent supervision and control. . . . We find large numbers of 
persons who are committed to prisons for repeated offences, which, 
being the manifestations of a permanent defect of mind, there is no hope 
of repressing, much less of stopping, by short punitive sentences. We 
find lunatic asylums crowded with patients who do not require the careful 
hospital treatment that well-equipped asylums now afford, and who might 
be treated in many other ways more economically, and as efficiently. We 
find, also, at large in the population many mentally defective persons, 
adults, young persons, and children, who are . . . incapable of self-
control, and who are therefore exposed to constant moral danger 
themselves, and become the source of lasting injury to the community. 
(CCCFM, 1908, p. 3). 
Constructed as a burden on the economy, the community, the family and the 
state, the logical solutions to be advocated by the Commission for these 
‘irresponsible’, ‘wayward’ individuals who were ‘incapable of self-control’ or of 
defending themselves against ‘constant moral danger’ due to an irrepressible 
and ‘permanent defect of mind’, were more efficient and effective methods of 
identification, surveillance and control. Recommendations included sheltering 
and protecting them from society in segregated, self-sustained ‘colonies’, 
preventing their reproduction ‘to diminish the number of such persons in the 
population’ (CCCFM, 1908, p. 185) and improving surveillance across a number 
of statutory and community sites to identify and govern those who were ‘at 
large’.  
The ensuing Mental Deficiency Act (MDA) 1913 created a new kind of person – 
the ‘mental defective’, who came in four different forms of ‘social inefficiency’ 
(Burt, 1920, p. 52): the ‘idiot’, the ‘imbecile’, the ‘feeble-minded’ and the ‘moral 
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defective’. Each of these was operationalised to ‘facilitate the introduction of 
better and more discriminating methods of help and control in regards to those 
whom the terms represent[ed]’ (CCCFM, 1908, p. 7), with an emphasis on 
social competency and adaptation that illustrates the social rather than medical 
concern for their creation, and that remains an integral part of the definition of 
‘learning disability’ today (Race, 2002). The latter two ‘higher grade’ categories 
were new and legitimised the institutionalisation of ‘moral deviants’, such as 
unmarried mothers and young men with minor offending behaviours who were 
arguably the main focus and drive for this new Act. In fact, many of the changes 
that were implemented involved an extension of existing lunacy legislation to 
these new ‘classes’ and, by utilising existing administrative and institutional 
frameworks and designs, the implementation of the Act was a fairly economic 
and straightforward one.  
In line with recommendations, the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 mandated the 
compulsory segregation of the ‘mentally deficient’ in the ‘large farm colonies’. 
Using existing asylum buildings, or constructing new ones that followed the 
same architectural layout enabling the disciplinary regulation of space, such 
‘colonies’ were designed to be self-sufficient, with onsite amenities and schools 
where children who were able to could learn useful practical skills for their adult 
life – not in society, but for use in the colony itself (Jarrett, 2012; Bradoch & 
Parish, 2001). There was to be a clear division of labour dependent on the 
‘grade’ of defectiveness: 
the high-grade patients are the skilled workmen of the colony, those who 
do all the higher processes of manufacture, those on whom there is a 
considerable measure of responsibility; the medium grade patients are 
the labourers, who do the more simple routine work in the training shops 
and about the institution; the best of the lower-grade patients fetch and 
carry or do the very simple work. (Mental Deficiency Committee [MDC], 
1929, p. 33) 
It was felt that ‘an institution that takes all types and ages is economical 
because the high-grade patients do the work and make everything necessary, 
not only for themselves, but also for the lower grade’ (MDC, 1929, p. 33). 
Rehabilitation and reintegration into society were thus no longer central aims. 
Instead, individuals were ‘employed and detained; and . . . kept under effectual 
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supervision so long as may be necessary’ (CCCFM, 1908, p. 185) – a decision 
that invariably fell to the medical superintendents that would continue to 
administer such facilities. In fact, as in previous legislation, medical power was 
widely supported by the MDA 1913; by mandating the submission of two 
medical certificates for the purposes of admission, the power to diagnose and 
dictate the site and mode of governance was firmly placed in doctors’ hands 
(Race, 2002), where it has remained for those deemed ‘mentally ill’ today. 
As recommended by the report, the Act also introduced careful surveillance and 
control of all potential deviants in the community to enable their identification 
and governance. This detection was aided by the systematic examination of 
children in statutory education using ‘scientific’ tools such as the intelligence 
test, and with assistance from voluntary organisations such as the ‘Central 
Association for the Care of the Mentally Defective’ that visited people on behalf 
of the government’s Board of Control34 (Hall, 2008). These measures enabled 
the operation of biopower through dispersed networks and across a number of 
different sites, especially in schools, where local education authorities were 
legally required to notify the local authority of any ‘defective’ children within their 
area (Mental Deficiency Act 1913); a mandate that continues today under the 
‘Special Educational Needs’ framework.  
The measures introduced by the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 were perceived as 
progressive and humane alternatives to workhouses, prisons and lunatic 
asylums and, because ‘mental defectives’ were deemed incapable of 
responsible citizenship, both conservative and liberal politicians agreed that 
their welfare and control had to be taken over by the state (Thomson, 1999). 
However, they clearly embodied ideas that ‘mental deficiency’ was responsible 
for the poverty, illness and crime that accompanied urbanisation (Harbour & 
Maulik, 2010), and eugenic fears that these permanent hereditary and 
pathological conditions would result in the degeneracy of the general 
population. Like earlier legislation (such as the Poor Law 1834), the Mental 
Deficiency Act ignored the fact that thousands of people had physical and 
sensory impairments caused by the poor housing, sanitary conditions, 
healthcare, lack of immunisations and diet associated with poverty and disease, 
                                                          
34 The ‘Board of Control’ replaced the ‘Lunacy Commission’, maintaining the strong medical and legal 
presence and authority that had been characteristic of the latter. 
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and no provisions were made to improve these. It had support from the majority 
of professionals involved in the administration of the mentally deficient, the 
‘experts’ who carried out the policy which, under the Act, continued to be 
Psychiatrists. Under this new regime, however, Psychiatrists were 
reconstructed as experts in heredity and social behaviour whose role was to 
differentiate the ‘normal’ from the ‘deficient’, and to govern rather than cure. 
3.2.5.2 The ‘Intelligence Quotient’ (IQ) apparatus of knowledge-power 
Initially intended as an aid for the appropriate educational placement of children 
in France, the intelligence test that was developed at the beginning of the 
twentieth century by Binet and Simon (1904) was quickly adopted and adapted 
by supporters of the eugenics movement across the Western world to support 
the identification and categorisation of the ‘mentally deficient’. Facilitating the 
ready comparison and quantification of individuals against a set of ‘norms’ 
(Rose, 1999), the intelligence test represented a far more efficient and effective 
‘scientific’ technology of power for the differentiation of ‘normality’ and 
‘pathology’ than the more qualitative psychiatric examination had done 
(Menolascino & McCann, 1983). Its deployment led to the ‘discovery’ of many 
more ‘mentally deficient’ people in the community than previously thought 
existed, although a more Foucauldian perspective would argue that it created 
more ‘mentally deficient’ subjects. In combination with the association of feeble-
mindedness with heredity (Goddard, 1913), these ‘findings’ further endorsed 
eugenic fears and demands for the identification and permanent segregation of 
all such individuals (Hall, 2008).  
The intelligence test placed ‘idiots’ and ‘imbeciles’ on a continuum with ‘normal’ 
people, which represented a shift from a categorical conceptualisation of 
‘insanity’ to a more quantitative one (Berrios, 1994). This challenged the 
conceptualisation of ‘idiocy’ as an ‘illness’ or form of ‘insanity’, favouring the 
‘developmental’ framework that continues to dominate constructions of learning 
disability today (Berrios, 1994). This discursive shift was aided by the concept of 
‘mental age’, which matched the performance of children who were struggling 
with school with that of younger children on intelligence tests. German 
psychologist William Stern (1912/1914) would later divide mental age by 
chronological age to yield an intelligence quotient (IQ); a measure of the rate of 
intellectual growth that would produce the concept of ‘developmental delay’ 
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(Berkson, 1993). Notwithstanding this new discourse, intelligence as a learning 
‘potential’, was viewed as a relatively stable, heritable, biological trait. This view 
has endured despite opposing evidence that it is predominantly environmentally 
determined, and that IQ tests are educationally and culturally biased (Manion & 
Bersani, 1987; Ryan & Thomas, 1987). 
Whilst it was not novel to conflate the competences of ‘idiots’ with those of 
children, the notion that their intellectual ability could be equated to typically-
developing children influenced later ideas that the emotional development in 
these two groups is also comparable; a key premise for the emergence and 
maintenance of ‘dual diagnosis’ and its attending social practices. The 
association of ‘idiocy’ with children also served to reinforce and justify the 
infantilising and paternalistic approaches that had been and, in many ways, 
continue to be afforded to these individuals.  
In combination with psychologists’ responsibility for the assessment of the 
evolving concepts of ‘personality’ and ‘temperament’, ‘intelligence’ and its 
measurement helped to create a role for the emerging discipline of Psychology, 
enabling psychologists to become ‘experts’ in establishing the ‘degree of mental 
inadequacy’ (Burt, 1920, p. 53). Largely due to this historical involvement, 
psychologists would later become one of the main authorities in learning 
disability and dual diagnosis alongside Psychiatry. Intelligence tests continue to 
be used as a dividing practice between the ‘normal’ and the ‘learning disabled’ 
in the present day (Barnes, 1991), and are one of the main determinants in 
peoples’ ability to access learning disability (and consequently dual diagnosis) 
services (Berkson, 1993). 
Together, the deployment of the IQ test and the prerogatives and philosophies 
of the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 resulted in an exponential increase in the 
number of admissions to the existing and newly-built colony asylums. Whereas 
in 1914 there had been just over 2,000 ‘mental defectives’ in institutions in 
England and Wales, by the mid-1950s this number had risen to nearly 61,000 
(Jones, 1972), with a further 43,000 under statutory supervision in the 
community (Race, 2002).  
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3.3 Analysis of the surface of emergence 
In this part of my analysis, I focus more explicitly on dual diagnosis. I map out 
and examine the more proximal conditions of possibility for its emergence, the 
implications of associated discourses on subjectivities and practice, and the 
subjugated understandings that might help identify alternative ways of acting 
(research questions 1, 3 and 4). As I lead up to the present, I will also examine 
some of the power-knowledge networks that sustain dual diagnosis (research 
question 2). 
I start by examining how classifications associated with learning disability and 
mental illness first began to be considered as a co-occurrence, and identify 
some of the historical explanations and practices that have been carried into 
contemporary understandings of dual diagnosis. I then consider the conditions 
of possibility for the re-emergence of this co-occurrence in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, and examine some of the ways in which understandings and 
practices are changing. 
3.3.1 Emerging medical research in the co-occurrence of ‘idiocy’ and 
‘insanity’: Late 1800s-1950 
The early to mid-nineteenth century conceptualisation of ‘idiocy’ and ‘lunacy’ as 
illnesses on a continuum of ‘insanity’ meant that they were largely perceived to 
be mutually exclusive. Within this dominant theoretical framework and, given 
the imperatives of efficient and effective administration and governance of the 
insane, most studies had focused on their distinction. Notable exceptions 
included Esquirol (1845), who stated that ‘imbeciles are not always deprived of 
moral sensibility, and are capable of becoming melancholics’ (p. 453), and 
Ireland (1877), who in his book chapter ‘insanity in children and insane idiots 
and imbeciles’ noted he had ‘seen imbeciles affected with mania, melancholia 
and delusions’ (p. 249). The title of Ireland’s (1877) chapter illustrates the 
concomitant efforts to investigate and understand instances of ‘childhood 
psychosis’, the often conflated ‘infantile autism’, and their relation to ‘mental 
deficiency’ (Donaldson & Menolascino, 1977). These interests were partly 
driven by observations that some forms of ‘insanity’ led to a (sometimes 
permanent) loss of intellectual and social functioning, sometimes at a very early 
age, and associated degenerative discourses and concerns that these were 
caused by a pre-existing ‘mental deficiency’ that eluded detection. Another 
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motivation was the growing preoccupation with the ‘dangerous age of childhood’ 
and the threats posed by the ‘maladjusted child’ to themselves, their family and 
wider society (Stewart, 2011). 
With the reconceptualization of ‘idiocy’ as a developmental delay on a 
continuum of ‘normality’ rather than an ‘illness’ or form of ‘insanity’, studies in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries began to consider the 
possibility that the two could co-exist in a more focused and systematic fashion 
(Parsons, May & Menolascino, 1984). In their investigations, psychiatrists and 
psychologists were able to make use of the more ‘sophisticated’ technologies 
and techniques of classification and examination that emerging nosological 
systems, IQ tests and concepts such as ‘mental age’ had enabled, to define, 
refine and theorise about particular clinical ‘subgroups’. Their professional 
involvement across a number of disciplinary sites, including asylums, schools, 
and the child guidance clinics that began to appear in Britain in the 1920s 
ensured a readily accessible population of individuals upon which such 
technologies could be deployed, and about whom knowledge could be created. 
Initially, the possibility of ‘insanity’ co-occurring with ‘mental deficiency’ was 
considered for the ‘higher grades’, as they not only represented the group ‘of 
greatest sociological importance’ (Earl, 1934, p. 230), but also because the 
largely non-verbal behaviour of ‘idiots’ made it inherently difficult to reliably 
identify ‘psychotic’ symptoms such as ‘delusions’ and ‘hallucinations’. Early 
researchers were particularly interested in whether presentation and aetiology 
of ‘insanity’ in those classified as ‘mentally deficient’ resembled that of ‘ordinary’ 
people. By and large, researchers concluded that in higher grades of 
‘imbecility’, ‘actual insanity in the form of ‘impulsive acts, morbid propensities. . . 
. mania . . . melancholia, and . . . delusions . . . run about the same course as in 
persons who possess a normal brain’ (Hurd, 1888, p. 269). Using detailed case 
studies, researchers provided numerous examples to support their conclusions. 
Many tested their theories by assessing peoples’ responses to painful stimuli or 
persistent provocation and, rather than interpreting subsequent aggression as a 
natural response, it was taken as evidence of ‘mania’ or ‘emotional dissociation’ 
(Ireland, 1877; Barr, 1904; Earl, 1934). 
Whereas initially it had been believed that ‘the lowest grade of imbeciles . . . do 
not have delusions nor can they properly be considered insane’ (Hurd, 1888, p. 
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269), as knowledge about ‘childhood psychosis’ was constructed alongside that 
of ‘insanity’ in ‘mental deficiency’, researchers increasingly concluded that ‘a 
primitive catatonic schizophrenia occurs in idiots and in very young normal 
children’ (Earl, 1934, pp. 250-251). To assist with the differentiation of insanity 
affecting ‘normal’ children, Kraepelin (1896/1919) introduced the classification 
of ‘pfropfhebephrenie35’ to describe ‘hebephrenia’ engrafted or superimposed 
on ‘idiocy’ or ‘imbecility’.  
In terms of presentation, and in contrast with the relatively normalised 
construction of ‘insanity’ in ‘imbecility’, it was largely believed that ‘insanity’ in 
‘idiocy’ presented ‘atypically’, in two main forms: ‘dull/melancholic’ or 
‘excitable/manic’. Barr (1904) claimed that behavioural and physiological signs 
of ‘insanity’ were detectable as early as the first year: ‘The torpid thumb-sucking 
baby, thin, anaemic, constipated, whose attention can seldom be attracted and 
never held’ (pp. 231-232) represented the ‘melancholic’ type; and ‘the 
screaming, restless, sleepless infant with variable temperature, quick pulse, 
flushed face, wild eyes and furred tongue, kicking and beating continually with 
hands or head’ (p. 232) typified the ‘manic’ variety. Earlier theorists had noted 
the difficulty in demonstrating that such behaviours in infants were not due to 
physical pain (Maudsley,1876; Ireland, 1877), but this alternative explanation 
(which could be applied to those with limited verbal communication today) has 
been systematically silenced or subjugated by the power-knowledge ‘truth’ 
statements produced by the biomedical psychiatric discourse.  
By the 1930s, the delineation and interpretation of ‘behaviour’ as indicative of 
‘mental illness’ had become a central focus of research. As illustrated by Earl 
(1934), this shift was largely pragmatic: ‘as the idiot is incapable of 
conversation, you have to rely on objective study of behaviour and psychomotor 
phenomena’ (p. 230) ‘not because the remaining features are unimportant, but 
merely because such active and positive phenomena as movements form better 
material for investigation’ (p. 250). In other words, they were a more tangible, 
convenient and acceptable target for the deployment of the positivist empirical 
technologies associated with the dominant scientific regime. In so doing, it 
became possible to claim the creation of ‘new’ knowledge, one that supported 
the notion of an ‘atypical’ behavioural presentation of ‘psychosis’ that was 
                                                          
35 Renamed ‘propfschizophrenia’ by Bleuler in 1911 (Kratter, 1959).  
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unique to ‘idiocy’ and which in turn facilitated its diagnosis. This notion of 
‘atypical’ presentation would be carried forward into Sovner and Hurley’s (1986) 
concept of ‘behavioural equivalents’ , and into the production of the DC-LD 
(RCP, 2001). It continues to provide the justification for the diagnosis of ‘mental 
illness’ in those assessed as having a lower level of intellectual functioning. 
It was at this time that emotions also became a focus of research. In line with 
current conceptualisations of people with a learning disability as having delayed 
or compromised emotional development, Earl (1934) stated that ‘the emotional 
life of idiots deviates from the normal almost as widely as their intelligence’ (p. 
230). Despite noting that ‘it is incredibly difficult at the lowest level to determine 
which feature is ‘normal’ and which is not’ (p.248), he went on to say that he 
believed that ‘in the great majority of cases, the earliest signs [of psychosis] are 
those of emotional abnormality’ (p. 242), highlighting ‘causeless weeping. . . [or] 
laughter’ (p. 242) as behavioural expressions of this anomaly. It is evident here 
that the judgement of causality, proportionality and appropriateness of 
emotional expression was (and continues to be) made by an ‘examiner’ always-
already in a position of power. ‘Idiots’ were constructed as lacking an internal 
world that they could be responding to, such as memories of past or current 
traumas (including the experience of institutionalisation itself), or physical pain 
or illness. In his report of patients who would ‘talk to themselves or even to a 
nurse, but remain obstinately mute in front of the psychiatrist’ (p. 235), and the 
subsequent attribution of this response to ‘negativity’ and thus further evidence 
of ‘insanity’, Earl (1934) highlights how such power relations were (and continue 
to be) difficult to resist.  
Environmental, social, economic and psychological aetiological discourses were 
not entirely absent at this time. However, they were typically silenced or 
subjugated in favour of moral and biomedical discourses. For example, whereas 
Hurd (1888) outlined multiple examples of ‘untoward events’, ‘overwhelming 
calamities’ and ‘severe mental shock’ in individuals’ personal histories, he 
concluded that ‘such causation seems rare’ (p. 268) and highlighted instead 
that: 
the determining causes of the development of insanity among 
imbeciles are generally physiological epochs or crises, or vicious 
practices or indulgences acting upon a neurotic organization 
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which has been directly inherited from an insane or dissolute 
parent. (p. 269) 
Earl (1934) too concluded that ‘the present evidence would appear to indicate 
the causal importance of physical rather than of experiential factors’ (p. 251). To 
support aetiological theories of brain injury or pathology, researchers 
increasingly drew on experimental animal studies demonstrating that damage to 
particular areas of the brain could cause symptoms of hypo- or hyperkinaesia. 
These reinforced discourses of ‘idiocy’ representing an almost sub-human 
ontological state that lay somewhere between ‘animal’ and ‘man’: ‘the idiot 
forms . . . a connecting link [between] the experimental animal . . . and the 
normal man of psychopathologists’ (Earl, 1934, p. 231). Constructed as such, 
any thoughts, feelings or pain such individuals might experience were more 
easily dismissed. There were a few attempts to formulate the internal world of 
‘idiots’ within emergent psychodynamic theories, however, researchers typically 
concluded that their ‘emotional life . . . has never been sufficiently developed to 
allow one to talk of conflict or repression in the analytical sense’ (Earl, 1934, p. 
249). The view that their psyche was ‘insufficiently organized to possess a 
super-ego’ (Earl, 1934, p. 248) persisted for decades, thwarting the proffering of 
psychological therapies to people with a learning disability and contributing to 
the view that such individuals were not sentient beings. 
Reflecting the ongoing influence of biological and degenerative discourses, by 
the 1940s it was generally agreed that ‘mental illness’ was more common in the 
‘mentally deficient’, and it was even stated that ‘the rate of mental disease 
declines as the degree of intelligence advances [and] if we were intelligent 
enough we might escape mental disease altogether’ (Pollock, 1945, p. 362). 
Research cited to support these conclusions included a survey undertaken by 
Duncan, Penrose and Turnbull (1935) in a British lunatic asylum that concluded 
one fifth of its patients could have been certified as ‘mentally deficient’. This 
inference assumed ‘insanity’ was a primary and accurate diagnosis, when in 
fact individuals’ cognition sometimes declined following episodes of ‘insanity’, 
physical illness, or seizures, and those who were too difficult to manage in other 
settings were routinely sent to lunatic asylums even when they were not thought 
to be ‘insane’ (Barr, 1904). Rather than highlighting or reflecting on the 
administrative and diagnostic inconsistencies that might have contributed to this 
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higher rate of ‘mental disease’ among the ‘mentally deficient’, a number of 
pathologising explanations were offered to explain this apparent link. Pollock 
(1945) listed these as follows:  
1. The mentally defective are poorly equipped to withstand stresses of 
unusual character. 
2. They have great difficulty in resolving their mental conflicts. 
3. Due to their lack of social competency and their susceptibility to 
suggestion they get into all sorts of difficulties.  
4. Many . . . are emotionally unstable and easily become so excited or 
depressed that they lose control of themselves.  
(Pollock, 1945, p. 362) 
These explanations are almost identical to those used today to justify why 
people with a ‘learning disability’ have an increased risk of developing a ‘mental 
illness’. 
Consistent with the biomedical discourses they were founded upon, treatments 
during this time became increasingly medicalised – fever therapy, insulin-coma 
therapy, prefrontal lobotomy, electroconvulsive therapy; procedures that carried 
serious medical risks and that only doctors could administer (Grob, 1983). 
Sedatives were also used as a form of chemical restraint: ‘trional or tetronal are 
excellent hypnotics, especially in cases of destructive proclivity’ (Barr, 1904, p. 
232). Alongside these however, were regimes reminiscent of aspects of moral 
therapy, including the avoidance of ‘undue excitement or fatigue; simple food, 
sleep, exercise and periods of rest, occupation and recreation alternating’ (Barr, 
1904, p. 232).  
The studies examined above illustrate the emergence of a discourse around the 
co-occurrence of ‘mental deficiency’ and ‘insanity’ towards the end of the 
nineteenth century that introduced a number of explanations and practices that 
continue to underpin and have relevance for contemporary understandings of 
dual diagnosis. It was accompanied by a shift from the evaluation of intellectual 
aspects to the increasingly technical and detailed assessment of social, 
emotional and behavioural dimensions. These initial efforts to explore the co-
occurrence of mental deficiency and insanity were relatively short-lived 
however, and would not be revisited in earnest again until the 1970s. 
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3.3.2 The ‘tragic interlude’ 
There were a number of events that contributed to what modern dual diagnosis 
psychiatric historians refer to as the ‘tragic interlude’ (Donaldson & 
Menolascino, 1977). The introduction of the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 had 
provided a permanent institutional solution to the problem of idiocy and 
imbecility, making them less of a concern or focus (Turner, 1989), particularly in 
the context of war and economic disarray. Governmental concerns became 
increasingly about the ‘borderlands’ – the troublesome feebleminded boys and 
the promiscuous feebleminded girls on the borderline with imbecility (Jackson, 
2000) – particularly as they approached adolescence, which was perceived as a 
particularly risky and unmanageable time. The study and governance of juvenile 
delinquency thus received more attention and, in an effort to prevent the 
degradation of the children ‘at large’, community education and parenting 
programmes were introduced, deployed through emergent ‘Child Guidance 
clinics’ led by child psychiatrists, psychologists and psychiatric social workers.   
Psychoanalysis, which offered a new role for community psychiatrists, was 
ruled out for people with mental deficiency as it was believed that ‘normal’ 
intellectual and language abilities were necessary for its success (Szymanski, 
1994). In combination with the increased reliance on ‘mental tests’ to diagnose 
mental deficiency, the assessment and therapeutic services of Psychiatrists 
were rendered expendable, and their role became much more about 
administration of those perceived to be chronically and incurably ill.  The need 
for further study into the co-occurrence of insanity in idiocy and imbecility was 
also reduced substantially following Kanner’s (1943) demarcation of ‘autism’, 
which offered the explanatory framework for childhood psychosis that 
researchers had been searching for some time (Eaton & Menolascino, 1982). 
As a consequence of the above events and the privileging of the ‘new’ 
approaches and patient groups, psychiatrists in mental deficiency hospitals 
were increasingly seen as the poor relation, or ‘Cinderella’ of Psychiatry 
(Donaldson & Menolascino, 1977) and the specialty was considered by many 
as a narrow and fruitless area for professional involvement (Menolascino & 
McCann, 1983). It was not until the last quarter of the twentieth century that it 
would once again rise in prominence and power as an important solution to 
governmental problems. 
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3.3.3 The emergence of the welfare state: National Health Service Act 
1946 
The period following the Second World War saw a number of political and 
organisational reforms led by the newly-elected Labour Party. This included the 
creation of a new National Health Service, as part of the State’s efforts to 
abolish the ‘five giants’ identified in the Beveridge Report (Inter-departmental 
Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, 1942): want, disease, 
squalor, ignorance and idleness36. 
The NHS offered free medical care to the whole population that was not based 
on the principle of insurance (where people would only be entitled if they had 
contributed). As such, and of interest to my research question number four, it 
represented a significant departure from most of the historical approaches to 
health and social care; the first system of its kind in any Western society (Hall et 
al., 2015). Under the NHS Act, responsibility for colonies and other certified 
institutions was transferred from Local Authorities to the Minister of Health. 
Colonies and asylums became ‘mental handicap’ and ‘mental illness’ hospitals, 
defined as institutions for ‘the reception of treatment of persons suffering from 
illness or mental defectiveness’ (NHS Act 1946, s79). 
They were incorporated into the newly-formed Regional Hospital Boards under 
their own Hospital Management Committee; a structure that would remain 
unchanged until 1974. Race (2002) notes how this shift in provision would 
considerably strengthen the medical power and authority over learning disability 
(and it is a power that continues to govern dual diagnosis today): 
Despite all the hospital closures, government reports, incentives and 
even legislation to try and get either joint working with others, or others 
as ‘lead authorities’, power over the learning disability agenda (even the 
‘official’ adoption of that classification) has remained in the hands of the 
Department of Health’ (p. 34). 
Initially, however, they continued to be run as before. There was ‘limited public 
and political awareness of the parlous state of these hospitals, which were 
massively underfunded and with overwhelming staffing problems’ (Hall, 2008, 
pp. 1006-1007). The lack of action or interest is also likely to have reflected 
                                                          
36 Other measures included the reform of social security, housing, education and unemployment (Hall et al., 2015). 
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ongoing economic, social, moral, degenerative and eugenic concerns, despite 
events and studies challenging the heritability of ‘mental disorders’, their higher 
prevalence amongst the lower classes, and the dominance of genetic aetiology 
as the sole explanation (for example, ‘combat stress’ in soldiers, and the impact 
of the environment on development; Berkson, 1993).  This is demonstrated in 
the following entry by Alfred Tredgold (1952), whose Textbook on Mental 
Deficiency was considered the most authoritative in the field of mental 
deficiency for training doctors and nurses (Hall, 2008) wrote that:  
The 80,000 or more idiots and imbeciles in the country . . . are not only 
incapable of being employed to any economic advantage, but their care 
and support, whether in their own homes or in institutions, absorbs a 
large amount of time, energy and money of the normal population which 
could be utilised to better purpose. Moreover, many of these defectives 
are utterly helpless, repulsive in appearance, and revolting in manners. 
Their existence is a perpetual source of sorrow and unhappiness to 
their parents, and those who live at home have a most disturbing 
influence upon other children and family life . . . In my opinion it would 
be an economical and humane procedure were their existence to be 
painlessly terminated. (p. 92) 
Public policy continued to promote the confinement of mental defectives 
(Coulter, 2009; Harbour & Maulik, 2010). The conditions of institutions would 
not begin to be reviewed until the mid-1950s, with changes to practice taking a 
substantially longer period of time.  
3.3.3.1 The rise of the psy-professions 
As noted above, outside the institutions, mental hygiene and psychodynamic 
approaches had emerged and gained popularity in the inter-war period as more 
attention was placed on those more therapeutically promising than the mentally 
handicapped (Thomson, 1999). This new focus had enabled the formation of 
new disciplinary authorities – psy-professions such as psychoanalysts, child 
psychiatrists and educational psychologists who, when the new NHS was 
formed, competed with the institutional authorities for a claim to both resources 
and a role in the post-war welfare state (Thomson, 1999).   
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3.3.3.2 The emergence of Clinical Psychology 
The emergence of Clinical Psychology is closely linked with the formation of the 
NHS; a ‘symbiotic’ power-relation that is ongoing (Hall et al., 2015). As the chief 
employer and funder of the profession and its training today, the NHS has 
shaped where and how clinical psychologists practice. The formation and 
subsequent involvement of the Clinical Psychology profession with dual 
diagnosis was made possible by Psychology’s earlier (and ongoing) roles in 
psychometry and in the deployment of behavioural technologies of power. This 
authority was aided by an appeal to the ruling scientific discourse in what was a 
medically dominated environment (Pilgrim, 2010), and significantly extended 
when the BPS was granted a royal charter in 1965 (which conferred it the right 
to be consulted on a range of government issues; Hall et al., 2015). Smail 
(1995) adds that part of the reason for the success of the clinical profession is 
the fact that it has not significantly challenged the more powerful authority of 
Psychiatry by attempting to obtain the statutory powers that underlie their 
existence. 
In the first two decades following the inception of the NHS, only a minority of 
mental illness or handicap hospitals employed psychologists. Earlswood 
Asylum, for example, appointed its first psychologist in 1959, with a remit of 
supporting patients with difficult behaviour. Behaviour increasingly became the 
focus of interventions, and in the 1960s, an outpatients department for children 
with emotional and behavioural difficulties was opened. 
3.3.3.2.1 Technologies of behavioural control 
Behaviourism is a psychological approach founded on the premise that all 
behaviour is learned from the environment through processes that became 
known as ‘classical’ or ‘operant conditioning’. Watson (1913) explained it as 
follows: 
Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental 
branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and 
control of behaviour. Introspection forms no essential part of its 
methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the 
readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of 
consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of 
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animal response recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. 
The behaviour of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms 
only a part of the behaviorist’s total scheme of investigation. (p. 158)  
Behaviourism has long been considered one of the most scientific psychological 
approaches and was key in helping the establishment of the Clinical Psychology 
profession. A disciplinary technology of power, it is typically deployed by more 
powerful persons to shape the conduct of those who are less powerful into more 
acceptable, desirable forms (Kipnis, 1990).  
Within institutions, behaviourists employed a wide variety of aversive 
techniques in an attempt to change peoples’ ‘maladaptive’ behaviours. This 
became increasingly unacceptable with the advent of normalisation principles, 
and more ‘positive’ behaviour support strategies were developed that 
interpreted behaviour as functional (LaVigna & Donnellan, 1986) and 
communicative (Carr & Duran, 1985) rather than maladaptive. By the 1970s, 
behaviour therapy had become the main psychological treatment for mental 
disorders (Stenfert Kroese, Dagnan & Loumidis,1997) and, it continues to be 
extremely popular in the construction and governance of dual diagnosis today.  
Of interest to my final research question, Smail (1990) has argued that 
behavioural approaches offered an alternative to medical focus on internal 
biology, but that the environmentalism37 they advocated was ‘lost in the power 
politics of scientific legitimation’ (p. 2). However, they still represent an 
individual solution to the problem, and their construction of internal states and 
emotions as irrelevant because they are not observable or measurable has 
contributed to their neglect.  
3.3.4 Challenges to institutional practices 
3.3.4.1 Human and civil rights discourses of abuse 
In 1951, the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) published a called 
50,000 Outside the Law highlighting the breach to civil liberties represented by 
the detention of people in institutions and drawing attention to the inadequacies 
and abusive conditions of the existing system (NCCL, 1951). The need for 
                                                          
37 Smail (1990) uses this term to describe ‘the view that people’s ‘inner worlds’, their psychology and indeed their 
emotional distress, are the products of and directly traceable to the influences of material structures of the ‘outer 
world’’ 
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reform was supported by a wide variety of pressure groups, including parents, 
politicians, doctors, psychologists and patients themselves (Unsworth, 1987), a 
collective power that forced a governmental review of the existing system.  
This took the form of the 1954 Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental 
Illness and Mental Deficiency. The ensuing report (commonly known as the 
Percy Report) was published in 1957. It proposed the abolition of compulsory 
detention for people who were mentally distressed to hospital (unless they were 
a danger to themselves or others) and a review of legal classifications to 
remove associations with criminality (Wooldridge, 1994). It recommended the 
integration of health and social welfare services, with mental health services 
integrated into existing local authority health and welfare departments to enable 
a continuum of care similar to that already provided to older people and those 
with physical disabilities (Concannon, 2005). It also recommended that mental 
hospitals be run in a similar way to general hospitals, with the development of 
supplementary outpatient and domiciliary care services in the community 
(Concannon, 2005).  
Most of these recommendations were welcomed by The Ministry of Health 
(Colcannon, 2005) and incorporated into the 1959 Mental Health Act (MHA; 
Wooldridge, 1994). The 1959 MHA reviewed the existing nomenclature, 
replacing ‘mental deficiency’ with ‘mental disorder’ that comprised four 
categories: ‘mental disorder’, ‘severe subnormality’, ‘subnormality’ and 
‘psychopathic disorder’. It ended compulsory certification, enabling the 
discharge of people with learning disabilities into the community but still 
retaining the power to ‘section’ people into hospital. The authority of Psychiatry 
was extended, for example compulsory detention became primarily a medical 
decision with the removal of routine court involvement.  
In the late 1960s the abusive conditions in the Ely and South Ockendon mental 
handicap hospitals were exposed in the national newspapers, with allegations 
of verbal and physical cruelty, neglect, lack of medical care and the wide-spread 
use of sedation. Both hospitals had been poor law institutions in the nineteenth 
century. These incidents and the subsequent inquiries prompted further policy 
review, resulting in the 1971 White Paper Better Services for the Mentally 
Handicapped (Department of Health and Social Security [DHSS], 1971), which 
recommended the closure of long-stay hospitals and set national targets for the 
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discharge of half the British hospital population into the community by 1990. It 
also recommended that people with a mental handicap should have equal 
access to mainstream health and social care services, including mental health 
services (DoH, 1993). 
Between 1968 and 1980 there were 18 published inquiries investigating 
allegations of mistreatment of patients at mental illness and mental handicap 
hospitals, which were found to be characteristic rather than exceptional 
(Mansell, 1997). Service users’ voices were either absent from reports or their 
testimony was given little weight (Butler & Drakeford, 2003), an indication of the 
way in which power networks operated to silence them, not just at the local level 
but also at a wider governmental one. Notwithstanding, the power that the 
public gaze can have is evidenced by the fact that most scandals were exposed 
by pressures groups, the media, strike action or police investigation of 
malpractice, rather than official complaints procedures (Butler & Drakeford, 
2003). This continues to be the case today, as evidenced by the serious case 
review of the Winterbourne Hospital scandal (see section 3.3.7).  
Institutionalised practices and abuse persist both within hospitals and in 
community services, and are especially evident in ‘specialist’ residential 
services that were designed to support people with severe and complex needs 
such dual diagnosis (Mansell & Ericsson, 1996). 
The challenges to institutional conditions and practices were driven by 
philosophies of human and civil rights, normalisation and citizenship that began 
to take shape in the late 1960s and 1970s. These also helped to promote the 
social acceptability of people with a ‘mental handicap’ in the community and, 
crucially for the emergence of dual diagnosis, the notion that they should have 
access to the same services, including mental health services, as everybody 
else. Normalisation principles also helped to think about people with mental 
handicap as having the same needs as everyone else, including emotional 
needs.  
Whilst exposure of abusive practice and principles of human and civil rights 
drove policy debates and led to some policy changes, there was again a gap 
between policy and practice. Institutional costs were lower than the proposed 
alternatives (Mansell & Ericsson, 1996), additional funding was not forthcoming 
and, with their restricted budgets, local authorities prioritised other areas 
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(Concannon, 2005). For changes to take place they needed to be consistent 
with government aspirations and agendas, which would not happen until the 
1980s and 1990s (Mansell & Ericsson, 1996), as discussed below. 
3.3.5 Deinstitutionalisation and community care  
The growth in the implementation of deinstitutionalisation in the 1980s became 
possible through a number of different but inter-related events, including: the 
neoliberal Thatcherite reforms, the growing evidence for the feasibility of 
community-based services, and philosophies of normalisation and civil rights 
(Mansell & Ericsson, 1996). 
Reforms by the Thatcher’s conservative government in the beginning of the 
1980s represented a shift from social democracy to neoliberal approaches to 
policy focused on reducing public expenditure. This included reorganising the 
NHS along more commercial lines and privatizing public goods and services 
(which included a greater emphasis on the family’s caring responsibilities). The 
high costs that care in the community would have represented were neutralised 
through transferring responsibility to local authorities and the potential income 
that the closure of large institutional estates represented (Mansell & Ericsson, 
1996). It was supported by ‘dowries’ available to those leaving institutions 
(Mansell & Ericsson, 1996). 
The Audit Commission’s (1986) Making a Reality of Community Care report 
criticised the lack of progress with the community care programme and made 
recommendations on how changes could be carried out that. A number of 
reports following, including the Griffiths Report (DHSS, 1988) and subsequent 
White Paper (1989), culminating in the NHS & Community Care Act of 1990. 
This Act signified a radical reorganisation of both health and social care 
services. It introduced a ‘purchaser-provider’ split; an internal market whereby 
Health Authorities commissioned services provided by NHS Trusts, GPs, 
private and voluntary services. 
Fletcher (1988) argued that deinstitutionalisation highlighted the mental health 
needs of people with learning disabilities, which Szymansky (1994) stated was 
because ‘disturbed behaviours are one of the main (if not the main) reasons of 
the failure of their integration into the community’ (p. 20). The distress 
experienced by people with learning disabilities was constructed as a pathology 
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rather than as a response to chronically under-developed and under-resourced 
community care system. Concerns about their behaviours enabled the 
justification for the creation of specialist health and social services to ‘manage’ 
them. 
3.3.5.1 Crises in the legitimacy of Psychiatry 
With the move to community care, psychiatrists who had worked in the 
institutions had to carve out a new role for themselves as the continuing need 
for their specialist services was questioned from both within and outside the 
profession (Day, 1994; Bewley, 2008; Godber, 1973). Within the profession and 
medicine more generally, mental handicap had a very low status, with poor 
resources, therapeutic nihilism and no prospects for more lucrative private 
practice endeavours making the recruitment to the specialty very poor (Ryan & 
Thomas, 1987; Bewley, 2008).  
The reputation of Psychiatry as a whole had been scrutinised by both the anti-
psychiatry movement’s publications such as Goffman’s (1961) Asylums, and the 
hospital inquiries that often implicated medical superintendents (Bewley, 2008), 
calling into question not just the field of knowledge it was based on but also its 
power-knowledge functions (Foucault, 2006). Other professions such as mental 
handicap nursing were also under threat, with recommendations for it to be 
replaced by a new social work profession in community-based services 
adopting a philosophy based on the principles of normalisation (Jay Committee, 
1979). 
The Mental Deficiency Section of the RCP responded to concerns by publishing 
a series of memorandums and reports that emphasised the mental health 
needs of people with a mental handicap and promoted the formation of 
specialist services in the community that should be led by Psychiatrists with 
specialist skills (RCP, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1986). 
The Jay Committee (1979) recommendations were not implemented, not 
necessarily because of these responses but due to the much wider changes 
that were taking place with the introduction of Thatcher’s ‘New Public 
Management’. 
The role of psychiatry in the governance of ‘dual diagnosis’ was secured 
following a DoH (1989) review of mental handicap services that led the Minister 
99 
 
of State for Health to reaffirm the long-term need for specialist psychiatric 
provision for people with learning disabilities (DoH, 1991; Day, 1994).  
The Mansell Report (DoH, 1993) threatened to shift the focus to ‘challenging 
behaviour’ rather than general mental health needs, prompting the RCP to 
publish an update to their earlier report to re-emphasise them (RCP, 1997).  
3.3.6 The ‘dual diagnosis’ term 
In the context of learning disabilities, the ‘dual diagnosis’ term has been 
consistently attributed to Frank Menolascino, an American Psychiatrist who 
published extensively about the mental health needs of children and adults with 
‘mental retardation’. It appears to emerge for the first time in Mental Health and 
Mental Retardation: Bridging the Gap (Menolascino & McCann, 1983), and 
subsequently ‘imported’ to Britain via Mental health in mental retardation: 
Recent advances and practices (Bouras, 1994).  
3.3.6.1 Increase in the ‘dual diagnosis’ documentary apparatus 
The growth in professional interest in dual diagnosis is reflected in the increase 
in academic publications employing this term from the 1980s onwards (Fletcher, 
1988). A search of the term ‘dual diagnosis’ in academic publications38 suggests 
that up until the 1980s it was used infrequently, referring predominantly to the 
co-existence of two physical health diagnoses. The earliest use of the term was 
traced to 1929, in the text of a paper titled ‘Conditions simulating pulmonary 
tuberculosis’ by Chandler, a doctor working at Charing Cross Hospital. Honig’s 
(1955) paper ‘Psychosis and peptic ulcer’ was the first time ‘dual diagnosis’ 
included a mental health diagnosis. The remaining papers identified as 
containing the term ‘dual diagnosis’ between 1950 and the 1970s almost all 
relate to physical health diagnoses. Its first use in relation to learning disability 
appears in 1978, in a paper titled ‘The elderly retarded: A little-known group’ by 
DiGiovanni, and refers to a dual diagnosis of ‘mental retardation’ and ‘emotional 
or behaviour problems’ (p. 265). 
From 1980 onwards, two significant things happen. Firstly, there is an 
exponential rise in the number of documents adopting the term ‘dual diagnosis’ 
(see Figure 3). Secondly, it begins to be used strategically.  
                                                          
38 See Appendix A for databases and search terms used. 
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Figure 3: Number of publications employing the ‘dual diagnosis’ term39. 
From the 1980s, there is a significant rise in the number of publications using 
the term, and, from 1980-1984, it is predominantly adopted in reference to the 
dual diagnosis of i) mental retardation, and ii) mental illness, emotional 
disorders or behavioural disorders. In 1983, the National Association for the 
Dually Diagnosed was formed in the US to promote the concept and assisted in 
the further production of knowledge in the form of national and international 
conferences with associated proceedings (e.g. Menolascino, 1984). In Britain, 
the Mental Handicap Section of the World Psychiatric Association held an 
International Conference at the University of Kent in 1994, leading to the 
publication of a book called Mental Health in Mental Retardation: Recent 
Advances and Practices (Bouras, 1994). 
Despite the initial success of the ‘dual diagnosis’ term, its dominance in the field 
of mental retardation was relatively short-lived. Within five years, its use was 
overtaken by literature focusing on addiction, possibly reflecting the greater 
threat to social order that this problem was perceived to present. Although the 
number of publications relating to learning disability continued to rise in the 
subsequent decades, the term began to fall out of fashion in the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. In Britain, this decline is likely to have been influenced 
by the DoH’s (2002) Dual Diagnosis Good Practice Guide, which clearly placed 
‘dual diagnosis’ within the remit of the substance misuse arena.   
                                                          
39 Derived from literature search as outlined in section 1.3.2, with the subsequent exclusion of the following search 
string: NOT ("cannabis" OR "tobacco" OR "chemical dependency" OR "substance abuse" OR "substance misuse" OR 
"substance use" OR "alcohol*" OR "addict*" OR "drug abuse" OR "drug rehabilitation" OR "cocaine") 
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Regardless of its adoption by a different speciality, the ‘dual diagnosis’ term 
continued to be used in both American and British publications. It also appeared 
in the Royal College of Psychiatry’s guidelines for Meeting the Mental Health 
Needs of People with Learning Disability in 1997, and its 2003 update (but not 
in the 2012 update nor in the NICE (2016a) guidelines).  
Although the use of the term itself has declined, the concept and practice that it 
embodies – that of the diagnosis of both learning disability and mental health – 
has become common-place (see Chapter 1). 
3.3.6.2 The strategic use of ‘dual diagnosis’ 
The second aspect to note is that the term began to be used strategically – 
instead of referring to a dual diagnosis, it became the dual diagnosis. 
Szymanski and Grossman (1984) note that it had ‘been expected by some that 
the implication of this term would be an increase in the professionals’ attention 
to the problem of mental disorders among persons with mental retardation 
through designating them as having a special condition, or rather a combination 
of two conditions’.  
Reiss (1994) highlights the links between the use of the term and service 
provision: ‘The concept of dual diagnosis provides an alternative to the 
concepts of primary and secondary handicaps. Instead of trying to guess 
whether the primary problem is emotional or intellectual, both disorders are 
diagnosed and (…) the person is given services for both mental retardation and 
mental illness.’ (p. 68).  
The production of knowledge through psychiatric and psychological literature 
relating to the mental health of people with learning disabilities helped to give 
credence to the notion of dual diagnosis whilst simultaneously constructing it as 
something that only a minority (of professionals) were sufficiently skilled to 
identify. Researchers and clinicians (re)developed or (re)colonised theories that 
supported a construction of people with learning disabilities as ‘atypical’ and 
‘complex’, for example regarding the effect of developmental level on emotional 
expression, the notion of ‘behavioural equivalents’ and the concept of 
‘diagnostic overshadowing’ (Reiss et al, 1982); explanations that continue to be 
widely cited in British research and policy relating to dual diagnosis today.  
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3.3.6.3 Refining technologies of diagnosis: The DC-LD 
There were a number of modifications to the DSM in the second half of the 
twentieth century that supported the production of dual diagnosis. In particular, 
the DSM-II (APA, 1968) encouraged the use of multiple mental health 
diagnoses for a single patient, and in the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) the diagnosis 
of mental retardation was transferred to Axis II (personality and developmental 
disorders), which compelled clinicians to make a separate statement about Axis 
I diagnosis (mental illness; Szymanski, 1994). Notwithstanding these shifts, 
Psychiatrists and researchers frequently argued that ‘mainstream’ classification 
systems such as the DSM and the ICD were not valid for people with learning 
disabilities. The rationale was twofold. Firstly, it was reasoned that diagnostic 
criteria required a degree of self-report to enable access to individuals’ internal 
world, which was difficult for people with significant cognitive and 
communication impairments. Secondly, it was argued that manuals did not take 
into account the effects that developmental level can have on psychopathology 
(see section 1.3.3.2). In an attempt to address these challenges, the RCP 
produced the DC-LD (RCP, 2001) a psychiatric diagnostic manual for use with 
adults with moderate to profound learning disabilities. With its publication, 
Psychiatry achieved the reification of mental illness in people with a learning 
disability, further reinforcing the notion of dual diagnosis, and their authority 
within it. What is interesting about the DC-LD is that ‘the criteria derived 
essentially reflect current practice within the UK and Republic of Ireland’ (RCP, 
2001, p. 3). It is therefore a measure of current practice rather than of ‘mental 
illness’; a logical fallacy much like the notion of ‘behavioural equivalents’.  
3.3.7 Transforming care?  
In 2011 the BBC exposed the systematic physical and psychological abuse of 
people with learning disability living at Winterbourne View hospital. A serious 
case review identified hundreds of previous incidents and numerous failures to 
act on former warnings, as well as multiple examples of poor practice across 
the UK (South Gloucestershire Safeguarding Adults Board, 2012). In its 
response, the Government vowed to ‘transform services for people with learning 
disabilities or autism and mental health conditions or behaviours described as 
challenging’ (DoH, 2012, p. 2). It set out a Transforming Care programme of 
action to improve existing services, reduce the number and duration of hospital 
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admissions and delayed discharges, out-of-area placements, and the use of 
physical and chemical restraint; measures highlighted as necessary almost 
twenty years earlier in the Mansell report (DoH, 1993). Amongst their time-
tabled pledges were the better inspection and regulation of dual diagnosis 
services, publication of clinical guidelines for managing the mental health of 
people with learning disabilities and/or autism (NICE, 2016a), and a 
recommendation that the BPS take a lead on promoting positive behaviour 
support training (DoH, 2012). 
Progress reviews in 2014 and 2015 found that people continued to be 
inappropriately placed in long-term institutional care, and that limited progress 
had been achieved in relation to discharging people to the community and 
closing inpatient units (Transforming Care and Commissioning Steering Group, 
2014; 2015). It was noted that ‘some commissioners have failed to grasp and 
act on the urgency of putting in place suitable community provision’ (Parkin, 
2016, p. 11), and the Government pledged to intervene (through legislation if 
necessary) if policy did not translate into practice (Parkin, 2016). Building the 
Right Support (ADASS, LGA & NHSE, 2015) introduced a ‘national service 
model’ (see Appendix G), setting out the range of support required to reduce 
the need for institutional care and achieve the 35-50% decrease in the number 
of inpatient beds by the new target date of 2019. 
In the latest progress update, the National Audit Office (NAO; 2017) found that 
whilst the numbers of admissions had begun to decline, the duration of inpatient 
stays had increased. The community infrastructure was still inadequate, and the 
Transforming Care programme partners were not confident that the 2019 target 
would be achieved. The majority of people in hospital were not being reviewed 
within the specified time-frame, and there was a lack of funding available for the 
additional community support needed. The NAO (2017) reiterated that ‘moving 
people out of mental health services is a considerable challenge. . . . [that] 
cannot be done quickly or cheaply’ (p. 25), and that ‘efforts to do so date back 
to the 1980s, and is a difficult task which defies simple solutions’ (p. 25). Indeed 
there are numerous parallels between the current drivers and measures for the 
closure of inpatient units and those associated with the deinstitutionalisation 
(and earlier) movements For example, the recent reform was prompted by the 
exposure of abusive and restrictive practices, once again illustrating the power 
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of the media in effecting policy change. In the case of Winterbourne View this 
has involved the production of documentation relating to dual diagnosis that is 
so extensive that it defies peoples’ ability to become familiar with it all, and that 
consequently may result in its poor or patchy deployment. Policy once again 
promotes hospital closures and the development of community services and, as 
before, there is a significant gap between recommendations and practice, as 
well as a lack of commitment to ongoing funding. Costs are being shifted to 
local authorities already struggling to meet local residents’ needs with their 
much reduced budgets so it is difficult to imagine how the Transforming Care 
programme will be sustainable. In combination with the severe and ongoing 
cuts to peoples’ benefits, support and self-advocacy services (National Forum 
of People with Learning Disabilities & National Valuing Families Forum, 2016)40, 
the structural and material causes of poverty, disability and distress are unlikely 
to be adequately addressed. 
3.3.7.1 The ‘new’ dual diagnoses 
Government policy since the Winterbourne scandal has consistently addressed 
‘people with learning disabilities and/or autism’ together (as though they are 
homogenous groups with similar needs), particularly when discussing those 
who ‘display challenging behaviour, including those with a mental health 
condition’. The perceived association between these diagnoses and 
presentations has been increasingly emphasised in both policy and clinical 
research, where it has been illustrated as follows:  
 
Figure 4: The relationship between learning disability, ASD, psychiatric disorder 
and challenging behaviour (RCP, BPS & RCSLT, 2007, p. 30) 
                                                          
40 The DoH funding for the organisations that produced this report has also been discontinued. 
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This figure was originally intended to demonstrate the association between 
challenging behaviour and psychiatric disorder across the spectrum of 
intellectual ability, and to illustrate that whilst there are overlaps between 
diagnoses, not everyone who has a learning disability or ASD will have a mental 
illness or display challenging behaviour (Xenitidis, Russell & Murphy, 2001).  
Whilst the recent change in policy focus may reflect pre-existing administrative 
practices, and policy has recognised that this ‘highly heterogenous group’ 
needs an approach to service development that reflects its diversity (ADASS, 
LGA & NHSE, 2015), grouping them together in this way is likely to impede the 
person-centred focus advocated. It is not a coincidence that the ‘new’ dual 
diagnoses of (i) learning disability and/or autism; and (ii) mental illness and/or 
challenging behaviour encompasses those who most struggle to conform to 
extant socioeconomic norms and values. It is but the most recent example of 
the long-standing practice of redefining classifications and categorisations to 
facilitate the governance of those problematized as unproductive, undesirable 
or as threatening to the capitalist social order. 
3.3.7.2 Challenging behaviour 
The term ‘challenging behaviour’ emerged within the ‘mental retardation’ field in 
alongside ‘dual diagnosis’  in the 1980s (Xenithidis et al., 2001). It came to be 
defined as  
culturally abnormal behaviour(s) of such an intensity, frequency or 
duration that the physical safety of the person or others is likely to be 
placed in serious jeopardy, or behaviour which is likely to seriously limit 
use of, or result in the person being denied access to, ordinary 
community facilities. (Emerson, 1995, cited in Emerson, 2001, p. 3) 
The emergence of the challenging behaviour concept enabled the development 
of a variety of psychosocial approaches that focused not only on the reduction 
of challenging behaviour itself but also on the improvement in people’s skills 
and quality of life, including ‘person-centred active support’ (Beadle-Brown, 
Hutchinson & Whelton, 2012) and the positive behavioural support (LaVigna & 
Willis, 2005) that is promoted in the Transforming Care programme. Despite 
evidence for the efficacy of these approaches for people with challenging 
behaviour (e.g. LaVigna & Willis, 2012), they have not been routinely offered to 
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people diagnosed with a mental illness because guidelines for the latter favour 
a more psychopharmacological approach.  Yet the causal factors associated 
with challenging behaviours are remarkably similar to those associated with 
mental illness – physical discomfort or illness, psychological trauma, 
communication difficulties, neuropsychiatric disorders and mental illness itself 
(RCP, BPS & Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists (RCSLT), 
2007).  
As noted above, challenging behaviour and mental illness are consistently 
associated in both research and policy, with authors arguing that challenging 
behaviour may be unrelated to psychiatric disorder, but can also be a primary or 
secondary manifestation of it’ (Xenithidis et al., 2001), a theorisation has 
developed in association with the explanatory concept of ‘behavioural 
equivalents’. The incorporation of ‘mental illness’ within the broader category of 
‘challenging behaviour’ has enabled both concepts to coexist without 
significantly competing with each other, although efforts to demarcate the two 
concepts does suggest a tension between them (e.g. RCP, BPS & RCSLT, 
2007; RCP & BPS, 2016). One of the solutions has been to highlight the social 
construction of ‘challenging behaviour’ whilst maintaining the perception of 
‘mental illness’ as an unquestionable scientific ‘truth’: ‘Challenging behaviour . . 
. is a socially constructed, descriptive concept that has no diagnostic 
significance and makes no inferences about the aetiology of the behaviour’ 
(NICE, 2016a, p. 176). However, as argued in this thesis and demonstrated by 
other critical researchers (e.g. Szasz, 1960; Boyle, 2014), mental illness could 
be considered a social construction too, and whilst it can provide a ‘diagnosis’, 
the aetiology of behaviour remains unclear. Nevertheless, this delineation 
between challenging behaviour and mental illness has enabled psychologists 
and psychiatrists to continue to claim a stake in the governance of people with 
learning disabilities that is consistent with their respective conceptual 
frameworks, with psychologists typically managing ‘challenging behaviours’ and 
psychiatrists managing them under the guise of ‘mental illness’. It will be 
interesting to see what happens to these roles and remits now that these two 
categories are being catered for in combination. 
Although intended to highlight that the problems caused by people’s behaviours 
were a function of both the ways in which a person was supported and of their 
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personal characteristics (DoH, 1993), recent publications have highlighted the 
increased tendency of its use as a diagnostic label, which locates the problem 
solely within the individual (RCP & BPS, 2016). Its construction means that 
when faced with a variety of distressing circumstances, people with learning 
disabilities are not described as ‘sad’ or ‘worried’ or ‘angry’; they display 
‘challenging behaviour’ that at times is interpreted as a mental health problem 
or illness, shaping not just their identities but the kinds of responses that are 
possible. Whilst challenging behaviour may offer an alternative, less 
medicalised construction of the expression of distress, this is not always the 
case, and it still elicits individualised approaches that may subjugate the 
person’s emotional life. 
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CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examined and problematized the dual diagnosis of learning disability 
and mental illness using a Foucauldian genealogical approach. It aimed to map 
out and explore the conditions of possibility for its historical emergence in 
Britain, its associated social practices, and the alternative understandings that 
may have been subjugated in order to raise critical discussion and debate, and 
thereby create new possibilities for thought and action. In this final chapter I 
provide a summary of the findings in the context of my research questions. This 
is followed by a consideration of potential implications for clinical psychology 
practice, research and policy, and a critical and reflective evaluation of the 
research undertaken. 
4.1 Summary of findings 
 
4.1.1 How was dual diagnosis ‘made’ possible? 
The conditions of possibility for the emergence of dual diagnosis that were 
identified and examined in this thesis are summarised in Figure 5.  
Dual diagnosis emerged within a historical context of enduring governmental 
concerns about population control, particularly in relation to economy, 
productivity and social order. Legal and conceptual frameworks shaping how 
the two classifications constituting dual diagnosis came to be constructed, 
differentiated and governed in the present can be traced back to fourteenth 
century English law. The state’s ongoing political power over mental disorders 
(and thus those with a dual diagnosis) was established through the introduction 
of patriae parens powers to act on behalf of those deemed ‘incompetent’ to look 
after their own affairs, and ‘police powers’ to detain those perceived as posing a 
‘risk’ to self or others. It was strengthened further through the vast disciplinary 
apparatuses of the state that developed in the context of a rising capitalist and 
industrial society to assist in the governance of a growing pauper population. 
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The knowledge and technologies produced in and by the scientisation and 
medicalisation of idiocy and lunacy within these apparatuses enabled the 
medical profession to become a dominant authority in their governance and 
thus shape how they were understood. When idiocy was reconceptualised as a 
developmental delay (rather than an illness), it enabled its disaggregation from 
insanity and opened up the possibility for their co-occurrence. It also provided a 
framework for many of the concepts that underpin current understandings of 
how people with a learning disability (and dual diagnosis) express their distress.  
Following the Second World War, the emergence of the NHS, challenges to 
institutional practices, and the advent of civil and human rights movements, in 
combination, opened up a space for alternative models and professions to 
compete with the dominance of the psychiatric framework. The dual diagnosis 
concept offered a solution to the social problem caused by those who did not 
settle into the community as desired, and legitimised the ongoing involvement of 
the Psychiatric profession with people with learning disabilities. 
 
Figure 5: Summary of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of dual 
diagnosis 
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4.1.2 What has held it in place?  
Dual diagnosis has been maintained by the production of an ever-increasing 
array of power-knowledge networks encompassing numerous authorities, 
technologies and techniques (see Appendix D). These have largely been 
endorsed by (or created through) government policy and strategy due to the 
potential solutions they present to the governance of undesirable behaviours. 
Through the use of the privileged scientific discourse and the rhetorical 
deployment of knowledge, the psy-complex in particular has contributed to the 
production of ‘truths’ about dual diagnosis and how people with learning 
disabilities express their distress that are difficult for those who are subject to 
them to question or challenge. The (re)production of these truths in legal and 
medical publications has played a key role in their reification, and they appear 
to be accepted by professionals, carers and services users alike. Paradoxically, 
the ‘scandals’ highlighting the inadequacy of governmental strategies have 
reinforced the very power-networks that they seek to challenge, as further 
governmental policy reiterating the need for specialist provision for this 
‘complex’ group of people is (re)created in response. With the ongoing cuts to 
social supports and a lack of readily-available (and economic) alternatives, the 
state has continued to rely on historical systems of government for the 
management of dual diagnosis. 
4.1.3 What have been the dominant discourses and their implications? 
Broadly, the discourses underpinning dual diagnosis have been predominantly 
economic, social, legal and biomedical, often working in concert through the 
power-knowledge networks outlined above.  
Economic discourses and associated governmental imperatives of productivity 
have problematized those who do not work as socioeconomic burdens – both to 
their families and to society. Social and moral discourses about how people 
should conduct themselves have contributed to the development of medicolegal 
and psychological ‘norms’ against which the behaviours (and thoughts) of 
people with a dual diagnosis are judged and acted upon. Legal discourses have 
positioned them as incompetent, irrational, vulnerable and risky, leaving little 
space for them to be authorities or experts in their own lives. Legislation has 
empowered competent, rational others with ‘specialist’ knowledge to govern 
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people with a dual diagnosis under discourses of care and protection. It has 
also legitimised the non-consensual detention and management of those 
exhibiting undesirable behaviours, particularly when justified by social 
discourses of risk and medical discourses of treatment and cure. The 
medicalisation of distress locates its cause within individuals, silencing the role 
played by peoples’ socio-political, economic and historical material and 
personal contexts, and pathologising what could be construed as a natural 
response to difficult circumstances. Associated developmental discourses and 
assumptions that people with learning disabilities are atypical and always-
already vulnerable to mental illness contribute to deficit-centric subjectivities 
that only serve to stigmatise and disenfranchise them further. The privileging of 
such discourses may subjugate alternative understandings and responses that 
could be more helpful for both service users and clinicians. They also silence 
the economic and political motivations for the creation of dual diagnosis and its 
historic counterparts. 
4.1.4 What have been the subjugated discourses and what alternative 
understandings might these allow? 
In the history of dual diagnosis, there has been a consistent subjugation of the 
emotions and voices of the dually diagnosed themselves and of the material 
and historical causes of distress. This has taken different forms, ranging from 
being silenced or altogether absent to being acknowledged as relevant but 
secondary to a biological construction of and predisposition to mental illness. 
Amelioration of peoples’ social and material environments has sometimes been 
part of psychosocial interventions (such as moral and behavioural therapies), 
however, these have largely been enacted at the level of the individual, and do 
not target the wider society structural causes giving rise to inequalities and 
damaging experiences or the power relations that sustain them. Where the 
latter have been acknowledged, there has been a significant discrepancy 
between policy and practice, and a lack of financial commitment to undertake 
change. Whilst there may be no point at which human beings are free from all 
power-relations, resistance is always possible (Foucault, 1976/1998), and in the 
next section I draw on the discourses outlined above to suggest some of the 
ways in which it may be possible to think, judge and act differently in relation to 
dual diagnosis. 
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4.2 Implications for Clinical Psychology 
It is important to note that in his work, Foucault aimed to raise questions and 
debate, rather than offer solutions or ‘implications’ for future research or 
practice (Foucault, 1984/1988). In the context of the demands of a clinical 
psychology doctoral thesis, and reflecting my own critical realist positioning, 
however, potential implications and possibilities for action within clinical 
psychology practice, research and policy are considered below. 
4.2.1 Clinical practice: Resistance at the local level 
As one of the main authorities in dual diagnosis, clinical psychologists must 
recognise their own role in creating and maintaining discourses about distress 
that might not be helpful to service users, and aim to use this authority to 
facilitate meaningful change. It is important not to collude with totalising 
formulations that pathologise the individual and conceal structural and historical 
causes of distress. Crucially, we must listen to, believe and validate the 
narratives of individuals and their families, use their own language and 
understandings to formulate their experiences, and help restore the power 
imbalance by treating them as ‘experts’ in their own lives (Pickersgill, 2012). For 
those who are non-verbal, we must view their behaviour not as an expression or 
confirmation of pathology, but as communication, and support their right to 
protest or resist what are often intolerable circumstances 
Instead of individualising approaches aiming to create docile bodies and minds 
that risk denying or silencing peoples’ voices, we should promote empowering 
social formulations and approaches that focus on a contextualised 
understanding of peoples’ needs and wishes. This includes challenging notions 
of ‘recovery’ and ‘strengths-based’ approaches that implicitly suggest a need to 
compensate for some kind of personal ‘deficit’ (Harper & Speed, 2012). It may 
be helpful to draw on social justice tools and approaches from ‘mainstream’ 
mental health service user and critical psychology movements, such as the 
‘UnRecovery Star’ (Recovery in the Bin, 2015) and Hagan and Smail’s (1997) 
‘power mapping’, to highlight the political nature of mental health, the ‘impress 
of power’ (Smail, 1999) upon peoples’ lives, and resources and powers that 
may be available for the alleviation of distress (see Appendix H).  
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Notwithstanding their potential value, it is vital that we move beyond reactive 
individual therapies to preventative approaches that reduce socioeconomic 
deprivation and inequality, perhaps drawing on community psychology and 
public health traditions as suggested by Harper (2016). The challenge is how to 
do so in the context of austerity and existing neoliberal structures and 
approaches to health care.  
4.2.2 Research: The creation and dissemination of subjugated 
‘knowledge’ 
Future research should aim to talk to those who are dually diagnosed and their 
families about their experiences of being positioned in this way, and implications 
for their subjectivities and their ability to access support that is (or is not) helpful 
to them. Moving beyond the traditional ‘satisfaction questionnaire’, this should 
aim to capture their rich, lived experiences, and allow for a consideration of both 
the productive and domination effects of power. Exploring how people 
diagnosed with a learning disability and their families have coped successfully 
with distress outside of the psychiatric framework could also help to develop a 
counter-memory promoting subjectivities of strength and resilience, as opposed 
to vulnerability and risk. This could open up alternative understandings and 
practices relating to distress and its prevention that could be more helpful to 
both service users and clinicians. Ultimately, research agendas should be 
determined by those subject to dual diagnosis themselves. 
Clinical psychologists’ proficiency in research (Health and Care Profession’s 
Council, 2015) means that they are well-positioned to challenge the rhetorical 
deployment of scientific ‘truth’, and emphasise the potential consequences of 
power, inequality, socioeconomic and political factors on peoples’ well-being 
generally, and for people diagnosed with a learning disability in particular. There 
is an urgent need for more critical psychological work in dual diagnosis (and 
learning disability) that contextualises these historically, socially and politically 
and, crucially, that questions assumptions and implications of current 
understandings and practices instead of glorifying them as ‘progressive’. It 
would be helpful for this interrogation to begin much earlier in psychologists’ 
careers, for it to play a central rather than ‘alternative’ focus in teaching and, 
indeed, for these views to be discussed at a wider societal level rather than 
amongst a relatively small number of people.  
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It is important to find ways of disseminating these subjugated understandings, 
and making these (and the associated critical methodologies) more accessible 
and comprehensible for all. This involves moving away from complex academic 
terminology and sharing views in a wider range of formats (such as video, oral 
history and social media).  
4.2.3 Policy: Political action 
Foucault (1963/2003) stated that ‘the first task of the doctor is . . . political’ (p. 
33), and I would argue that this applies to clinical psychologists too. We are 
already involved in a number of clinical, academic, and partnership committees 
and boards where they can advocate for change and help shape strategy and 
action. We might achieve greater impact by forging strategic alliances and 
coalitions of interest with other agencies and service user groups (such as 
‘Psychologists Against Austerity’ and ‘Learning Disability England’), drawing on 
corresponding political agendas and commissioning priorities to promote 
desired change. In this process it will be vital to abide by service users’ 
mandate that there should be ‘nothing about us without us’ (DoH, 2001b) and 
ensure that they empowered to be ‘leaders’ and ‘co-producers’ rather than 
‘passive recipients’ (Crowther, 2007).  
I would encourage trainee psychology programmes to include more 
assignments geared towards political change, for example, completing a project 
with a self-advocacy group, attending an MP drop-in session to improve the 
local community and/or discuss alternative approaches to distress, or preparing 
a written response to proposed policy or clinical guideline changes. 
What we really need is a social transformation approach that looks at and 
addresses the root causes of and associations between distress, disability and 
poverty (Department for International Development, 2000). This will ultimately 
require a redistribution of social, economic and political resources, power and 
control, and substantial investment, reform and cultural change in governmental 
policy and services (Harper & Speed, 2012; Crowther, 2007). 
4.3 Critical evaluation and reflection 
Genealogy represents an interpretational form of qualitative research and, as 
such, it would not be appropriate to apply ‘positivist’ criteria such as ‘validity’, 
‘reliability’ and ‘generalisability' to its evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). In the 
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appraisal of the quality of my research, I have chosen the guiding principles 
outlined by Spencer and Ritchie (2012) to reflectively assess its ‘contribution’, 
‘credibility’ and ‘rigour’. 
4.3.1 Contribution 
Although there are numerous publications regarding the mental health of people 
with learning disabilities, these are written almost exclusively from an empirical 
and realist epistemological position. My research offered an analysis that was 
substantially different. By adopting a genealogical approach I was able to 
problematize dual diagnosis, destabilise ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge 
associated with its medicolegal construction, and demonstrate the 
power/knowledge networks that limit and delimit what can be said and done in 
relation to the distress that people with a learning disability may experience. 
This included challenging specific ‘truth’ statements (such as the perceived 
increased prevalence of mental illness and its ‘atypical’ presentation in people 
with learning disabilities), drawing attention to how ‘knowledge’ has been used 
rhetorically throughout history to support particular political or socioeconomic 
aspirations, emphasising the role that the psy-complex has played in its 
construction and production, and highlighting how the dually diagnosed 
themselves have been systematically subjugated. By revealing some of the 
historical contingencies, continuities and discontinuities associated with dual 
diagnosis, I aimed to demonstrate that things do not have to be as they are, and 
suggested some possibilities for action that may not have been explored before. 
4.3.2 Credibility 
Foucault (1977) emphasised the perspectival nature of genealogy. It is ‘an 
interpretation, which itself is neither true nor false’ (Sembou, 2011, p. 3). Hence, 
in my research, I was not attempting to create a more accurate, exhaustive or 
‘true’ representation of dual diagnosis, but to illustrate how ‘truth’ is a socially 
produced power, that present day understandings are not fixed or inevitable, 
and to highlight some of the subjugated discourses that may be helpful to 
consider. Notwithstanding, I strived to be precise in the sense of thoroughly 
researching the historical events analysed, accessing original documents 
wherever possible, and using extracts from these as well as secondary sources 
to support my arguments. I also consulted texts that were not limited to clinical 
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or policy arenas to ensure a broader contextualised account and enable the 
identification of discourses and events that might be important to highlight in the 
history of dual diagnosis.  
One obvious limitation of my thesis was that the views and experiences of those 
who are dually diagnosed are largely speculative, and this limited the extent to 
which I was able to explore and adequately address my final research question 
about ‘subjugated discourses’ and ‘alternative understandings’. This omission 
reflects the significant absence of literature focusing on service users’ 
perspectives, recommendations for further research to capture this subjugated 
yet central view are made in section 4.2.  
4.3.3 Rigour 
During the development of my thesis I was often reminded of Foucault’s (1977) 
statement that ‘genealogy demands relentless erudition’ (p. 77), particularly 
given my limited pre-existing knowledge of history, philosophy, politics and 
economics, and complete unfamiliarity with Foucault’s work. Whilst I understood 
the potential value of his ideas, Foucault’s complex terminology, regular 
modifications to the meaning of theoretical concepts, and the lack of a clear 
methodology for genealogy (Mills, 2013; O’Farrell, 2015) made it challenging to 
put his ideas into practice. It also required me to step outside the ‘positivist’ 
epistemology favoured by my previous training and experience (see section 
2.4.3), and to be mindful not to be drawn towards writing a ‘continuous’ history 
or undertaking an overly-Marxist examination of power that risked disregarding 
its productive aspects.  
To help me address and explore some of these tensions and challenges, I read 
and regularly referred back to Foucault’s own work and others’ genealogies as 
outlined in section 2.5.2.1. I also discussed them frequently with my supervisor 
and other clinical psychology trainees undertaking Foucauldian-informed 
research, keeping a reflective research journal to help me develop my thinking 
(see Appendix C). These measures were also beneficial for resolving analytical 
dilemmas, as the history of dual diagnosis turned out to be much more complex 
than I had been aware, and my analysis ended up taking a path and focus that 
were rather different from the ones I had set out. For example, I had not 
intended to go as far back as the fourteenth century, or to focus so much on the 
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histories of learning disability or mental illness themselves. However, as I traced 
the emergence and descent of dual diagnosis, it became increasingly evident 
that not doing so would have missed important governmental concerns, 
strategies, and power-knowledge networks that continue to have relevance to 
present day practices and subjectivities. Attempts to restrict what I focused on 
were continually challenged, and I had to be more inclusive that I had originally 
intended. For example, I had to extend my analytical gaze to literature on 
children and ‘mental illness’ (including children without a mental deficiency 
diagnosis), because they represented a key condition of possibility for the 
emergence of dual diagnosis and the concepts that underpin its construction 
today.  
On reflection, my aims and research questions were somewhat ambitious for a 
clinical psychology doctorate, and as a novice researcher I am conscious that 
there are numerous aspects of dual diagnosis that remain unexamined and 
unexplored. Notwithstanding, my hope is that this research will encourage 
readers to be more critical about the value and meaning of not only dual 
diagnosis and its associated social practices, but of the diagnoses of learning 
disability and mental illness more broadly, and of the historical socioeconomic, 
political and professional contexts that continue to shape the present. I hope 
that it inspires others to investigate, develop, and indeed challenge my thesis 
further, and that in so doing, we can continue to create new possibilities for 
thought and action. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this research I have argued that the creations of dual diagnosis and its 
historical counterparts have been responses to social, political, moral and 
economic governmental concerns and problematizations, particularly (although 
not exclusively) in relation to the poor, and those unable or unwilling to 
contribute to the economy or conform to social or behavioural norms. As such, 
present day understandings are neither fixed nor inevitable; they are ‘truths’ 
produced by power. Dual diagnosis stigmatises and disenfranchises people with 
learning disabilities further by conceptualising them as atypical, irrational and 
always-already vulnerable to mental illness. Its biomedical construction locates 
problems within individuals, pathologising natural responses to difficult 
circumstances and legitimising restrictive and potentially damaging 
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interventions. A social transformation approach is needed that addresses the 
material and social causes of distress, disability and poverty, and the power-
networks sustaining these. This will require a redistribution of social, economic 
and political resources, power and control, and substantial investment, reform 
and cultural change in governmental policy and services. 
 
 
119 
 
REFERENCES 
Alaszewski, A., & Brown, P. (2012). Making health policy: A critical introduction. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Alcoff, L. M. (2005). Foucault’s philosophy of science: Structures of 
truth/structures of power. In G. Gutting (Ed.), Continental philosophy of 
science (pp. 211-223). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Alexander, R., & Cooray, S. (2003). Diagnosis of personality disorders in 
learning disability. British Journal of Psychiatry, 44, 28-31. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1968). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (3rd ed., rev.). Washington, DC: Author. 
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Anderson, J. E. (2015). Public policymaking (8th ed.). Stamford: Cengage 
Learning. 
Argent, V. (1978). Counter-revolutionary panic and the treatment of the insane: 
1800. Retrieved from http://studymore.org.uk/1800.htm  
Arribas-Ayllon, M., & Walkerdine, V. (2008). Foucauldian discourse analysis. In 
C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative 
research in psychology (pp. 91-108). London: SAGE. 
Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, Local Government 
Association, & National Health Service England. (2015). Building the right 
support: A national plan to develop community services and close inpatient 
facilities for people with learning disabilities and/or autism who display 
behaviour that challenges, including those with a mental health condition. 
Retrieved from https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/service-model-291015.pdf 
Ayers, G. M. (1971). England’s first state hospitals and the Metropolitan 
Asylums Board, 1867-1893. London: Wellcome Institute of the History of 
Medicine. 
120 
 
Audit Commission. (1986). Making a reality of community care. London: HMSO. 
Bailey, N. M., & Andrews, T. M. (2003). Diagnostic criteria for psychiatric 
disorders for use with adults with learning disabilities/mental retardation 
(DC/LD) and the diagnosis of anxiety disorders: A review. Journal of 
Intellectual Disability Research, 47(1), 50-61. 
Barnes, C. (1991). A brief history of discrimination and disabled people. In C. 
Barnes (Ed.), Disabled people in Britain and discrimination: A case for anti-
discrimination legislation (pp. 11-27). London: C. Hurst & Co.   
Barr, M. W. (1904). Mental defectives: Their history, treatment and training. 
Philadelphia: P. Blakiston’s Son & Co. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/cu31924012217968  
Bartlett, P. (1999). The poor law of lunacy. Leicester: Leicester University 
Press. 
Bartlett, P., & Sandland, R. (2014). Mental health law: Policy and practice (4th 
ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Battie, W. (1758). A treatise on madness. London: J. Whiston & B. White. 
Beadle-Brown, J., Hutchinson, A., & Whelton, B. (2012). Person-centred active 
support – Increasing choice, promoting independence and reducing 
challenging behaviour. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 25(4), 291-307. 
Beail, N., & Jahoda, A. (2012). Working with people: Direct interventions. In E. 
Emerson, C. Hatton, K. Dickson, R. Gone, A. Caine & J. Bromley (Eds.), 
Clinical psychology and people with intellectual disabilities (pp. 121-140). 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Beardsmore, A., Dorman, T., Cooper, S.-A., & Webb, T. (1998). Affective 
psychosis and Prader-Willi syndrome. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities 
Research, 42, 463-471. 
Beier, A. L. (1985). Masterless men: The vagrancy problem in England 1560-
1640. London: Methuen. 
121 
 
Benjamin, L. T., & Baker, D. B. (2004). From séance to science: A history of the 
profession of psychology in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thomson 
Learning. 
Bentall, R. P. (2004). Madness explained: Psychosis and human nature. 
London: Penguin. 
Berkson, G. (1993). Children with handicaps: A review of behavioral research. 
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.-Berkson, (2006). Mental 
disabilities in western civilization from ancient Rome to the Prerogativa 
Regis. Mental Retardation, 44(1), 28-40. 
Bernal, J., & Hollins, S. (1995). Psychiatric illness and learning disability: A dual 
diagnosis. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 1, 138-145. 
Berrios, G. (1994). Mental illness and mental retardation: History and concepts. 
In N. Bouras (Ed.), Mental health in mental retardation: Recent advances 
and practices (pp. 5-18). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bewley, T. (2008). Madness to mental illness: A history of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
Bhaumik, S., Tyrer, F. C., McGrother, C., & Ganghadaran, S. K. (2008). 
Psychiatric service use and psychiatric disorders in adults with intellectual 
disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 52, 986-995. 
Binet, A., & Simon, (1904). Application des méthodes nouvelles au diagnostic 
du niveau intellectual chez des enfants normaux et anormaux d’hospice et 
d’école primaire. L’Année Psychologique, 11(1), 245-336. 
Bloy, M. (2002). The 1832 Royal Commission of inquiry into the operation of the 
Poor Laws. Retrieved from 
http://www.victorianweb.org/history/poorlaw/royalcom.html  
Bloy, M. (2016). The Poor Law Amendment Act, 1834. Retrieved from 
http://www.historyhome.co.uk/peel/poorlaw/poorlaw.htm   
Bongiorno, F. P. (1996). Dual diagnosis: Developmental disability complicated 
by mental illness. Southern Medical Journal, 89(12), 1142-1146. 
Borsay, A. (2005). Disability and social policy in Britain since 1750: A history of 
exclusion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
122 
 
Borthwick-Duffy, S. (1994). Prevalence of destructive behaviours: A study of 
aggression, self-injury, and property destruction. In T. Thompson & D. B. 
Gray (Eds.), Destructive behavior in developmental disabilities: Diagnosis 
and treatment (pp. 3-23). Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Bouras, N. (Ed.). (1994). Mental health in mental retardation: Recent advances 
and practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bouras, N., & Drummond, C. (1992). Behaviour and psychiatric disorders of 
people with mental handicaps living in the community. Journal of Intellectual 
Disability Research, 36(4), 349-357. 
Bouras, N., & Holt, G. (2004). Mental health services for adults with learning 
disabilities. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 184(4), 291-292. 
Boyle, M. (2003). The dangers of vulnerability. Clinical Psychology, 24, 27-30. 
Boyle, M. (2014). Schizophrenia: A scientific delusion? (2nd ed.). London: 
Routledge. 
Bracken, P., & Thomas, P. (2001). Postpsychiatry: A new direction for mental 
health. British Medical Journal, 322, 724-727. 
Bradoch, D. L., & Parish, S. I. (2001). An institutional history of disability. In G. 
L. Albrecht, K. D. Seelman & M. Bury (Eds.), Handbook of Disability Studies 
(pp. 11-68). London: Sage Publications. 
British Psychological Society. (2000). Learning disability: Definitions and 
contexts. Leicester: Author.  
British Psychological Society. (2008). Best Interests guidance on determining 
the best interests of adults who lack the capacity to make a decision (or 
decisions) for themselves. Leicester: Author. 
British Psychological Society. (2011). Commissioning Clinical Psychology 
services for adults with learning disabilities. Leicester: Author. 
British Psychological Society. (2016). Psychological therapies and people who 
have intellectual disabilities. Leicester: Author. 
Buckles, J., Luckasson, R., & Keefe, E. (2013). A systematic review of the 
prevalence of psychiatric disorders in adults with intellectual disability, 
123 
 
2003-2010. Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 6, 
181-207. 
Burr, V. (2003). Social constructionism (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. 
Burt, C. (1920). The definition and diagnosis of mental deficiency. Part I: 
Amentia as distinguished from dementia. Studies in mental inefficiency, 
1(3), 49-54. 
Butler, I., & Drakeford, M. (2003). Social policy, social welfare and scandal: How 
British public policy is made. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Carabine, J. (2001). Unmarried motherhood 1830-1990: A genealogical 
analysis. In M. Weatherell, S. Taylor & S. J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse as 
data: A guide for analysis (pp. 267-310). London: Sage. 
Carlson, L. (2005). Docile bodies, docile minds: Foucauldian reflections on 
mental retardation. In S. Tremain (Ed.), Foucault and the government of 
disability (pp. 133-152). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Carr, E. G., & Durand, V. M. (1985). Reducing behavior problems through 
functional communication training. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 18, 
111-126. 
Census of Great Britain. (1801). Abstract of the answers and returns made 
pursuant to an Act, passed in the forty-first year of His Majesty King George 
III. intituled "An act for taking an account of the population of Great Britain, 
and the increase or diminution thereof". Enumeration. Part I. England and 
Wales. Part II. Scotland BPP 1801-02 VI (9) 4. Retrieved from 
http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/Browse?path=Browse/Census (by 
date)&active=yes&treestate=expand&titlepos=0  
Census of Great Britain (1851), Tables of the population and houses in the 
divisions, registration counties, and districts of England and Wales, in the 
cities, and burghs of Scotland, and in the Islands in British Seas BPP 1851 
XLIII (1399) 2. Retrieved from 
http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/Browse?path=Browse/Census (by 
date)&active=yes&treestate=expand&titlepos=0 
124 
 
Chandler, F. G. (1929). Conditions simulating pulmonary tuberculosis. British 
Medical Journal, 2(3589), 706-709.  
Chappell, A. L. (1998). Still out in the cold: People with learning difficulties and 
the social model of disability. In T. Shakespeare (Ed.), The disability reader: 
Social science perspectives (pp. 211-220). London: Cassell.  
Chappell, A. L., Goodley, D., & Lawthom, R. (2001). Making connections: The 
relevance of the social model of disability for people with learning 
difficulties. British Journal of Learning Disabilities, 29, 45-50. 
Clarke, D. J., Cumella, S., Corbett, J., Baxter, M., Langton, J., Prasher, V., . . . 
Thinn, K. (1994). Use of ICD-10 research diagnostic criteria to categorise 
psychiatric and behavioural abnormalities among people with learning 
disability: The West Midlands trial. Mental Handicap Research, 7, 273-285. 
Coggon, D., Rose, G., & Barker, D. J. P. (2003). Epidemiology for the 
uninitiated (5th ed.). London: BMJ Books. 
Colebatch, H. K. (2002). Government and governmentality. Using multiple 
approaches to the analysis of government. Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 37(3), 417-435. 
Commission for the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded. (1908). Report of 
the Royal Commission on the care and control of the feeble-minded. 
London: HMSO. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/reportroyalcomm00mindgoog  
Commissioners in Lunacy. (1847). Further report of the commissioners in 
lunacy. London: Shaw & Sons. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/39002086342418.med.yale.edu  
Concannon, L. (2005). Planning for life: Involving adults with learning disabilities 
in service planning. London: Routledge. 
Conolly, J. (1847). The construction and government of lunatic asylums and 
hospitals for the insane. London: John Churchill. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/constructiongove00cono  
125 
 
Conrad, P. (2007). The medicalization of society: On the transformation of 
human conditions into treatable disorders. Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
Cooper, S.-A., & Bailey, N. (2001). Psychiatric disorders amongst adults with 
learning disabilities: Prevalence and relationship to ability level. Irish Journal 
of Psychological Medicine, 18, 45-53. 
Cooper, S.-A., & Bonham, K. G. (1987). A study of two community mental 
handicap teams in Scotland. The British Journal of Mental Subnormality, 
33(65), 117-130. 
Cooper, S.-A., Melville, C. A., & Einfeld, S. L. (2003). Psychiatric diagnosis, 
intellectual disabilities and Diagnostic Criteria for Psychiatric Disorders for 
Use with Adults with Learning Disabilities/Mental Retardation (DC-
LD). Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 47 (Suppl. 1), 3-15. 
Cooper, S.-A., Smiley, E., Morrison, J., Williamson, A., & Allan, L. (2007). 
Mental ill-health in adults with intellectual disabilities: Prevalence and 
associated factors. British Journal of Psychiatry, 190, 27-35. 
Corbett, J. (1979). Psychiatric morbidity and mental retardation. In F. James & 
R. Snaith (Eds.), Psychiatric illness and mental handicap (pp.11-25). 
London: Gaskill Press. 
Corsini, R. J. (2002). The dictionary of psychology. London: Brunner-Routledge. 
Coulter, D. L. (2009). Policy and goals for the future for individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disabilities. In M. Shevell (Ed.), Neurodevelopmental 
disabilities: Clinical and scientific foundations (pp. 50-69). London: Mac 
Keith Press. 
Cromby, J., & Nightingale, D. J. (1999). What’s wrong with social 
constructionism? In, D. J. Nightingale & J. Cromby (Eds.), Social 
constructionist psychology: A critical analysis of theory and practice (pp. 1-
19). Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Crow, L. (1996). Including all of our lives: Renewing the social model of 
disability. In C. Barnes & G. Mercer (Eds.), Exploring the divide: Illness and 
disability (pp. 55-74). Leeds: Disability Press. 
126 
 
Crowther, N. (2007). Nothing without us or nothing about us? Disability & 
Society, 22(7), 791-794. 
Dagnan, D., & Lindsay, W. R. (2012). People with intellectual disabilities and 
mental ill-health. In E. Emerson, C. Hatton, K. Dickenson, R. Gone, A. 
Caine & J. Bromley (Eds.), Clinical psychology and people with learning 
disabilities (2nd ed., pp. 313-338). London: Wiley. 
Dale, P., & Melling, J. (Eds.). (2006). Mental illness and learning disability since 
1850: Finding a place for mental disorder in the United Kingdom. London: 
Routledge. 
Dalton, M. (1618). The countrey justice: Conteyning the practise of the justices 
of the peace out of their sessions, gathered for the better helpe of such 
justices of peace as have not beene much conversant in the studie of the 
lawes of this realme. London: Printed [by Adam Islip] for the Societie of 
Stationers. 
Day, K. (1994). Psychiatric services in mental retardation: generic or specialised 
provision? In N. Bouras (Ed.), Mental health in mental retardation: Recent 
advances and practices (pp. 275-292). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and rule in modern society. London: 
Sage. 
Dearden-Phillips, C., & Fountain, R. (2005). Real power? An examination of the 
involvement of people with learning difficulties in strategic service 
development in Cambridgeshire. British Journal of Learning Disability 
Research, 33, 200-204. 
Deb, S., Matthews, T., Holt, G., & Bouras, N. (2001). Practice guidelines for the 
assessment and diagnosis of mental health problems in adults with 
intellectual disability. London: Pavilion Press. 
Deleuze, G. (1992). What is a dispositif? In T. J. Armstrong (Ed.), Michel 
Foucault, philosopher: Essays translated from the French and German (pp. 
159-168). London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
127 
 
Department for Constitutional Affairs. (2007). Mental Capacity Act 2005, Code 
of Practice. London: The Stationery Office. 
Department for International Development. (2000). Disability, poverty and 
development. London: Author. 
Department of Health. (1989). Needs and responses: Services for adults with 
mental handicap who are mentally ill, who have behaviour problems or who 
offend: Report of a Department of Health study team. London: Author. 
Department of Health. (1991). Stephen Dorrell’s Mencap speech: Statement on 
services for people with learning disabilities – Tuesday 25 June 1991. 
London: Author. 
Department of Health. (1993). Services for people with learning disabilities and 
challenging behaviour or mental health needs: Report of a project group 
(Chairman: Prof. J. L. Mansell). London: HMSO. 
Department of Health. (2001a). Valuing people: A new strategy for learning 
disability for the 21st century. London: The Stationery Office. 
Department of Health. (2001b). Nothing about us without us: The service users 
advisory group report. London: The Stationery Office. 
Department of Health. (2002). Mental health policy implementation guide: Dual 
diagnosis good practice guide. London: Author. 
Department of Health. (2005). Valuing people: The story so far; a new strategy 
for learning disability in the 21st century. London: Author. 
Department of Health. (2009). Valuing people now: A new three-year strategy 
for learning disabilities. London: Author. 
Department of Health. (2012). Transforming care: A national response to 
Winterbourne View Hospital. Department of Health review: Final report. 
London: Author.  
Department of Health and Social Security. (1971). Better services for the 
mentally handicapped. London: HMSO. 
Department of Health and Social Security. (1988). Community care: Agenda for 
action. London: HMSO. 
128 
 
Descartes, R. (1989). Passions of the soul. (S. H. Voss, Trans.). Hackett 
Publishing. (Originally published 1649) 
Desjardins, M. (2016). Idiotic associations: Wordsworth and nineteenth-century 
discourses on idiocy. In T. Connolly & S. Clark (Eds.), Liberating medicine: 
1720-1835 (pp. 141-151). London: Routledge. 
Detels, R. (2015). Epidemiology: The foundation of public health. In R. Detels, 
M. Gulliford, Q. Abdool Karim & C. C. Tan (Eds.), Oxford textbook of global 
public health (6th ed., pp. 401-410). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
DiGiovanni, L. (1978). The elderly retarded: A little-known group. The 
Gerontologist, 18(3), 262-266. 
Digby, A. (1996). Contexts and perspectives. In D. Wright & A. Digby (Eds.), 
From idiocy to mental deficiency: Historical perspectives on people with 
learning disabilities (pp. 1-21). London: Routledge. 
Donaldson, J. Y., & Menolascino, F. J. (1977). Past, current, and future roles of 
child psychiatry in mental retardation. Journal of the American Academy of 
Child Psychiatry, 16(1), 38-52. 
Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1982). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism 
and hermeneutics (2nd ed.). Brighton: The Harvester Press. 
Duggan, M. (2002). Modernising the social model in mental health: A discussion 
paper. London: Social Perspectives Network. 
Duncan, A. G., Penrose, L. S., & Turnbull, R.C. (1935). A survey of the patients 
in a large mental hospital. Journal of Neurological Psychopathology, 16, 
225-238. 
Earl, C. J. C. (1934). The primitive catatonic psychosis of idiocy. British Journal 
of Medical Psychology, 14(3), 230-253. 
Eaton, L. F., & Menolascino, F. J. (1982). Psychiatric disorders in the mentally 
retarded: Types, problems and challenges. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
139, 1297-1303. 
Emerson, E. (2001). Challenging behaviour: Analysis and intervention in people 
with severe intellectual disabilities (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
129 
 
Emerson, E., & Hatton, C. (1994). Moving out: The impact of relocation from 
hospital to community on the quality of life of people with learning 
disabilities. London: HMSO. 
Esquirol, E. (1845). Mental maladies: Treatise on insanity. (E. K. Hunt, Trans.). 
Philadephia: Lea & Blanchard. (Original work published 1838) Retrieved 
from https://archive.org/details/mentalmaladiestr00esqu 
Felstrom, A., Mulryan, N., Reidy, J., Staines, M., & Hillery, J. (2005).  Refining a 
diagnosis: Applying the DC-LD to an Irish population with intellectual 
disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 49(2), 813-819. 
Fitzherbert, A. (1718). The New Natura Brevium (8th ed.). (Original work 
published 1534) Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/newnaturabreviu00fitzgoog 
Fletcher, R. J. (1988). A county systems model: Comprehensive services for the 
dually diagnosed. In J. A. Stark, F. J. Menolascino, M. H. Albarelli & V. C. 
(Eds.), Mental retardation and mental health: Classification, diagnosis, 
treatment, services (pp. 254-264). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Fletcher, R. J., Earl, L., Stavrakaki, C., & First, M. (Eds.). (2007). Diagnostic 
manual – intellectual disability: A textbook of diagnosis of mental disorders 
with intellectual disability. Kingston: National Association for the Dually 
Diagnosed. 
Fornet-Betancourt, R., Becker, H., & Gomez-Müller, A. (1987). The ethic of care 
for the self as a practice of freedom: An interview with Michel Foucault on 
January 20, 1984. (J. D. Gauthier, Trans.). Philosophy & Social Criticism, 
12(2-3), 112-131. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. (D. F. Bouchard & S. 
Simon, Trans.). In D. F. Bouchard (Ed.), Language, counter-memory, 
practice: Selected essays and interviews (pp. 139-164). Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Two lectures. (A. Fontana & P. Pasquino, Trans.). In C. 
Gordon (Ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 
1972-1977 (pp. 78-108). New York: Pantheon. (Original work published 
1977) 
130 
 
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777-795. 
Foucault, M. (1988). Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of 
reason. (R. Howard, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work 
published 1961) 
Foucault, M. (1988). The concern for truth. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). In L. D. 
Kritzman (Ed.), Michel Foucault: Politics, philosophy, culture: Interviews and 
other writings 1977-1984 (pp. 255-267). London: Routledge. (Original work 
published 1984) 
Foucault, M. (1991). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. (A. Sheridan, 
Trans.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1975)  
Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. (C. Gordon, Trans.). In G. Burchell, C. 
Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality 
(pp. 87-104). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Original work 
published 1978) 
Foucault, M. (1994). Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir. In Dits et 
Écrits (Vol. 2, pp. 521-525). Paris: Gallimard. (Original work published 
1974) 
Foucault, M. (1998). The history of sexuality: Volume 1, The will to 
knowledge. (R. Hurley, Trans.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work 
published 1976) 
Foucault, M. (2000). Omnes et singulatim: Towards a criticism of ‘political 
reason’. (R. Hurley, Trans.). In. J. D. Faubion (Ed.), Power: The essential 
works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (Vol. 3, pp. 298-325). (Original work 
published 1986)  
Foucault, M. (2002). The archaeology of knowledge. (A. M. Sheridan Smith, 
Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work published 1969) 
Foucault, M. (2003). The birth of the clinic: An archaelogy of medical 
perception. (A. M. Sheridan, Trans.). London: Routledge. (Original work 
published 1963) 
131 
 
Foucault, M. (2003). 15 January, 1975. (G. Burchell, Trans.). In V. Marchetti & 
A. Salomoni (Eds.), Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-
1975. London: Verso.  
Foucault, M. (2007). What our present is. (L. Hochroth, Trans.). In S. Lotringer 
(Ed.), The politics of truth (pp. 129-143). Los Angeles:  Semiotext(e). 
(Original work published 1988)  
Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities. (2002). Count us in: The report 
of the committee of inquiry into meeting the mental health needs of young 
people with learning disabilities. London: Mental Health Foundation. 
Foundation for People with Learning Disabilities. (2004). Green light for mental 
health: A service improvement toolkit. London: Author. 
Führer, A., & Eichner, F. (2015). Statistics and sovereignty: The workings of 
biopower in epidemiology. Global Health Action, 8(1). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v8.28262   
Gall, F. J. (1835). On the functions of the brain and of each of its parts. (W. 
Lewis, Trans.). Boston: Marsh, Capen & Lyon. (Original work published 
1810) 
Galton, F. (1883). Inquiries into human faculty and its development. New York: 
MacMillan. 
Garland, D. (2014). What is a “history of the present”? On Foucault’s 
genealogies and their critical preconditions. Punishment & Society, 16(4) 
365-384. 
Gergen, K. J., Hoffman, L., & Anderson, H. (1996). Is diagnosis a disaster? A 
constructionist trialogue. In F. W. Kaslow (Ed.), Handbook of relational 
diagnosis and dysfunctional family patterns (pp. 102-118). Oxford: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Gillman, M., Heyman, B., & Swain, J. (2000). What's in a name? The 
implications of diagnosis for people with learning difficulties and their family 
carers. Disability & Society, 15(3), 389-409. 
132 
 
Gillman, M., Swain, J., & Heyman, B. (1997). Life history or ‘care history’, the 
objectification of people with learning difficulties through the tyranny of 
professional discourses. Disability & Society, 12(5), 675-694. 
Goble, C. (1998). 50 Years of NHS involvement in the lives of people with 
learning difficulties: A cause for celebration? Disability & Society, 13(5), 
833-835. 
Godber, G. (1973). The responsibilities and role of the doctor concerned with 
the care of the mentally handicapped. British Journal of Psychiatry, 123, 
617-620. 
Goddard, H. H. (1913). The Kallikak Family: A study in the heredity of feeble-
mindedness. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
Goffman, E. (1961). Asylums: Essays on the social situation of mental patients 
and other inmates. New York: Doubleday Anchor. 
Goldenberg, M. J. (2006). On evidence and evidence-based medicine: Lessons 
from the philosophy of science. Social Science and Medicine, 62(11), 2621-
2632. 
Gooding, P. (2014). Change and continuity in mental health law: The long road 
to the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities 
and its implications for mental health and the law today. European Journal 
of Current Legal Issues, 20(3). Retrieved from 
http://webjcli.org/article/view/367/470  
Goodley, D. (1998). Supporting people with learning difficulties in self‐advocacy 
groups and models of disability. Health and Social Care in the 
Community, 6(6), 438-446. 
Goodley, D. (2001). 'Learning difficulties', the social model of disability and 
impairment: Challenging epistemologies. Disability & Society, 16(2), 207-
231. 
Goodley, D., & Rapley, M. (2001). How do you understand “learning 
difficulties”? Towards a social theory of impairment. Mental Retardation, 
39(3), 229-232. 
133 
 
Gordon, C. (1991). Governmental rationality: An introduction. In G. Burchell, C. 
Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality 
(pp. 1-51). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Green, B. S. (1983). Knowing the poor: A case-study in textual reality 
construction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
Grob, G. N. (1983). Mental illness and American society, 1875-1940. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1981). Effective evaluation. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Gustafsson, C., Öjehagen, A., Hansson, L., Sandlund, M., Nyström, M., Glad, 
J., . . . Fredriksson, M. (2009). Effects of psychosocial interventions for 
people with intellectual disabilities and mental health problems: A survey of 
systematic reviews. Research on Social Work Practice, 19(3), 281-290. 
Hagan, T., & Smail, D. (1997). Power-mapping: I. Background and basic 
methodology. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 7, 257-
267. 
Hall, J. (2008). Mental deficiency: Changing the outlook. The Psychologist, 
21(11), 1006-1007. 
Hall, J., Pilgrim, D. & Turpin, G. (2015), Introduction. In J. Hall, D. Pilgrim & G. 
Turpin (Eds.), Clinical Psychology in Britain: Historical perspectives (pp. 3-
19). Leicester: The British Psychological Society.  
Hanley, B. (2000). Barriers to interdisciplinary teaming across multiple settings 
[Abstract]. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 44 (Suppl. 1), 307-
308. 
Harbour, C. K., & Maulik, P. K. (2010). History of intellectual disability. In: J. H. 
Stone & M. Blouin (Eds.), International encyclopedia of rehabilitation. 
Buffalo: Centre for International Rehabilitation Research Information and 
Exchange (CIRRIE). 
Harper, D. (2011). Choosing a qualitative research method. In D. Harper & A. R. 
Thompson (Eds.), Qualitative research methods in mental health and 
134 
 
psychotherapy: A guide for students and practitioners (pp. 83-98). 
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Harper, D. (2016). Beyond individual therapy. The Psychologist, 29, 440-444. 
Harper, D. & Speed, E. (2012). Uncovering recovery: The resistible rise of 
recovery and resilience. Studies in Social Justice, 6(1), 9-25. 
Harper, D., Patel, N., Davidson, S., & Byrne, A. (2007). Drawing back the 
curtain: Maintaining a critical stance in clinical psychology training. 
International Journal of Critical Psychology, Counselling and 
Psychotherapy, 7(4), 201-210. 
Hassiotis, A., & Turk, J. (2012). Mental health needs in adolescents with 
intellectual disabilities: Cross-sectional survey of a service sample. Journal 
of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities, 25(3), 252-261.  
Hawksley, J. (2013). A genealogy of the care programme approach in mental 
health services (D.Clin.Psych. thesis). Retrieved from British Library e-
theses online service. (uk.bl.ethos.586599) 
Health and Care Profession’s Council. (2015). Standards of proficiency: 
Practitioner psychologists. London: Author.  
Hemmings, C., Deb, S., Chaplin, E., Hardy, S., & Mukherjee, R. (2013). Review 
of research for people with ID and mental health problems: A view from the 
United Kingdom. Journal of Mental Health Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 6(2), 127-158. 
Higginbotham, P. (2017a). An Act for the Amendment and better Administration 
of the Laws relating to the Poor in England and Wales 1834. Retrieved from 
http://www.workhouses.org.uk/poorlaws/1834act.shtml 
Higginbotham, P. (2017b). The Workhouse. Retrieved from 
http://www.workhouses.org.uk/  
Hollins, S., & Sinason, V. (2000). Psychotherapy, learning disabilities and 
trauma: New perspectives. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 176, 32-36 
Honig, E. M. (1955). Psychosis and peptic ulcer. Bulletin of the Menninger 
Clinic, 19(2), 61-67. 
135 
 
Hook, D. (2005). Genealogy, discourse, ‘effective history’: Foucault and the 
work of critique. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2(1), 3-31. 
Hoole, L., & Morgan, S. (2010). ‘It’s only right that we get involved’: Service-
user perspectives on involvement in learning disability services. British 
Journal of Learning Disabilities, 39(1), 5-10. 
Horner, N. (2012). What is social work? Context and perspectives (4th ed.). 
London: Sage. 
Hove, O., & Havik, O. E. (2008). Mental disorders and problem behavior in a 
community sample of adults with intellectual disability: Three-month 
prevalence and comorbidity. Journal of Mental Health Research in 
Intellectual Disabilities, 1(4), 223-237. 
Hurd, H. M. (1888). Imbecility with insanity. American Journal of Insanity, 45, 
261-269. 
Hurley, A. D. (2008). Depression in adults with intellectual disability: Symptoms 
and challenging behaviour. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 
52(11), 905-916. 
Inter-departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services. (1942). 
State provision for social need: The Beveridge Committee report on the 
welfare state. Marlborough: Adam Matthew. 
Ireland, W. W. (1877). On idiocy and imbecility. London: J & A Churchill. 
Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/b21951342 
Itard, E. M. G. (1802). An historical account of the discovery and education of a 
Savage man: or, the first developments, physical and moral, of the young 
savage caught in the woods near Aveyron in the year 1798. London: 
Phillips. 
Jackson, M. (2000). The borderland of imbecility: Medicine, society and the 
fabrication of the feeble mind in late Victorian and Edwardian England. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Jarrett, S. (2012). Disability in time and place. Retrieved from 
https://content.historicengland.org.uk/content/docs/research/disability-in-
time-and-place.pdf  
136 
 
Jay Committee. (1979). Report of the committee of enquiry into mental 
handicap nursing and care. London: HMSO. 
Jenkins, R. (2000). Use of psychotropic medication in people with a learning 
disability. British Journal of Nursing, 9(13), 844-850. 
Jóhannesson, I. A. (2010). The politics of historical discourse analysis: A 
qualitative research method? Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of 
Education, 31(2), 251-264. 
Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health. (2013). Guidance for 
commissioners of mental health services for people with learning 
disabilities. Retrieved from https://www.jcpmh.info/wp-content/uploads/jcph-
learningdisabilities-guide.pdf  
Joint Committee on Human Rights. (2008). A life like any other? The human 
rights of adults with learning disabilities. London: The Stationery Office. 
Jones, K. (1972). A history of the mental health services. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Kanner, L. (1943). Autistic disturbances of affective contact. Nervous Child, 2, 
217-250. 
Kerker, B. D., Owens, P. I., Zigler, E., & Horwitz, S. M. (2004). Mental health 
disorders among individuals with mental retardation: Challenges to accurate 
prevalence estimates. Public Health Reports, 119(4), 409-417. 
King’s Fund. (1980). An ordinary life: Comprehensive locally-based services for 
mentally handicapped people. London: Author. 
Kipnis, D. (1990). Technology and power. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Kraepelin, E. (1919). Dementia Praecox. Edinburgh: E. and S. Livingstone 
(Original work published 1883). Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/dementiapraecoxp00kraeiala 
Kratter, F. E. (1959). The pseudo-mental-deficiency syndrome. Journal of 
Mental Science, 105, 406-420. 
Langdon Down Museum of Learning Disabilities. (2014). Earlswood Asylum. 
Retrieved from https://langdondownmuseum.org.uk/research/u3a-
137 
 
research/2014-long-stay-institutions-for-people-with-learning-
disabilities/earlswood/  
LaVigna, G., & Donnellan, A. (1986). Alternatives to punishment: Solving 
behaviour problems with non-aversive strategies. New York: Irvington. 
LaVigna, G., & Willis, T. (2005). A positive behavioural support model for 
breaking the barriers to social and community inclusion. Tizard Learning 
Disability Review, 10(2), 16-23. 
LaVigna, G. W., & Willis, T. J. (2012). The efficacy of positive behavioural 
support with the most challenging behaviour: The evidence and its 
implications. Journal of Intellectual & Developmental Disability, 37(3), 185-
195. 
Lee, A. (2000). Discourse analysis and cultural (re)writing. In A. Lee & C. 
Poynton (Eds.), Culture and text. Discourse and methodology in social 
research and cultural studies (pp. 188-202). Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Letherby, G., Scott, J., & Williams, M. (2013). Objectivity and subjectivity in 
social research. London: Sage. 
Locke, J. (1825). An essay concerning human understanding (25th ed.). 
London: Thomas Tegg. (Original work published 1690) Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/humanunderstandi00lockuoft 
Lombroso, C. (2006). Criminal man (2nd ed.). (M. Gibson & N. H. Ratter, 
Trans.). Durham, NC: Duke University Press (Original  work published 
1876) 
Lund, J. (1985). The prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in mentally retarded 
adults. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 72(6), 563-570. 
Lupton, D. (1997). Foucault and the medicalisation critique. In A. R. Petersen & 
R. Bunton (Eds.), Foucault, health and medicine (pp. 94-110). London: 
Routledge. 
Lushington, S. G. (1895). Archbold’s lunacy (4th ed.). London: Shaw & Sons. 
Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/b21293879 
138 
 
Manion, M. L., & Bersani, H. A. (1987).Mental retardation as a Western 
sociological construct: A cross-cultural analysis. Disability, Handicap & 
Society, 2(3), 231-245. 
Mansell, J. (1997). ‘Better Services’ 25 years on. Tizard Learning Disability 
Review, 2(1), 45-46. 
Mansell, J., & Ericsson, K. (1996). Conclusion: Integrating diverse experience. 
In J. Mansell & K. Ericsson (Eds.), Deinstitutionalization and Community 
Living (pp. 241-253). Boston: Springer. 
Martorell, A., Tsakanikos, E., Pereda, A., Gutiérrez-Recacha, P., Bouras, N., & 
Ayuso-Mateos, J. L. (2009). Mental health in adults with mild and moderate 
intellectual disabilities: The role of recent life events and traumatic 
experiences across the life span. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 
197(3), 182-186. 
Matson, J. L., & Mahan, S. (2010). Antipsychotic drug side effects for persons 
with intellectual disability. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 
31(6),1570-1576. 
Maudsley, H. (1876). The physiology of the mind. London: MacMillan. 
McBrien, J. A. (2003). Assessment and diagnosis of depression in people with 
intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 47(1), 1-13. 
McDonagh, P. (2008). Idiocy: A cultural history. Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press. 
McGillivray, J. A., & McCabe, M. P. (2004). Pharmacological management of 
challenging behavior of individuals with intellectual disabilities. Research in 
Developmental Disabilities, 25, 523–537. 
McGlynn, M. (2005). Idiots, lunatics and the Royal Prerogative in early Tudor 
England. Journal of Legal History 26(1), 1-24. 
McHoul, A. & Grace, W. (1993). A Foucault primer: Discourse, power and the 
subject. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
McManus, S., Meltzer, H., Brugha, T., Bebbington, P., & Jenkins, R. (2009). 
Adult psychiatric morbidity in England 2007: Results of a household survey. 
London: NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care.  
139 
 
McNay, L. (1994). Foucault: A critical introduction. Cambridge: Polity. 
Mellett, D. J. (1981). Bureaucracy and mental illness: The commissioners in 
lunacy 1845-90, Medical History, 25, 221-250. 
Melton, G. B., Petrila, J., Poythress, N. G., & Slobogin, C. (2007). Psychological 
evaluation for the courts: A handbook for mental health professionals and 
lawyers. (3rd ed.). London: Guildford Press. 
Meltzer, H., Gill, B., Petticrew, M. & Hinds, K. (1995). OPCS Survey of 
psychiatric morbidity in Great Britain, report 2: Physical complaints, service 
use and treatment of adults with psychiatric disorders. London: HMSO. 
Menolascino, F. J. (1970). Psychiatric approaches to mental retardation. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Menolascino, F. J., & McCann, B. M. (Eds.). (1983). Mental health and mental 
retardation: Bridging the gap. Baltimore: University Park Press. 
Mental Deficiency Committee. (1929). Report of the Mental Deficiency 
Committee: Being a joint committee of the Board of Education and Board of 
Control. London: HMSO. Retrieved from 
http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/wood/wood1929.html 
Metropolitan Commissioners. (1844). Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners 
in lunacy to the Lord Chancellor. London: Bradbury and Evans. Retrieved 
from https://archive.org/details/reportofmetropol00lond 
Michael, J. (2008). Healthcare for all: Report of the independent inquiry into 
access to healthcare for people with learning disabilities. London: 
Department of Health. 
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (2008). Governing the present: Administering economic, 
social and personal life. Cambridge: Polity. 
Mills, S. (2013). Michel Foucault. London: Routledge. 
Moncrieff, J., & Timimi, S. (2013). The social and cultural construction of 
psychiatric knowledge: An analysis of NICE guidelines on depression and 
ADHD. Anthropology and Medicine, 20, 59-71. 
140 
 
Morel, B. A. (1857). Traite des degenerescences physiques, intellectuelles et 
morales de l'espece humaine. Paris: Masson. 
Morgan, A. (2010). Discourse analysis: An overview for the neophyte 
researcher. Journal of Health and Social Care Improvement, 1, 1-7. 
Moss, S. C., Prosser, H., Ibbotson, B., & Goldberg, D. P. (1996). Respondent 
and informant accounts of psychiatric symptoms in a sample of patients 
with learning disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 40, 457-
465. 
Myers, E. D. (1998). Workhouse or asylum: the nineteenth century battle for the 
care of the pauper insane. Psychiatric Bulletin, 22, 575-577. 
National Council for Civil Liberties. (1951). 50,000 outside the law: An 
examination of those certified as mentally defective. London: Author.  
National Forum of People with Learning Disabilities, & National Valuing Families 
Forum. (2016). The effect of spending cuts on people with learning 
disabilities and their families. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationalforums.co.uk/shared/shared-information/cuts-evidence  
National Health Service Health Advisory Service. (1997). Voices in partnership: 
involving users and carers in commissioning and delivering mental health 
services. London: Stationery Office. 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2016a). Mental health 
problems in people with learning disabilities: Prevention, assessment and 
management. Retrieved from https://www.nice.org.uk/Guidance/NG54  
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. (2016b). Mental health 
problems in people with learning disabilities: Prevention, assessment and 
management. Methods, evidence and recommendations Retrieved from 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng54/evidence/full-guideline-pdf-
2612227933  
Naylor, V, & Clifton, M. (1993). People with learning disabilities – meeting 
complex needs. Health and Social Care in the Community, 1(6), 343-353. 
Neugebauer, R. (1979). Medieval and early modern theories of mental illness. 
Archives of General Psychiatry, 36(4), 477-483. 
141 
 
Neugebauer, N. (1996). Mental handicap in medieval and early modern 
England: Criteria, measurement and care. In D. Wright & A. Digby (Eds.), 
From idiocy to mental deficiency: Historical perspectives on people with 
learning disabilities (pp. 22-43). London: Routledge. 
O’Brien, G., & Yule, W. (1995). Why behavioural phenotypes? In G. O’Brien & 
W. Yule (Eds.), Behavioural phenotypes (pp. 1-23). London: Mac Keith 
Press. 
O’Farrell, C. (2005). Michel Foucault. London: Sage. 
Oliver, M. (1990). The politics of disablement. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Parker, I. (1992). Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual 
psychology. London: Routledge. 
Parkin, E. (2016). Learning disability – Overview of policy and services. London: 
House of Commons Library. Retrieved from 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07058/SN07058.p
df  
Parsons, J. A., May, J. G., & Menolascino, F, J. (1984). The nature and 
incidence of mental illness in mentally retarded individuals. In F. J. 
Menolascino & J. A. Stark (Eds.), Handbook of mental illness in the 
mentally retarded (pp. 3-43). Boston: Springer. 
Paschos, D., Bass, N., & Strydom, A. (2014). Behavioural phenotypes and 
genetic syndromes. In E. Tsakanikos & J. McCarthy (Eds.), Handbook of 
psychopathology in intellectual disability: Research, policy and practice (pp. 
109-122). New York: Springer Science. 
Patel, N. (2003). Clinical Psychology: Reinforcing inequalities or facilitating 
empowerment? The International Journal of Human Rights, 7(1), 16-39. 
Pickersgill, M. (2012). What is psychiatry? Co-producing complexity in mental 
health. Social Theory & Health, 10(4), 328-347. 
Pilgrim, D. (2008). The eugenic legacy in psychology and psychiatry. 
International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 54(3), 272-284. 
Pilgrim, D. (2010). British clinical psychology and society. Psychology Learning 
& Teaching, 9(2), 8-12. 
142 
 
Pilgrim, D., & Rogers, A. (2014). A sociology of mental health and illness (5th 
ed.). Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
Pinel, P. (1806). A treatise on insanity (D. D. Davis, Trans.). Sheffield: Cadell & 
Davies. (Original work published 1798) Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/atreatiseoninsa00pinegoog  
Pollock, H. M. (1945). Mental disease among mental defectives. American 
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 49, 477-480. 
Poor Law Commission Office. (1836). Second annual report of the poor law 
commissioners. London: HMSO. Retrieved from 
https://archive.org/details/b21366251_0002 
Poor Law Commissioners. (1834). Report from His Majesty's commissioners for 
inquiring into the administration and practical operation of the poor laws. 
London: B. Fellowes. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/b28746119 
Prescott, N. (2013). A genealogical exploration of the conditions of possibility for 
re-feeding to emerge as a treatment regimen (D.Clin.Psych. thesis). 
Retrieved from British Library e-theses online service. (uk.bl.ethos.590837) 
Prout, H., & Browning, B. (2011). Psychotherapy with persons with intellectual 
disabilities: A review of effectiveness research. Advances in Mental Health 
and Intellectual Disabilities, 5, 53-59. 
Public Health England. (2015). Prescribing of psychotropic drugs to people with 
learning disabilities and/or autism by general practitioners in England. 
London: Public Health England. 
Quigley, A., Murray, G. C., Mckenzie, K., & Elliot, G. (2001). Staff knowledge 
about symptoms of mental health problems in people with learning 
disabilities. Journal of Intellectual Disabilities, 5(3), 235-244. 
Rabinow, P. & Rose, N. (2003). Foucault today. In P. Rabinow & N. Rose 
(Eds.), The essential Foucault: Selections from the essential works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984 (pp. vii-xxxv). New York: New Press.  
Race, D. (2002). The historical context. In D. Race (Ed.), Learning disability: A 
social approach (pp. 23-52). London: Routledge. 
143 
 
Ramsay, R., Gerada, C., Mars, S., & Szmukler, G. (Eds.). (2001). Mental 
illness: A handbook for carers. London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Rapley, M. (2004). The social construction of intellectual disability. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Read, J. (2005). The bio-bio-bio model of madness. The Psychologist, 18(10), 
586-587. 
Record Commission. (1963). The statutes of the realm: Printed by command of 
His Majesty King George the Third, in pursuance of an address of the 
House of Commons of Great Britain. From original records and authentic 
manuscripts (Vol. 1). London: Dawsons of Pall Mall. (Original work 
published 1810) Retrieved from 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915496;view=1up;seq=417  
Recovery in the Bin (2015). UnRecovery star. Retrieved from 
https://recoveryinthebin.org/unrecovery-star-2  
Reich, W. (2000). Psychiatric diagnosis as an ethical problem. In S. Bloch, P. 
Chodoff & S. A. Green (Eds.), Psychiatric ethics (3rd ed., pp. 193-224). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Reiss, S. (1994). Psychopathology in mental retardation. In. N. Bouras (Ed). 
Mental health in mental retardation: Recent advances and practices (pp. 67-
78). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Reiss, S., Levitan, G. W., & Szysko, J. (1982). Emotional disturbance and 
mental retardation: Diagnostic overshadowing. American Journal of Mental 
Deficiency, 86, 567-574. 
Roberts, A. (1981). The Lunacy Commission. Retrieved from 
http://studymore.org.uk/01.htm  
Roberts, M. (2005). The production of the psychiatric subject: Power, 
knowledge and Michael Foucault. Nursing Philosophy, 6(1), 33-42. 
Rose, N. (1993). Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism. 
Economy and Society, 22(3), 283-299. 
Rose, N. (1996a). Inventing our selves. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
144 
 
Rose, N. (1996b). Identity, genealogy, history. In S. Hall and P. du Gay (Eds.), 
Questions of cultural identity (pp. 128-150). London: Sage.  
Rose, N. (1999). Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self (2nd ed.). 
London: Routledge. 
Rose, N. (2001a). The politics of life itself.  Theory, Culture and Society, 18(6), 
1-30. 
Rose, N. (2001b). Normality and pathology in a biological age. Outlines, 1, 19-
34. 
Rose, N., & Miller, P. (1994). On therapeutic authority: Psychoanalytic expertise 
under advanced liberalism. History of the Human Sciences, 7(3), 29-64. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (1974). Mental deficiency section: Memorandum 
on the responsibilities and role of the consultant psychiatrist in mental 
handicap. British Journal of Psychiatry Supplement, News and Notes, 
May, 5. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (1978). Mental handicap. Bulletin of the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2(4), 56-61. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (1986). Psychiatric services for mentally 
handicapped adults and young people. Bulletin of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 10, 321-322. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (1996). Meeting the mental health needs of 
adults with mild learning disabilities. London: Author. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2001). DC-LD: Diagnostic criteria for psychiatric 
disorders for use with adults with learning disabilities/mental retardation. 
London: Gaskell. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2003), Meeting the mental health needs of 
adults with a mild learning disability. London: Author. 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2013). People with learning disability and 
mental health, behavioural or forensic problems: The role of in-patient 
services. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/FR%20ID%2003%20for%20website.pdf 
145 
 
Royal College of Psychiatrists. (2016). Psychotropic drug prescribing for people 
with intellectual disability, mental health problems and/or behaviours that 
challenge: Practice guidelines. Retrieved from 
https://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/FR_ID_09_for_website.pdf 
Royal College of Psychiatrists, & British Psychological Society. (2016). 
Challenging behaviour: a unified approach – update. Clinical and service 
guidelines for supporting children, young people and adults with intellectual 
disabilities who are at risk of receiving abusive or restrictive practices. 
Retrieved from http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/FR_ID_08.pdf  
Royal College of Psychiatrists, British Psychological Society, & Royal College of 
Speech and Language Therapists. (2007). Challenging behaviour: A unified 
approach. Clinical and service guidelines for supporting people with 
learning disabilities who are at risk of receiving abusive or restrictive 
practices. Retrieved from 
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/cr144.pdf 
Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency. 
(1957). Report of the Royal Commission on the Law relating to mental 
Illness and mental deficiency. London: HMSO. 
Rushton, P. (1988). Lunatics and idiots: Mental disability, the community, and 
the poor law in north-east England, 1600-1800. Medical History, 32, 34-50. 
Rushton, P. (1996). Idiocy, the family and the community in early modern 
northeast England. In D. Wright & A. Digby (Eds.). From idiocy to mental 
deficiency: Historical perspectives on people with learning disabilities (pp. 
44-64). London: Routledge. 
Ryan, J., & Thomas, F. (1987). The politics of mental handicap. London: Free 
Association Books. 
Scheerenberger, R. C. (1987). A history of mental retardation: A quarter century 
of promise. Baltimore: PH Brookes. 
Schroeder, S. R., Tessel, R. E., Loupe, P. S., & Stodgell, C. J. (1997). Severe 
behavior problems in people with developmental disabilities. In W. E. 
McLean (Ed.), Handbook of mental deficiency (3rd ed., pp. 439-465). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
146 
 
Schuengel, C., de Schipper, J. C., Sterkenburg, P. S., & Kef, S. (2013). 
Attachment, intellectual disabilities and mental health: Research, 
assessment and intervention. Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities, 26(1), 34-46. 
Scull, A. T. (1977). Madness and segregative control: The rise of the insane 
asylum. Social Problems, 24(3), 337-351. 
Scull, A. T. (Ed.). (1981). Madhouses, mad-doctors, and madmen: The social 
history of psychiatry in the Victorian era. London: Athlone Press. 
Scull, A. T. (1989). From madness to mental illness: Medical men as moral 
entrepreneurs. In A. T. Scull (Ed.), Social order / Mental disorder: Anglo-
American psychiatry in its historical perspective (pp. 118-161). Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Sembou, E. (2011, June). Foucault’s genealogy. Paper presented at the 10th 
annual meeting of the international social theory consortium, Cork, Ireland. 
Retrieved from www.academia.edu/679231/_Foucaults_Genealogy_  
Shakespeare, T. (2006). Disability rights and wrongs. London: Routledge. 
Shorter, E. (1997). A history of psychiatry: From the era of the asylum to the 
age of Prozac. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Shuttleworth, G. E. (1895). Mentally-deficient children: Their treatment and 
training. London: H. K. Lewis. 
Silverman, D. (1997). Validity and credibility in qualitative research. In G. Miller 
& R. Dingwall (Eds.) Context and method in qualitative research. The 
alternative paradigm (pp. 12-25). London: Sage. 
Singleton, N., Bumpstead, R., O’Brien, M., Lee, A., & Meltzer, H. (2001). 
Psychiatric morbidity among adults living in private households, 2000. 
London: The Stationery Office. 
Slack, P. (1990). The English poor law, 1531-1782. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Smail, D. (1990). Design for a post-behaviourist clinical psychology. Clinical 
Psychology Forum, 28, 2-10. 
147 
 
Smail, D. (1995). Clinical psychology: Liberatory practice or discourse of 
power? Clinical Psychology Forum, 80, 3-6. 
Smail, D. (1999). Patients’ powers and the impotence of psychotherapy. 
Universities Psychotherapy Association Review, 7, 35-42. 
Smiley, E. (2005). Epidemiology of mental health problems in adults with 
learning disability: An update. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 11, 214-
222. 
South Gloucestershire Safeguarding Adults Board. (2012). Winterbourne View 
hospital: A serious case review. Retrieved from 
https://www.learningdisabilitytoday.co.uk/media/16179/report.pdf  
Sovner, R. (1986). Limiting factors in the use of DSM-III criteria with mentally ill/ 
mentally retarded persons. Psychopharmacology Bulletin, 22(4), 1055-
1059. 
Sovner, R., & Hurley, A. D. (1982). Diagnosing depression in the mentally 
retarded. Psychiatric Aspects of Mental Retardation Newsletter, 1(1), 1-4. 
Sovner, R., & Hurley, A. D. (1986). Four factors affecting the diagnosis of 
psychiatric disorders in mentally retarded persons. Psychiatric Aspects of 
Mental Retardation Reviews, 5(9), 45-49. 
Spencer, L., & Ritchie, J. (2012). In pursuit of quality. In D. Harper & A. R. 
Thompson (Eds.), Qualitative research methods in mental health and 
psychotherapy: A guide for students and practitioners (pp. 227-243). 
Oxford: Wiley. 
Stebbings, C. (2012). Protecting the property of the mentally ill: The judicial 
solution in nineteenth century lunacy law. Cambridge Law Journal, 71(2), 
384-411. 
Stenfert Kroese, B., Dagnan, D., & Loumidis, K. (Eds.). (1997). Cognitive-
behaviour therapy for people with learning disabilities. London: Routledge 
Stern, W. (1914). The psychological methods of testing intelligence (G. M. 
Whipple, Trans.). Baltimore: Warwick & York. (Original work published 
1912) Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/psychologicalmet00ster  
148 
 
Stewart, J. (2011). ‘The dangerous age of childhood’: Child guidance and the 
‘normal’ child in Great Britain, 1920-1950. Paedagogica Historica, 47, 785-
803. 
Sturmey, P. (1995). DSM-IIIR and people with dual diagnoses: Conceptual 
issues and strategies for future research. Journal of Intellectual Disability 
Research, 39, 357-364. 
Sturmey, P., Laud, R. B., Cooper, C. L., Matson, J. L., & Fodstad, J. C. (2010). 
Mania and behavioural equivalents: A preliminary study. Research in 
Developmental Disabilities, 31(5), 1008-1014. 
Szasz, T. S. (1960). The myth of mental illness, American Psychologist, 15, 
113-118. 
Szklo, M., & Nieto, F. J. (2007). Epidemiology: Beyond the basics. Burlington: 
Jones & Bartlett Learning. 
Szymanski, L. S. (1994). Mental retardation and mental health: Concepts, 
aetiology and incidence. In N. Bouras (Ed.), Mental health in mental 
retardation: Recent advances and practices (pp. 19-33). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Szymanski, L. S., & Grossman, H. (1984). Dual implications of dual diagnosis. 
Mental Retardation, 4, 155-166. 
Tamboukou, M. (1999). Writing genealogies: An exploration of Foucault’s 
strategies for doing research. Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics of 
education, 20(2), 201-217. 
Taylor, J. L., Lindsay, W. R., & Willner, P. (2008). CBT for people with 
intellectual disabilities: Emerging evidence, cognitive ability and IQ effects. 
Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 36, 723-733.  
Thomson, M. (1999). The problem of mental deficiency: Eugenics, democracy 
and social policy in Britain, c.1870– 1959. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Tizard, J. (1960). Residential care of mentally handicapped children. British 
Medical Journal, 1(5178), 1041-1046. 
149 
 
Transforming Care and Commissioning Steering Group. (2014). Winterbourne 
View – Time for change. Retrieved from https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/transforming-commissioning-services.pdf  
Transforming Care and Commissioning Steering Group. (2015). Winterbourne 
View – Time is running out. Retrieved from 
https://www.acevo.org.uk/sites/default/files/Time Is Running Out FINAL 
WEB_0.pdf  
Tredgold, A. (1952). Textbook on mental deficiency (8th ed.). Oxford: Williams 
& Wilkins. 
Tremain, S. (Ed.). (2005). Foucault and the government of disability. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Tsiouris, J. A., Mann, R., Patti, P. J., & Sturmey, P. (2003). Challenging 
behaviours should not be considered as depressive equivalents in 
individuals with intellectual disability. Journal of Intellectual Disability 
Research, 47(1), 14-21. 
Turner, T. H. (1989). Schizophrenia and mental handicap: An historical review, 
with implications for further research. Psychological Medicine, 19, 301-314. 
United Nations. (2006). The United Nations convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities: New era or false dawn. Retrieved from 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-
of-persons-with-disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-
disabilities-2.html  
Unsworth, C. (1987). The politics of mental health legislation. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
van den Hout, M., Arntz, A., & Merckelbach, H. (2000). Contributions of 
psychology to the understanding of psychiatric disorders. In M. G. Gelder, J. 
L. Lopez-Ibor Jr. and N. C. Andreasen (Eds.), New Oxford textbook of 
psychiatry, (pp. 277-292). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Watson, J. B. (1913). Psychology as the behaviourist views it. Psychological 
Review, 20(2), 158-177. 
150 
 
Whitaker, S., & Read, S. (2006). The prevalence of psychiatric disorders among 
people with intellectual disabilities: An analysis of the literature. Journal of 
Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities. 19, 330-345. 
Williams, J. (1996). Social inequalities and mental health: Developing services 
and developing knowledge. Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology, 6, 311-316. 
Williams, J. (1999). Social inequalities and mental health. In C. Newnes, G. 
Holmes & C. Dunn (Eds.), This is madness: A critical look at psychiatry and 
the future of mental health services (pp. 29-50). Ross-on-Wye: PCCS 
Books. 
Williams, V., & Heslop, P. (2005). Mental health support needs of people with a 
learning difficulty: a medical or a social model? Disability & Society, 20(3), 
231-245. 
Willig, C. (2013). Introducing qualitative research in psychology (3rd ed.). 
Maidenhead: Open University Press.  
Wooldridge, A. (1994). Measuring the mind: Education and psychology in 
England, c. 1860-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
World Health Organization. (2001). The world health report 2001:  Mental 
health: New understanding, new hope. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
World Health Organization. (2016). International statistical classification of 
diseases and related health problems: Tenth revision (5th ed.). Geneva: 
World Health Organization. 
Wright, D. (2001). Mental disability in Victorian England: The Earlswood asylum 
1847-1901. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wright, D., & Digby, A. (Eds.). (1996). From idiocy to mental deficiency: 
Historical perspectives on people with learning disabilities. London: 
Routledge. 
Xenithidis, K., Russell, A., & Murphy, D. (2001). Management of people with 
challenging behaviour. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7, 109-116. 
Zaman, S. H. & Bouras, N. (2016). Managing mental health problems in people 
with intellectual disabilities. In A. Carr, C. Linehan, G. O’Reily, P. Noonan 
151 
 
Walsh, & J. McEvoy (Eds.). The handbook of intellectual disability and 
clinical psychology practice (pp. 688-730). London: Routledge. 
  
152 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Bibliographical databases and search strings used 
 
The bibliographical databases used for all searches were: 
- Academic Search Complete, CINAHL Plus, Education Research 
Complete, ERIC and PsycINFO.  
 
 
1. Introduction chapter 
 
Search string: 
 
"intellectual* disab*" OR "learning disab*" OR "mental* retard*" OR 
"developmental* disab*" OR "developmental* disorder*" 
 
AND 
 
“mental health” OR "mental* ill*" OR "mental* disorder*" OR "psychiatric* ill*" OR 
"psychiatric disorder*" OR "psychological problem*" OR "psychological* disturb*" 
OR "spsychopathology" 
 
 
2. Analysis and discussion chapter 
 
i) ‘Dual diagnosis’ term 
 
Search string: “dual* diagnos*”  
 
(In order to identify other early papers, additional searches were 
undertaken using:   the BPS Discovery service, Google Scholar and the 
British Medical Journal). 
 
 
ii) Historical co-occurrence of diagnoses 
 
Search string:   
 
mental* retard*" OR "mental* handicap*" OR “mental* impair*” OR “mental* 
defect*” OR “mental* deficienc*” OR “mental* disab*” OR "Mental* 
subnormal*” OR "learning disab*" OR "developmental* disab*" OR 
“developmental* disorder*” OR “developmental* impair*” OR "intellectual* 
disab" OR "intellectual* disord*" OR "intellectual* impair*" OR “intellectual 
development disorder*” OR "idiot*" OR “idiocy” OR “imbecil*” OR "feeble 
minded" OR “oligophren*” 
 
AND 
 
"emotional* disturb*" OR "emotional* disorder*" OR "behavior* disturb*" OR 
"behavior* disorder*" OR "behaviour* disturb*" OR "behaviour* disorder*" OR 
"psychopathology" OR "mental* ill*" OR "mental health" OR "mental* 
disorder*" OR "psychiatr*" OR "schizophreni*" OR "psychosis" OR 
“psychotic” OR “insan*” OR "lunatic" OR "lunacy" OR "hebephreni*" 
[  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Biopsychosocial factors associated with an increased risk of mental 
health problems in people with learning disabilities. 
 
Biological Genetic links (including ‘behavioural phenotypes’ associated 
with particular genetic conditions41, or the heritability of 
particular mental health disorders such as schizophrenia); 
Increased risk of comorbid neurological conditions (such as 
epilepsy), biochemical and structural abnormalities42, medical 
problems (such as abnormal thyroid functioning), physical 
disabilities, and sensory impairments (such as visual or hearing 
loss); Medication side effects associated with polypharmacy; 
Increasing severity of learning disability; Particular demographic 
factors (such as increasing age, female gender, and belonging 
to an ethnic minority). 
Psychological Limited coping strategies due to poorer communication, 
problem-solving and planning skills (van den Hout et al., 2000), 
poor emotional awareness, perceived powerlessness and 
external locus of control, low self-esteem, lack of confidence, 
attachment difficulties (Hollins & Sinason, 2000) and the effects 
of labelling, stigmatisation and trauma (Schuengel, de Schipper, 
Sterkenburg & Kef, 2013). 
Social Increased likelihood of stigma, physical and sexual abuse; 
increased exposure to negative life events such as bullying and 
loss; restricted access to employment, marriage and parenting; 
low income; impoverished support systems; poor quality of life; 
lack of meaningful leisure opportunities (BPS, 2016). 
 
  
                                                          
41 A behavioural phenotype is ‘a characteristic pattern of motor, cognitive, linguistic and social abnormalities which 
is consistently associated with a biological disorder. In some cases, the behavioural phenotype may constitute a 
psychiatric disorder’ (O’Brien & Yule, 1995, p.2). For example, affective psychosis has been associated with Prader-
Willi syndrome (Beardsmore, Dorman, Cooper & Webb, 1998) and social anxiety with Fragile X syndrome (Paschos, 
Bass & Strydom, 2014). 
42 For example, structural abnormalities in the frontal lobe are thought to cause apathy, social withdrawal and 
disinhibition 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Example pages from research journal 
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APPENDIX D 
The dispositif of ‘dual diagnosis’ 
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APPENDIX E 
Chronology extract 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Corpus of statements genealogy was based on 
 
Section of 
Analysis 
Official Legislation, Policy and 
Guidance 
Clinical Literature 
DD in the 
present 
 Mental health problems in people with learning 
disabilities: Prevention, assessment and 
management (NICE, 2016a) 
 Psychotropic drug prescribing for people with 
intellectual disability, mental health problems 
and/or behaviours that challenge: practice 
guidelines (RCP, 2016) 
 Psychological therapies and people who have 
intellectual disabilities (BPS, 2016) 
 ICD-10 (WHO, 2016) 
 Building the right support: a national plan to 
develop community services and close 
inpatient facilities for people with learning 
disabilities and/or autism who display 
behaviour that challenges, including those 
with a mental health condition (ADASS, LGA 
& NHSE, 2015) 
 Guidance for commissioners of mental health 
services for people with learning disabilities 
(JCPMH, 2013)  
 People with learning disability and mental 
health, behavioural or forensic problems: The 
role of in-patient services (RCP, 2013) 
 Enabling people with mild intellectual disability 
and mental health problems to access 
healthcare services (RCP, 2012) 
 Transforming Care: A national response to 
Winterbourne View Hospital (DoH, 2012) 
 Future role of psychiatrists working with 
people with learning disabilities (RCP, 2011) 
 Commissioning clinical psychology services 
for adults with learning disabilities (BPS, 2011) 
 Managing mental health 
problems in people with 
intellectual disabilities (Zaman & 
Bouras, 2016). 
 A systematic review of the 
prevalence of psychiatric 
disorders in adults with 
intellectual disability, 2003-2010 
(Buckles et al., 2013) 
 Review of research for people 
with ID and mental health 
problems: A view from the 
United Kingdom (Hemmings et 
al., 2013) 
 People with intellectual 
disabilities and mental ill-health 
(Dagnan & Lindsay, 2012) 
 Psychotherapy with persons 
with intellectual disabilities: A 
review of effectiveness research 
(Prout & Browning, 2011). 
 Mental health support needs of 
people with a learning difficulty: 
a medical or a social model 
(Williams & Heslop, 2005). 
Emergence  Services for people with learning disabilities 
and challenging behaviour or mental health 
needs (DoH, 2007) 
 Valuing people now: A new three-year 
strategy for learning disabilities (DoH, 2009) 
 Mental Health Act 2007 
 Mental Capacity Act: Code of practice (DCA, 
2007) 
 Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 Meeting the mental health needs of adults with 
a mild learning disability (RCP, 2003) 
 DC-LD: Diagnostic criteria for psychiatric 
disorders for use with adults with learning 
disabilities/ mental retardation (RCP, 2001) 
 Valuing people: A new strategy for learning 
disability for the 21st century (DoH, 2001a) 
 Nothing about us without us: The service 
users advisory group report (DoH, 2001b) 
 Meeting the mental health needs of people 
with learning disability (RCP, 1997) 
 Mental health in mental 
retardation: Recent advances 
and practices (Bouras, 1994) 
 Bridging the gap (Menolascino 
& McCann, 1983) 
 Psychiatric approaches to 
mental retardation 
(Menolascino, 1970) 
 Mental disease among mental 
defectives (Pollock, 1944) 
 The primitive catatonic 
psychosis of idiocy (Earl, 1934) 
 Mental defectives, their history, 
treatment and training (Barr, 
1904) 
 Imbecility with insanity (Hurd, 
1888) 
 On idiocy and imbecility 
(Ireland, 1877) 
 Mental maladies: Treatise on 
insanity (Esquirol, 1845) 
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Section of 
Analysis 
Official Legislation, Policy and 
Guidance 
Clinical Literature 
 Services for people with learning disabilities 
and challenging behaviour or mental health 
needs (DoH, 1993) 
 Mental handicap services: The future (RCP, 
1983) 
 Better services for the mentally handicapped 
(DHSS, 1971) 
 Mental Health Act 1959 
Descent  Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee 
(MDC, 1929) 
 Mental Deficiency Act 1913 
 Report of the Royal Commission on the care 
and control of the feeble-minded (CCCFM, 
1908) 
 Lunacy Act 1890 
 Idiots Act 1886 
 Commissioners in Lunacy (1847) 
 County Asylums Act 1845 
 Report of the Metropolitan Commissioners in 
Lunacy (1844) 
 Second annual report of the poor law 
commissioners (PLCO, 1836) 
 Poor Law Amendment Act 1834 
 Report from His Majesty's commissioners for 
inquiring into the administration and practical 
operation of the poor laws (PLC, 1834) 
 County Asylums Act 1808 
 Vagrancy Act 1714 
 Poor Relief Act 1601 
 Act for Punishment of Sturdy Vagabonds and 
Beggars 1536 
 Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds 
Statute 1531 
 Vagabonds and Beggars Act 1494 
 De Praerogativa Regis 1324 
 The definition and diagnosis of 
mental deficiency. Part I: 
Amentia as distinguished from 
dementia (Burt, 1920) 
 The construction and 
government of lunatic asylums 
and hospitals for the insane 
(Conolly,1847) 
 An essay concerning human 
understanding (Locke, 1690) 
 The New Natura Brevium 
(Fitzherbert, 1534) 
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APPENDIX G 
The National Service Model  
(ADASS, LGA & NHSE, 2015, p. 26) 
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APPENDIX H 
Power-based formulations and tools  
1. Power-mapping (Hagan & Smail, 1997) 
                                                     
To acknowledge the importance of power in context(s), Hagan and Smail (1997) 
developed ‘Power Mapping’, which moves away from individual ‘pathology’ and 
considers supportive and destructive influences (or powers) in a person’s life. The 
authors suggest four quadrants (Home and Family Life, Social Life, Personal 
Resources and Material Resources), which are rated in relation to their 
supportiveness/destructiveness for the individual. The clinical focus, then, becomes 
less about individual change and more about consideration for the extent to which 
the individual can modify negative influence(r)s and develop positive powers within 
their context. Acknowledging power thus allows for a more realistic, contextually 
situated (and therefore more humanistic) view of the individual in distress. 
 
2. The ‘UnRecovery Star’  (Recovery in the Bin, 2015) 
 
The UnRecovery star highlights existing social inequalities that can hinder 
‘recovery’. It can be used as a teaching tool to help people consider wider 
community/society/family problems as factors that may lead to an individual’s 
distress. It can also be used to campaign for greater social equality by identifying 
social and political solutions for social problems. 
